Page:CAB Aviation Accident Report, Mid-Air Collision on 15 December 1959.pdf/8

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adequate profile for visual detection within the distance which separated the aircraft. The Board therefore concludes that there was an adequate opportunity for the jet formation leader to have seen the Beechcraft in time to have led his wingman off collision course, in accordance with the responsibility of an overtaking pilot.

At all times during the 60-second period before collision the jet formation was positioned well to the right rear of the Beechcraft. This position was as much as 129 degrees and was never less than 110 degrees. It is fundamental that a pilot's primary responsibility is to direct his attention to the most critical area, which is the 180-degree quadrant ahead of his aircraft. While this is not intended to mean that a pilot should not search all areas available to him, it does mean that his greatest effort should be in the direction of flight with reliance that an overtaking pilot will similarly fulfill the same responsibility. Accordingly, the Board does not believe that the opportunities afforded Mr. Lewis were sufficiently adequate to have expected him to have seen the jets.

The Board believes that the action by the National Guard unit to require the safety pilot to remain in this role throughout an entire mission is an effective measure. It is believed to be effective in that the requirement will permit greater utilization of both pilots in such flight in the difficult task of looking for other aircraft. The second action taken was to raise the jet altitude minimum prior to initial approach. This was also done by the Air Guard unit. The Board believes that if there is a concentration of traffic in the Cheyenne Airport area between 3,000 and 4,000 feet, action to utilize a higher altitude by the fighters should also be effective in reducing collision exposure.

Probable Cause

The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was that during an overtaking situation the jet formation leader failed to see the Beechcraft in time to lead his wingman off collision course.

BY THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD.

/s/WHITNEY GILLILAND
Chairman

/s/G. JOSEPH MINETTI
Member

/s/ALAN S. BOYD
Member

/s/J. S. BRAGDON
Member


Chan Gurney, Vice Chairman, did not participate in the adoption of this report.