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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR OF AIR COMMERCE
WASHINGTON
JUNE 12, 1935
Memorandum to the Secretary:
The report of the Accident Board which includes information and probable causes of the TWA air line accident near Atlanta, Missouri, on May 6, 1935, is attached. Because of the unusual interest and concern over this tragedy, it is felt that certain comments as well as corrective measures should be added.
A. The following comments are pertinent at this time:
- 1. No evidence was produced which indicated that the established Department of Commerce navigation aids or its personnel were not functioning properly in this area.
- 2. It is apparent that even with an approved operating system, such as that of the TWA Company, the judgment and decisions of the ground and air personnel, the so-called personal equation, still remains paramount. In this case, the decisions were in violation of Department regulations for which proper action will be taken. We are also reminded that the problems of unfavorable weather, particularly as it affects the landing of aircraft, as well as those of navigating and communicating by radio, are not yet solved. However, improvements for the increase of safety are continuing rapidly, both by the Department and the air lines.
- 3. Not only was this accident unfortunate because of the failure of various of its component parts, rather than the general structure of the company's operation methods and procedure, but it was also unfortunate that it occurred during the period of transition to the Department's new and revised regulations which require approved company operating manuals, as well as material and numerous additional safeguards and safety devices. However, company personnel initiated or permitted certain irregularities which were inexcusable, were violations of regulations and automatically will be treated as such.
- 4. As to reserve fuel, formerly the Department required transport aircraft to carry 35% flight fuel reserve. This was unsatisfactory since a pilot, when flying against a head wind or in circling storms could actually run out of fuel, experience an emergency landing, or even crash, and yet be complying with Department regulations. Last Fall the Bureau increased this requirement by changing the regulations to read that the pilot must have not only adequate reserve for delays enroute, but must have in the tanks sufficient fuel for 45 minutes of flying after landing at his terminal or at a refueling point. The applicable regulation appears as Section 2 of Chapter 8, Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7-B, Governing Operation of Scheduled Interstate Air Line Services.
"(A) An air line craft shall carry sufficient fuel and oil to fly 45 minutes in addition to the time required for the flight to the next scheduled stop or refueling station.
