Page:A Brief History of Modern Philosophy.djvu/59

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56
THE GREAT SYSTEMS

yond itself and its own states. If the changes of one being (e.g. the soul) correspond to the changes in another being (e.g. the body), it can only be explained by the fact that their common author forever adapts them to each other—like two clocks which a clockmaker is constantly regulating in successive order (a figure used already by the Cartesian Cordemoy).—The ethical system which Geulincx elaborates on this foundation consistently assumes the character of resignation, and its chief virtue is humility. For, where I am unable to do anything, it is sheer folly that I should desire (ubi nihil vales, nihil velis!).

Malebranche, a member of the Oratory, gives the mystic phase of occasionalism still greater prominence. His philosophic inspiration came from one of Descartes’ books, and it permeated his entire life, which was spent in the cloister. The senses—as appears in his Recherche de la verité (1674ff)—are given us for practical purposes and they are unable to discover the real nature of things. The senses deceive us every time we are misled into ascribing sensible qualities to things themselves. Whence therefore do we get knowledge of things? The understanding is quite as incapable as sensibility to teach us anything about things which exist independently of us. Neither we ourselves nor things can produce knowledge, for no finite being can create anything new. Causation is a divine thing, and it is pagan to ascribe causality to finite beings. Finite beings forever remain simply causes occasionelles. We can neither regard the motions of matter nor the thoughts of men as causes. God could not even give a finite being the power to be a cause, for God cannot create gods. Our knowledge is entirely the work of God; we see everything in Him. It is only through his inter-