Page:(1856) Scottish Philosophy—The Old and the New.pdf/33

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the old and the new.
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follow? This would follow, that the centre could never think either of its own circumference, without thinking of itself, or of any other circumference without also thinking of some other centre. The thought of a circumference without a centre would be contradictory, or nonsensical thought. But what is there to prevent this individual centre from thinking, without a contradiction, another whole circle (circumference and centre) as totally independent of itself. Nothing in the world. Having got the type once given to it, namely, a centre and a circumference, it can suppose, without the smallest contradiction, that same type repeated ad infinitum. But, in supposing this, it must suppose the whole type repeated, otherwise, in supposing only half of the type (centre without circumference or circumference without centre), a contradiction would inevitably emerge. So in regard to the "me" and the "not-me." Contradiction arises whenever the attempt is made to conceive either of these out of relation to the other. But no contradiction arises when one case of "me-plus-not-me," is conceived out of all relation to another case of "me-plus-not-me."

The difference between centre and circumference illustrates exactly the distinction between "me" and "not me," between subject and object: it is a relation of opposition, but not a relation of independency. The difference between two whole circles illustrates exactly the distinction between one instance of object-plus-subject, and another instance of object-plus-subject: this is a relation of independency, and it can be conceived as such, which the other relation cannot, without a contradiction.

These remarks, coupled with the observation in the Institutes to which reference has been made, obviate entirely Mr Cairns' objection, and prove that the new philosophy cannot, by any sophistry or obtuseness, be twisted into the absurdity with which it stands charged, "of suspending, on the successive thoughts of the individual, the existence of God and the universe."

The fifth result of my system is said to be this:—

"V. That it resolves absolute existence into a mere relation,