Spinoza (Über die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozistischen Pantheizmus, 1868), for the theory of identity is a splendid example of the reduction of all ideas to a single idea. The title of a later treatise (Philosophie als Denken der Welt nach dem Prinzip des kleinsten Kraftmasses, 1876) gives definite expression to the economic theory, and his chief work (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, 1890) consists of an investigation of the physiological and psychological conditions of the origin and the evanescence of problems. In his last essay (Der menschilche Welthegriff, 1891) he seeks to sift out the last vestige of animism, the reading of subjective elements into actual experience, completely.
A problem presupposes a "vital difference" i.e. a state of tension between the individual and the environment. Such a state of tension arises whenever the stimuli proceeding from the objective world demand a greater or smaller expenditure of energy than the individual is capable of furnishing.
Whenever the stimulus (R) and the energy on hand (E) balance each other (so that R = E), we have a vital maximum of preservation: Recognition is possible; the individual feels at home and has confidence in his ideas and perceptions.
But if a greater effort is required than the individual is capable of putting forward (i.e. R > E), the individual discovers contradictions, deviations and exceptions in the given; it appears strange and recognition is impossible. Every extension of the circle of experience, every enlargement of the horizon, is liable to bring with it new problems. The advance of civilization increases the problems.
Conversely, if the energy is greater than the demand (so that R < E), a desire to transcend the given will arise.
