COSMOLOGY
416
COSMOLOGY
cifically, and are by their very nature extended; (2)
they possess powers or energies both passive and ac-
tive which spring from their substantial nature and
are inseparable from it; (3) they have an inmianent
tendency toward certain special ends to be realized by
the exercise of their native energies. The basic prin-
ciple of this cosmology is that of immanent finahty.
The corporeal world is a masterpiece of order and har-
mony. In spite of ceaseless transformations, every
species of body, simple and composite alike, reappears
again and again with its characteristic properties to
further the well-being of the individual and of the uni-
verse as a whole. Now this constant and harmonious
co-operation of innumerable causes acting imder con-
ditions the most diverse can only be explained, say the
Scholastics, by admitting in the material agents them-
selves fixed and permanent principles of order. The
universe must therefore be composed of specific na-
tures, i. e. of beings which by their constitution and
properties are really adapted to the ends they have to
attain. Substance and its distinctive energies form a
whole which is completely subordinated to its ap-
pointed destiny; so that if serious alterations, such as
chemical combinations, succeed in affecting these
properties and in marring the harmony that ought to
exist between them and their substantial base, the
being so affected must put on a new nature in har-
mony with its new state. There takes place, in other
words, what the Scholastics call a substantial trans-
formation. But this implies that an essential portion
of the original being must persist throughout the
change, and be carried over into the final result, other-
wise transformation would involve the annihilation of
the first being and the production of the second out of
nothing. On the other hand, if we hold that during
the process the being in question does not lose its own
specific difference in exchange for another, it would be
illogical to speak of a transformation, since a change
which preserves the substantial integrity of the being
can never have as its result the production of a new
being All bodies, then, that are subject to such a
change must contain, in spite of their unity, two con-
stituent principles. The one is a specifying or deter-
mining principle whence spring the actuality and dis-
tinguishing marks of the body itself; and it is this
principle which is born and dies at every step in the
deeper transformations of matter. It is called sub-
stantial form. The other, the indeterminate comple-
ment of this, is the substratum which receives the
various essential forms; and it is called first matter.
These are the fundamental ideas in the Scholastic
theory.
As a system it is not at every point the direct anti- thesis of the two other systems outlined above. It is true that, while Mechanism claims that the proper- ties of bodies are nothing but local motion, the Scho- lastics admit the existence of quahties properly so called in all bodies, i. e. accidental determinations, fixed and destined for action. These properties are generated with the new substance; they cling to it indissolubly during its existence and they are its nat- ural manifestation. But, on the other hand, the Scholastics concede to the mechanical theory that local motion plays a large part in the world, that it is the accompaniment and the measure of every exertion of material force. Hence they give Mechanism credit for assigning a quantitative value to the phenomena of nature by measuring the movement proportionate to each; while, on their side, they explain the activity at work in each case by taking into accoimt the qualita- tive elements as well as the kinetic. Again, with the mechanical theory the Scholastic recognizes in every corporeal being an essential principle of passivity, of inertia, divisibility, and extension — in a word, of .all the properties so highly prized by Mechanism; this principle is first motter. But the Scluilastic theory adds a substantial form, i. e. a determining principle
Ooi)
and a root-cause of the activities and peculiar tenden-
cies displayed by each Individual body.
A similar partial agreement exists between Scho- lasticism and Dynamism. In the hylomorphic consti- tution of bodies the dynamic element has a preponder- ating role, represented by the substantial form; bul tk«i since the corporeal being does not appear to be a source iliiii of energy pure and simple, the dynamic element if e joined with first matter, of which passivity and exten- sion are the natural outcome.
A fourth and last system is called Dynamic Atom- ism. The only real difference between it and Mechan- ism lies in the fact that it attributes to bodies forceaj distinct from local motion; but at the same time itj maintains that they are purely mechanical forces.] Matter, it asserts, is homogeneous and the atom in- capable of transformation. This theory, proposed by Martin and Tongiorgi, and upheld nowadays by cer- tain scientists, is a transition between the mechanical and the Scholastic system. Its partisans, in fact, are persuaded that a theory which denies the reality of qualitative energies inherent in matter and reduces them to local motion thereby makes the true explana- tion of natural phenomena impossible and hands over the universe to the whims of chance. Some Dyna- mists, therefore, to meet the obvious requirements of order in the world, seek in substance itself the reasons of its secondary principles of activity. But in this hypothesis it seems rather hard not to admit, as the Scholastics maintain, that diversity of substance is the only explanation of the constancy observed in the accidental differences of things.
The final cause of the material universe. — The last problem that cosmology attempts to solve is that of the final cause. It is intimately bound up with that of the first cause. Materialists like Hackel and BUch- ner, who refuse to see in the universe a plan or a pur- pose, can assign no goal to cosmic evolution. In their opinion, just as the world, during its eternal past, has undergone countless variations in form, so during its eternal future it is destined to ceaseless change. The laws of mechanics, the chance encounter of atoms and molecules, the capricious [ilay of natural forces follow- ing no preconceived aim, will determine the number, nature, and form of the states through which matter is lnjj. to pass. Pantheists and all who identify God with i^|k^ matter share as a rule the same view. For them the ■ ,f | condition of the world is but the fatal result of pur- ij,j^ poseless evolution; so that the world is its own end, ,jjj(,'j or rather is itself the term of its existence and activity. '^^^^^
Those who believe in the existence of a personal God can never admit that an all-wise being created without a purpose. And since a perfect and inde- pendent being can have no other than himself as the final aim of his action, it follows that the ultimate end of creation is to manifest the glorj' of the Creator, man being the intermediary, and, as it were, the high-priest of the material world. The welfare of man himself is the secondary purpose of creation. According to St. Thomas the world is a vast hierarchy of which inor- ganic matter is the base and man the summit. The mineral order ministers to the vegetable and this in turn to the animal, while man finds in all these the satisfaction of his needs and the adornment of his earthly life. Above all he finds in the material uni- verse and in the service it renders him a means of ris- i ing to perfect happiness in the possession of God.
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(Louvain, 10U4):
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