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with their support. I will not permit, without challenge, any aspersion, or even insinuation, to be thrown out against the truthfulness and sincerity of these men. Hence it is that I have taken this public opportunity of making these remarks; and I feel justified in having made them. But I have said enough. There are one or two other topics connected with testimonials in general, and with my own in particular, to which I pass on as better worthy of your consideration, and to which your attention may be reasonably requested.
I am humbly of opinion that the value of testimonials is entirely determined by these two circumstances—the position and competency of the granters, and the nature and relevancy of the facts which they certify.
In reference to the first of these considerations, I venture to remind you that in my list of supporters are to be found many names which are great names—names of the highest celebrity in literature and science, and whose authority, in any matter which they attest, no unprejudiced human being would ever dream of calling in question. On this point I fearlessly court comparison with the lists of any of my esteemed rivals for your favour.
The other consideration is one which enters more deeply into the merits of the case. The relevant facts which require to be thoroughly ascertained in a competition of this kind, and to which the Electors are bound to look as essential tests or proofs of competency for such a Chair, seem to be these two, and not more than these two—first, A Candidate's reputation in Authorship on subjects proper to the Chair; and, secondly, His success and soundness in teaching Philosophy. That the appointment of a Candidate not possessing, or not certified to possess, both the one and the other of these qualifications, would be a rash and hazardous experiment, is an assertion which, I presume, will not be disputed; and I respectfully submit, that the preference of the
