CORTES
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CORTES
)f his success lay in his marvellously quiclt niove-
nents, for which Narvaez was not prepared, as well
IS ill his nipirl return to the plateau, by which he sur-
3rised tlic Indians who lield Alvarado and his people
it tiioir Miorcy. Tlic desperate defence of the Span-
ards in the absence of fortes would have been un-
ivailing had the latter not moved with such celerity.
.n contrast with that lightning-like quickness, but
jqually well adapted to the necessities of the case,
vas the methodical investment and capture of the
ake settlement, sliowing the fertility of the con-
queror's mind in suiting his tactics to altered condi-
lons.
To these military accomplishments Cortes joined m unusual perspicacity in penetrating tl>c general it nation in aboriginal Mexico. He saw, soon after anding at \'era Cruz, the looseness of the Ijonds by vhicli the Indian tribes were connected, and yet his
- een percept ion remained at fault in that lie did not ap-
)reciate (nor could he. from t he standpoint of t he times, mderstand) Indian tribal organization. The sway he tribes of the table-land and interior lake-basin icld over many of their neighbours appeared to limi judging from European and Asiatic models) as an vidence of a consolidated empire; the offices of uperior rank held by chiefs, as parts of an organized lierarchy or feudal lordships; and the head war- liief a hereditary autocrat. Of the nature of tribal ociety he h.ad not. and could not ha\-e, any idea. Vhilo. therefore, his attempts at winning tribes pagiicd with the Mexican confederacy over to the Ipanish cause were usually successful, he was less ortunate in his relations with the Mexicans them- elves. His seizure of the person of Montezuma, the lead war-chief of the confederates, did not have the
- xpected result. Led by the belief that Monte-
- uma was a supreme ruler, hence the pivot of a state,
)ort& confidently hoped to control the Mexican ribe and its confederates through his captive. The eizure itself appears as an act of singular daring, and fortes and his men were astonished at the ease with vhich it was executed, and the lack of opposition on he part of the Indians; but they did not know that heir prisoner was of so little importance. He was m elected officer, who could be replaced without rouble, and the tribal council, supported by the nedicine men and guided by their oracular utter- mces, were the real lieads of the confederacy. The general outbreak against the Spaniards began after ilontezuma's successor had been installed; until then lostile manifestations were limited to blockading Alvarado.
For th.e sake of policy, Cortes was, in general, far rom cnicl towards the Indians. He allowed Cuauh- emotzin to be tortured in order to force him to ■eveal the whereabouts of his supposed hidden treas- ires. Such acts were not uncommon at that period, ind every nation was at times guilty of them. This
- ruelty was, however, useless, because the greater
lart of the Mexican treasures had already pas.sed into he hands of the Spaniards. The execution of ^uauhtemotzin on the journey to Honduras was mother instance of the misconception by Cortes of [ndian conditions. It is not at all unlikely that the VIexican chieftain was party to a plan to exterminate
- he Spaniards while they were floundering through
- he forests and swamps, but even if this were so, his
jxecution wa.s not necessary. By restraint the same object miglit have been achieved. But Cortfi's iiad an exaggerated conception of the power and influence of t'uauhtemotzin's office, as he had in the
- a.se of Montezuma. To the Indians as a mass he
Kos kind. He recognized that their preservation would insure eventual prosperity for the Spaniards, provided the Indians gradually accepted European ideas. Therefore he regarded the Church as the main instrument for the education of the Indian.
But he was far from sharing in the dreams of Las
Casas. His relations with the clergy were very
cordial, he did all he could to introduce missionaries,
and even L.as Casas mentions him favourably. It
has been intimated that the kind treatment of the
Jlexican natives by Cortes was part of a deeply-laid
plan to use his conquest of Mexico for selfish and
treasonable purposes, for Cortes was not always the
faithful suliject. This leads us to consider his rela-
tions to the Crown of Spain and a few points of his
private character.
The imjiression has prevailed that Cortes was treated liy the Spanish Government with base in- gratitude. It is true that a few years after 1521 an unfavourable change took place in his relations with the Emperor Charles V and his government. The change never led to an absolute break, but it caused a gradual curtailing of his power which Cortes felt very keenly. While lavishly contribut- ing his own means at the outset, Cortes made his conquest avowedly as a Spanish subject, for and in behalf of Spain and its monarch. Mexico be- came a Spanish colony through his uistrumentality, but it was the duty of the Spanish Government; to care for it. Cortes personally was not un- generously rewarded, but he speedily complained of insufficient coniijcnsation to himself and his com- rades. Thinking liimself beyond reach of restraint, he disobeyed many of the orders of the Crown, and, what was more imprudent, said so in a letter to the emperor, dated 1.5 October, 1524 (Ycazbalccta, "Document OS para la Historia de Mexico", Mexico, 1858, I). In this letter Cortfe, besides recalling in a rather abrupt manner that the conquest of Mexico was due to him alone, deliberately acknowledges liis disobedience in terms which could not fail to create a most unfavourable impression. Soon after the capture of the Indian settlement the Crown, as was its prerogative, in 1522 sent to Mexico officers to investigate the condition of affairs, and to report on the conduct of Cortes. To this he could not object, as it was an estalilislied custom. The commissioner, Tapia, charged with the investigation, was so ham- pered, however, by the officers of Cortes that he did not even reach the valley of Mexico, but returned without carrying out his orders. Cortes himself, while keeping at a distance, treated him with the utmost courtesy, but rendered all action on his part impossible. A second commissioner. Luis Ponce de Leon, was sent in 1526 with discretionary and very dangerous powers. He died at Mexico soon after his arrival, in a manner that leaves little doubt of foul play, although Prescott discredits it. But Prcs- cott had not then the documentary material since unearthed. A number of minor charges were brouglit against the conqueror, and they appear to have been substantiated. They could not fail to create grave suspicion, because they presented the picture of a conspiracy, the object of which was to make Cortfe the independent ruler of Mexico. I'nder such cir- cumstances the least that could be expected was the elimination of Corti'-s from the government of the new province. The situ.ation was a very critical one for the Crown. Cortes held the countrj' and its resources, and controlled a body of officers and men who had, in 1520. expressed to the etnperor in writing their ad- miration for their captain, and dwelt in the strongest tenns on the oliligations under which his achieve- ments had placed the mother countrj'. It is tnie, in ca.se of a clash. Spain might have counted upon the svipport of the inhabitants of the Antilles, but the military reputation of Cort/w had become so great that tiie selection of a leader against him would have been very embarni-ssing. Hence a conflict had to be avoided iis long as po.ssible. Cortfe' position was gradually tmdennined, titles and honours were conferred upon liim, but not the administrative
