On the 11th, my command was moved to the rear of Hill's line, near Gainses' Mill; and, on the 12th, I received orders to move, with the 2nd Corps, to the Shenandoah Valley, to meet Hunter. This, therefore, closed my connection with the campaign from the Rapidan to James River.
When I moved, on the morning of the 13th., Grant had already put his army in motion to join Butler, on James River, position which he could have reached, from his camps on the north of the Rapidan, by railroad and transports, without the loss of a man. In attempting to force his way by land, had already lost, in killed and wounded, more men than were in General Lee's entire army; and he was compelled to give up, in despair, the attempt to reach Richmond in that way.[1]
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Grant, in describing his movement from Spotsylvania Gum House to Hanover Junction, says: "But the enemy again having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North-Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it." And when he speaks of his final determination to join Butler, he says: "After the Battle of the Wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risk with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or, feebly on the offensive, immediately in front of them, and where, in case, of repulse, he could retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I designed north of Richmond."
Mr. Secretary Stanton, with a keenness of stragetic accumen which is altogether unparalled. says: "Forty-three days of desperate fighting or marching, by day and night, forced back the rebel army from the Rapidan to their intrenehments around Richmond, and carried the Army of the Potomac to the south side of James River. The strength of the enemy's force when the campaign opened, or the extent of his loss, is not known to this Department. Any inequality between Lee's army and the Army of the Potomac, was fully compensated by the advantage of position."
We are left in the dark whether it was the desperate fighting or the desperate marching which did all this; but, however that may be it was a wonderful achievement, especially when it is considered that the Army of the Potomac might, have been carried to the south side of James river by transports, and Lee's army thereby forced back to the intrenchments around Richmond, without the "Forty-three days of desperate lighting or marching by day and by night," and without the loss of men sustained by Grant. There are some who think Stanton is slyly making fun of Grant; but, if he is not, and is in dead earnest, the question naturally arises, in the mind of one not as gifted as the Federal Secretary of War: How happened it that, if Lee was being constantly forced back, for forty-three days, over a distance, of more than eighty miles, he always had the shorter line, and possession of the main roads, and got the advantage of position, and had time to fortify it?
I happen to know that General Lee always had the greatest anxiety to strike at Grant in the open field: and I should like to know when it was that the latter operated on the defensive, or offensive either, except behind, or immediately in front of, far better intrenchment than General Lee's army, with its limited means, was able to make. An inspection of the battle-fields, from the Rapidan to the James, will show that Grant's army did a vast deal more digging than General Lee's.
The truth is, that the one commander was a great captain, and perfect master of his art, while the other had none of the requisites of a great captain, but merely possessed the most ordinary brute courage, and had the control of unlimited number and means. Yet, it is
