BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
HQs, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF TACTICAL SITUATION: On 26 February 1991 3AD was conducting a movement to contact against the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command, specifically the Tawalkana Armored Division, just shy of the northwestern Kuwaiti border. ; 4-7 CAV was conducting a moving screen on 3AD's southern (right) flank. A/4-7 CAV as the lead ground troop; two platoons were arranged in depth clearing the zone between 3AD and the screen line. One platoon was on the screen line proper. The lead platoon, 3/A/4-7 CAV, was using bounding overwatch by section. See enclosure #1.
B. KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY SITUATION AND CERTAINTY OF THAT INFORMATION: Although A/4-7 CAV knew the general location of the Tawalkana Armored Division (to within approximately 10K) prior to crossing the LD, it did not know any enemy dispositions, orientation, or composition. Just prior to making contact, A/4-7 CAV was told that the bulk of the Republican Guards was in full retreat northeast towards Basra and that 3AD was not in pursuit. However, dispositions and movement techniques remained unchanged.
C. DYNAMICS OF INTERACTION: The action was joined when 3/A/4-7 CAV gained visibility and engaged enemy troops at a range of between 300 and 400 meters. The Iraqi infantry initially returned small arms fire. (I think that the enemy infantry, at least, were shooting at A/4-7 CAVs muzzle flashes). Both 2/A/4-7 CAV came on line and engaged troops and BMPs (BMP-1) at ranges of about 300 meters to 800 meters. We engaged with TOW2 and TOW2A, 25mm HEI and AP, 7.62 (COAX) and 155mm (DPICM). The Iraqi forces returned fire with small arms, machine gun (12.7mm and 14.5mm), 73mm (BMP-1), RPGs, ATGM, 125mm sabot (T-72), and indirect fires. A/4-7 CAV was in contact for approximately one hour. See enclosures 2,3 & 4.
E. RANGE OF ENGAGEMENT: See paragraph D.
F. SENSOR INFORMATION-SYSTEM USED: Enemy acquisition was achieved with thermal sights only. The engagement was fought entirely with thermal sights.
