SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY
There are occasions on which even such small contests as those connected with University Chairs rise into almost national importance. This happens when, all the ordinary influences by which such contests are usually determined having become subordinate, the turning-point on which the election has come to hinge, is seen to be a principle which must impede the advancement, if it does not imperil the existence, of science. An occurrence of this kind is an infinitely worse evil than the bestowal of a Chair on an inferior candidate, through the incompetent judgment of the electors, or through the corrupt motives of private friendship or sectarian preference. In the latter case, the interests of philosophy are merely compromised through error or passion; in the former they are struck at upon principle. In the one case the mischief done is but temporary; in the other it threatens to be perpetual. It is on occasions such as this that our educational fabrics are endangered; and it is at such times that contests like the one which has lately terminated, rise into importance, and become objects of public interest and concern. And it is then, too, that every man is entitled to speak his mind, even although he should stand in the somewhat delicate predicament of an unsuccessful competitor.
Such a crisis has been presented to our view in the grounds which the Town Council of Edinburgh have assigned for their recent appointment to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in
