essence of the mind itself, which, as followed by others, had formed the most convenient object of demolition to the sceptic, and limited himself to observations on the operations of the mind, as he saw them performed before him. Instead, therefore, of appealing to any theories of his own (which he knew would require to be founded on vague speculation, and independently of observation,) on the essence of the mind, when he tried the truth of his observations, he appealed to what he called "common sense," or that sense, however acquired, which prompts us to believe one thing, and disbelieve another. Hence it might be said, in common language, that, instead of making his inquiries by means of subtle and metaphysical reasonings, he stated his views, trusting that his readers would believe him from their common sense, and, if they did not choose to do so, knowing that the greater part of the world was on his side, despite of any tine-spun objections which might be produced by the sophist The following, perhaps, more than most other passages in his works, bears a marked stamp of his method of reasoning: "Perhaps Des Cartes meant not to assume his own existence in this enthymeme, but the existence of thought, and to infer from that the existence of a mind, or subject of thought. But why did he not prove the existence of his thought? Consciousness, it may be said, vouches that But who is voucher of the consciousness? Can any man prove that his consciousness may not deceive him? No man can: nor can we give a better reason for trusting to it, than that every man, while his mind is sound, is determined, by the constitution of his nature, to give implicit belief to it, and to laugh at, or to pity, the man who doubts its testimony. And is not every man in his wits as determined to take his existence upon trust, as his consciousness?"[1] It is easier to find objections to, than to erect a system of metaphysical philosophy; and that of Reid affords ample room for controversy. Admitting that the only ground on which we can ever place metaphysical truths is, the general belief of men of sound mind, it must still, in every instance, be a very questionable matter, whether these men of sound mind have come to the right conclusion, and whether it may not be possible, by a little more investigation and argument, even though conducted by a sceptical philosopher, to show reasons for coming to a different conclusion, and to establish it upon the very same grounds, viz., the general belief of men of sound mind. When Galileo discovered that nature abhorred a vacuum, and was afterwards obliged to admit that this abhorrence did not extend above thirty-three feet, many men of sound mind probably felt themselves " determined, by the constitution of their nature, to give implicit belief "to both positions, until one discovered the effect of atmospheric pressure, and got men of common sense to admit that nature had no greater horror at a vacuum than at a plenum. It became a necessary consequence of this method of reasoning, that Reid's first, or instinctive principles, were less simple and more numerous than those of other philosophers; and his opponents accused him of having by that means perplexed and complicated the science of mind. In simplifying this science, there are two evils to be avoided; a propensity to refine every thing into first principles, unsupported by reason; and the lesser vice of producing confusion, by not extending .speculation so far towards the establishment of first principles, as there may be good reason for proceeding. It was probably in his anxiety to avoid the former, that Reid incurred not unjust censure for sometimes embracing the latter alternative. The "Principle of Credulity," and the "Principle of Veracity," are certainly objectionable. Reid has had many warm followers, and many who have looked on his philosophy with great contempt. Those who conceive that all systems of mental philosophy are merely useful for the exercise they give the mind,
- ↑ Inquiry, (1819.) 28.
