CONTRACT
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CONTRACT
object^sphere and attests that all things observed and
searched into have a borrowed existence. This idea
of contingency is then further assured by the witness
of consciousness to the conditioned, and hence contin-
gent, character of its own states, a testimony which is
reconfirmed by the facts of birth and death.
Against this statement of the genesis of the contin- gency-concept it may be objected that experience does not extend beyond the field of sensuous phenomena. On the other hand, however, the intellect, motived by the principle of sufficient reason, discerns the under- lying noimienon, or essence of things material, Kant to the contrary notwithstanding, at least sufiiciently to pronounce with certitude on their essential condi- tionateness and contingency. But it is urged by ma- terialistic monists that the underlying substrate of the sensuous world is one homogeneous, eternal, necessary being, essentially involving existence. To this objec- tion it may be answered that no finite thing, much less a finite material being, can contain the ultimate reason of its existence. The definite limitations, spa- tial, integral, positional, etc., and the inertia of the hypothetical primordial matter shows that it is condi- tioned by some limiting and determining cause, while its passage from the homogeneous to the heterogene- ous state, into which it is supposed to have evolved in the actual universe, equally demands an extraneous active agency. It should, however, be noted that the argument from contingent to necessary being does not explicitly prove the existence of God. A further analysis of the objective concept is necessarily re- quired in order to show that the latter concept in- cludes that of imderivedness (dseitas) and that this in turn includes completeness, absence of any potential- ity for further perfection (actus purus), hence infini- tude. The failure to note this limitation of the argument seems to have led Kant to deny its validity.
Balmes, Fundamental Philosophy (New York, 1864); Dris- COLL. Christian Philosophy — God (New York, 1904); Aveling, The God of Philosophy (St. Louis and London. 1906); Eisler, Wtirterbuch der phil. Begriffe (Berlin, 1904); Blanc, Diction- naire de philosophie (Paris, 1906); Urraburu, Institutiones Phil. (ValladoUd, 1S99).
F. P. Siegfried.
Contract (Lat. contractus; Old Fr. contract; Mod Fr. contrat; Ital. contralto). — I. The Canonical AND MoRALLST DocTRiNE ou this subjcct is a de- velopment of that contained in the Roman civil law. In Roman law a mere agreement between two parties to give, do, or refrain from doing some- thing was a nude pact {pactum nudum) which gave rise to no civil obligation, and no action lay to enforce it. It needed to be clothed in some in- vestitive fact which the law recognized in order to give rise to a civil obligation which should be enforced at law. Not that the nude pact was con- sidered to be destitute of all binding force ; it gave rise to a natural obligation, and it might afford ground for a legal exception. A man of honour would keep his engagements even if he knew that the law could not be invoked to compel him to do so. Moral theology, being the science of Christian conduct, could not be satisfied with the mere legal view of the effect of an agreement. If the agreement had all olher requisites for a valid contract, moral theology must necessarily consider it to be binding, even though it was a nude pact and could not be enforced in the courts of law. Canon law made this moral attitude its own. In the Decretals of Gregory IX it is expressly laid down that pacts, however inide, must be kojit, and that a strenu- ous endeavour must be made to put in execution what one has promised. It thus came to pass that nude pacts could be enforced in the Christian courts, and the Church's legislation served eventually to break down the rigid formalism of Roman law, and to prepare the way for the more eqiiitable law of contract which all Christi:ui nations now possess.
In the canonical and moral doctrine there is hardly
room for the distinction between a nude pact, or mere
agreement, and a contract. The Roman jurist's defi-
nition of the former is freqtiently used by canonists to
define contract. They say that a contract is the con-
sent of two or more persons to the same proposal ; or,
bringing out a little more definitely the effect and
object of a contract, they define it to he an agreement
by which two or more persons mutually bind them-
selves to give, do, or abstain from something. From
the moralist's point of view, then, every agreement
seriously entered into by those who are capable of
contracting with reference to some lawful object is a
contract, whether such agreement can be enforced in
the civil courts or not. The intention of the parties
is looked at, and if they seriously intended to bind
themselves, there is a contractual relation between
them. This doctrine, however, gives rise to a ques-
tion of some importance. The Church fully admits
and defends the right of the State to make laws for the
temporal well-being of its citizens. All States require
certain forni;iliiii> for the validity of certain actions.
Last wills ami ti -t mir nis are a familiar example, and
although they :iTr ii^t strictly contracts, yet the prin-
ciple is the same and they will serve for an example of
what is meant. A deed, the only formal contract
of English law, is another example. A will destitute of
the requisite formalities is null and void at law; but
what is the effect of such a voiding law in the fonun
of conscience? This question has l)een much debated
among moralists. Some have maintained that such
a law is binding in the internal as well as in the ex-
ternal forum, so that a formal contract, destitute of the
formalities required by law, is null and void in con-
science as it is in law. Others adopted the contrary
opinion, and held that the want of formality only
affected the external forum of civil law, and left intact
the natural obligation arising from a contract. The
common opinion takes a middle coiu-se. It holds
that the want of formality, though it makes the con-
tract void in the eyes of the law, renders it only void-
able in the forum of conscience ; so that, imtil one ol
the parties moves to set the contract aside, it remains
valid, and anj'one deriving benefit under it may enjoj
his benefit in peace. If, however, the party interested
moves to set it aside, and does so effectively, by hav-
ing recourse to the court of law if necessarj', both must
then abide by the law which makes the contract void
and of no effect.
There arc four essential elements in a contract: con- sent of the parties, contractual capacity in them, de- terminate and lawful subject-matter, and a lawful consideration. The contract is formed by the mutual consent of the jiarties, which must be real, not feigned, and manifested so that each may know that the othei party consents. There is no diffic\ilty about the out- ward manifestation of con.sent when the parties entei into the contract in each other's presence. But wher the parties are not present to each other, and the con- tract is made by letter or tclegrajih, it sometimes be- comes a question of imjiortance as to when and how the contract is eft'ected. Is the contract entered intc when the offeree signifies his consent by posting a let ter of ac reptLince to llie offeror, or is the knowledge o his acicptanrc nquired to complete the contract AH that is rniuircd by tlie nature of a contract is tha there should be mutually manifested agreement o the two wills. There will be such agreement whei one of the parties makes an offer to the other, and thi one manifests his acceptance of the offer by posting : letter or by sending a telegram. There is then con sent of two wills to "the proposal, and so there is a con tract. Mutual consent to the same propo.sal may b hindereci by a mistake of one of the parties. Sue mistakes are not infrequently caused by the fraud n misrepresentation of the other party. If tlve niistak is substantial, so that at least one of the parties tliiiiK that the subject-matter of the contract is quite otlii
