Principles. 3. An Appeall to ordinary Reason. 4. That at least Necessary Existence is a Perfection, if bare Existence he not. 5. An Illustration of that last Conclusion.
Chap. V. 1. That there is a vast difference betwixt arguing from forced Figments or fancies, and from the natural Ideas of our own Minds. 2. That the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil does not imply necessary Existence, whether it signifie a Being absolutely Imperfect, 3. Or absolutely Wicked, 4. Or absolutely Miserable, 5. Or absolutely Mischievous. 6. That if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant onely the Infinite power of doing hurt, this is God, whose absolute Goodness prevents the execution thereof. 7. That the right Method of using our Reason is to proceed from what is plain and unsuspected to what is more obscure and suspicable. 8. That according to this Method, being assured first of the Existence of a Being absolutely Perfect from his Idea, we are therewithall inabled to return answer, that Impossibility of Existence belongs to a Being either absolutely Miserable or absolutely Mischievous. 9. That the Phænomena of the World further prove the impossibility of the Existence of a Being absolutely Mischievous. 10. And that the Counsels and Works of God are not to be measured by the vain Opinions of Men.
Chap. VI. 1. That the sense of his Argument from the idea of God in the first posture, is not simply That the Idea is true, and if God were, his Existence were necessary; but, That this Idea being true does exhibite to our Minde an absolute necessary Existence as belonging to Him. 2. That the Idea of the God of the Manichees does not include in it necessary existence. 3 . That to say that necessary Existence included in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect is but conditional, is a Contradiction. 4. The second posture of his Argument made good, and that by virtue of the form thereof the Existence of the Manichean God is not concludible. 5. The invincible Evidence of the third posture of his Argument in the judgement of his Antagonist himself 6. That the force of his Argument in the fourth and last posture is not That we conceive the Idea of Matter without necessary Existence; but that, look as near as we can, we finde no necessary exiftence included therein, as we do in the idea of God. 7. That the Faculties of our Minde, to which he perpetually appeals are to be supposed, not proved to be true.
Chap. VII. 1. That that necessity of Existence that seems to be included in the Idea of Space is but the same that offers it self to our Mind in that more full and perfect Idea of God. 2. That there is the same reason of Eternal Duration, whose immediate subject is God, not Matter. 3 . That Space is but the possibility of Matter, measurable onely as so many several possible Species of things are numerable. 4. That Distance is no Physical affection of any thing, but onely Notional. 5. That Distance of Bodies is but privation of tactual union, measurable by parts, as other Privations of qualities by degrees. 6. That if distant Space after the removal of Matter be any real thing, it is that necessary Being represented by the Idea of God. 7. That Self-Existence and Contingency are terms inconsistent with one another.
Chap. VIII. 1. That the idea of God is a natural and indeleble Notion in the Soul of Man. 2. That if there were some small obscurity in the Notion, it hinders not but that it may be natural. 3. That the Politician's abuse of the notion of God and Religion argues them no more to be his Contrivance, then natural Affection, love of Honour and Liberty are; which he in like manner abuses. 4. A twofold Answer to an Objection touching God's implanting his Idea in us upon counsel or design.
Chap. IX. 1. That the natural frame of Conscience is such, that it suggests such Fears and Hopes that imply that there
