than a simple impression or a single idea, there is liability
to error, as was observed and exemplified in the case of a
fluid, which, from being bitter and yellow, is at once
assumed to be bile because those are the known qualities
of that fluid. Many of our errors arise, no doubt, in like
manner, from our not sufficiently scrutinising the impres-
sions derived from external objects.
CHAPTER II.
Note 1, p. 135. It is then manifest that perception
&c.] This is a conclusion drawn from the reasoning
of a former chapter, and its purport is to shew that our
senses enable us to judge even of privative conditions, as
darkness and silence; and, further, that, being receptive
of forms without matter, they can retain images, and so,
through the sensorium recall objects after their with-
drawal.
Note 2, p. 136. The action of the object of percep-
tion, &c.] It has been attempted, by some of the
ancient commentators, to annex this to the preceding
argument, and shew that, as sight must first be imbued
with colour, so the hearing must, in order to perceive
sounds, be first sensible of the actions of sonorous bodies.
But the more obvious signification, and which is equally
supported by the text, is, that there must be simultaneous-