DUEL
186
DUEL
The intrinsic reason why duelling is in itself sinful
and reprehensible is that it is an arbitrary attack on
tiod's right of ownership as regards human hfe.
Only the owner and master of a thing has the right at
pleasure to destroy it or expose it to the danger of de-
struction. But man is not the owner and master of
his life; it belongs, instead, entirely to his Creator.
Now man can only call that his property and treat it
as such which is intended in the first instance for his
benefit, so that he has the right to exclude others from
the use of the same. Man, however, is not created
primarily for himself but for the glory and service of
God. Here below he is to serve his Creator and Lord
as long as the Lord wills and thus attain his own salva-
tion. For this end God has given man hfe, main-
tains it for him, and has bestowed on him the instinct
nf sch'-preservation. But if man is not the master of
hi- lilr, he has not the right to expose it at pleasure to
(listruction or even deliberately to seek such danger.
In order rightfully to expose the life to danger there
must be a justifiable reason, and even then the risking
of life is only permissible, not the end to be sought in
itself. What is said of one's own life applies also to
the life of one's fellow-man. Every man has the right
in case of necessity forciljly to defend himself against
an unlawful attack on his life, even if it cost the life of
the assailant; this is a requirement of public safety;
but apart from such defence no man has the right as a
private iadividual to injure the life of his fellow-man
or at pleasure to expose his own to similar danger.
Hence it is easy to perceive that a duellist unjustifi-
ably exposes both his own life and that of his fellow-man,
consequently is guilty of a wrongful assumption of the
right of God, the Lord of life and death. To make
this clear it is only necessary to examine the pretexts
used to palliate duelling, or, what is the same, to look
into the aims sought to be attained by this custom.
One of the principal reasons given in justification of
duelling is the obtaining of satisfaction. A man is in-
sulted or injured in reputation, and in order to obtain
satisfaction challenges the defamer. But besides the
offence against civil law in seeking to establish one's
rights with weapons, thus evading the authority of the
State, a duel is totally unsuited to the attainment of
satisfaction and in addition is wrongful. Satisfaction
consists in the offender withdrawing his insult and
treating the offended person with respect and honour.
This end cannot, however, be attained by duelling.
When the one who has given the provocation accepts
the challenge he does not thereby withdraw the insult;
he intends, rather, to maintain it by weapons and
shows himself, moreover, ready to add other and
greater wrongdoing to the first, inasmuch as he may
severely wound or even kill the challenger. Moreover,
who would allow to the man whom he wishes to compel
to make good a wrongthe same chance of victory as to
himself, i. e. who would give the offender the oppor-
tunity to add to the wrong he has already done an
even more heinous injury? Yet this is what the chal-
lenger does in granting his adversary the same weapons
and the same chance for success as he claims for him-
self.
Another reason offered in justification of duelling is self-defence. The duellist desires to avoid the loss of the respect of his peers and thus to retain his office and his income, or, as is said, to defend his honour and his social position. It is unfortunately only too true that to-day the conscientious opponent of duelhng, especi- ally in the army, must often suffer great losses. Nevertheless duelling cannot be justified as self-de- fence. Honour and the respect of others carmot be preserved by the use of arms, nor in a duel is there any actual vindication of these. The duel implies that the honour of the challenger has already Ix'cn injured, and consequently that this injury is an accomplished fact; besides, the duel takes place according to agreement, so that it is not a case of self-defence against sud-
den attack. But the word selj-defence is used in a
broader sense. According to the prejudices existing
in certain circles, the person who does not answer an
insult by a challenge or who dechnes a challenge is
held to be dishonourable and cowardly; thus it may be
that a man's entire social position is at stake. Yet,
from its very nature, a duel is an unsuitable and illicit
method of preserving or rehabilitating honour. Look
at a duel first from the point of view of the person
injured. He must, it is said, send a challenge because
he has been insulted. Two cases, however, are here
possible. Either his moral character and good name
have been attacked, or the specific charge of cowardice
has been made against him. If the former be the case,
the duel is manifestly unsuited to defend the injured
man's honour. A duel can never prove that the per-
son attacked is a man of honour, is not a simpleton,
has not committed adultery, or the like. A man with-
out character or morals can be just as skilful in hand-
ling weapons as his honourable opponent. If the
quarrel hinges on the charge of cowardice, a duel is
apparently a proper means of disproving the same.
But in this instance the challenger directlj' endangers
his life in order to prove that he is no coward. Con-
sequently he cannot say that he only suffers his life to
be endangered, he deliberately seeks this danger in
order to show his courage. And, according to our
former statements, this is to dispose of one's life un-
lawfully. It cannot be said in reply that the injured
person merely intends the rehabilitation of his honour.
That is certainlj^ the final aim of the duel, but the first
and direct aim is to prove one's courage by fighting
the duel. Is it permissible, however, to risk one's own
hfe and that of one's fellow-man merely as a means of
proving one's courage? If this be correct, it would
be equally allowable to enter a lion's cage, sword in
hand, if public opinion demanded such proof of per-
sonal bravery. Hence it follows that the duel is not
in reality a proper means to demonstrate one's courage,
for true courage is a moral virtue which is not bUud
and foolhardy, but exposes itself to danger only if
reason demand it. What has been said of the injured
party is applicable also to the party giving the provo-
cation, the one who is challenged. If he has acted un-
justly he should as a man of honour offer reparation;
that is his duty, and the refusal to perform this duty
plainly gives him no right to fight a duel with his
opponent. If he is not in the wrong he ought to refuse
the challenge. The only ground for which a chal-
lenge might be accepted would be fear of the accusa-
tion of cowardice; that this reason is, however, not
tenable has already been shown. It surely is the basest
cowardice to do, through fear of being accused of
want of courage, what sober reflection would lead any
man of sense to condemn as immoral and wrong.
The conclusion necessarily to be drawn from the above is: whoever is killed in a duel is indirectly guilty of self-murder, because he has for no justifiable reason risked his life, and whoever slaj^s his adversary in a duel is guilty of unjustifiable homicide, because he has taken the risk of causing death without any right to do so; this holds true even though he did not directly intend liis opponent's death. The above ap- plies not only to duels undertaken by private indi- viduals of their own free will, but also to duels fought on account of personal grievances by ortler of State authorities. Those in authority have not the right to dispose at their pleasure of the life of the subject. Should a dispute be laid before them, they should ex- amine the matter judicially and punish the guilty party. If the guilt cannot be proved the accused should be acquitted; in such a case the authorities have no right to command a duel and thus expose the inno- cent to the same peril as the guilty. This has all xhe more force, as duels often take place on account of WTongs which are not to-day punished with death by civil law.
