Page:CREST-Allendes Chile Supply Demand Gap.pdf/3

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Approved For Release 2006/04/19 ; CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700040058-3
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  1. This does not necessarily mean that Allende will get his comeuppance in the March 1973 congressional elections. Economists may wring their hands and the foreign press may view with alarm, but the fact remains that many Chileans are better off than before. Furthermore, many people are delighted with the leveling of incomes at the elite's expense. The shortages common in recent months have affected Allende's low-income constituency, but the living standards of the upper and middle classes have been hit much harder. Moreover, people with extra money in their pockets for the first time probably have not yet begun to worry much about the lack of things to buy. In fact, Allende's actions have encountered little effective resistance except when they have threatened to cut deeply into middle-class interests. The month-long strike that nearly paralyzed the economy in October was triggered by independent truckers and small retail merchants, who were later joined by professionals and larger entrepreneurs. Although violence flared intermittently (see the photograph), Allende was supported by the military in his efforts to get the economy moving again. The subsequent entry of the military into key cabinet posts - while opposed by Allende's more radical coalition partners - promises to lessen turmoil in the crucial months ahead.
  2. Violence Chilean Style

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Approved For Release 2006/04/19 ; CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700040058-3
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