GOD
612
GOD
science brings out the attribute of holiness in the
First Cause and self-existent Personal Being with
whom we must ultimately identify the Designer and
the Lawgiver.
(iv) The confirmatory argument based on the con- sent of mankind may be stated briefly as follows: mankind, as a whole, has at all times and everywhere believed, and continues to believe, in the existence of some superior being or beings on whom the material world and man himself are dependent, and this fact cannot be accounted for except by admitting that this belief is true, or at least contains a germ of truth. It is admitted of course that Polytheism, Dualism, Pan- theism, and other forms of error and superstition have mingled with and disfigured this universal belief of mankind, but this does not destroy the force of the argument we are considering. For at least the ger- minal truth, which consists in the recognition of some kind of deity, is common to every form of religion, and can, therefore, claim in its support the universal consent of mankind. And how can this consent be explained except as a result of the perception by the minds of men of the evidence for the existence of deity? It is too large a subject to be entered upon here — the discussion of the various theories that have been advanced to account in some other way for the origin and universality of religion ; but it may safely be said that, abstracting from revelation, which need not be discussed at this stage, no other theory will stand the test of criticism. And, assuming that this is the best explanation philosophy has to offer, it may further be maintained that this consent of mankind tells ultimately in favour of Theism. For it is clear from history that religion is liable to degenerate, and has in many instances degenerated instead of pro- gressing; and, even if it be impossible to prove con- clusively that Monotheism was the primitive historical religion, there is, nevertheless, a good deal of positive evidence adducible in support of this contention. And, if this be the true reading of history, it is per- missible to interpret the universality of religion as witnessing implicitly to the original truth, which, however much obscured it may have become in many cases, could never be entirely obliterated. But, even if the history of religion is to read as a record of pro- gressive development, one ought in all fairness, in accordance with a well-recognized principle, to seek its true meaning and significance not at the lowest but at the highest point of development; and it cannot be denied that Theism, in the strict sense, is the ultimate form which religion naturally tends to assume.
If there havebeen, and are to-day, atheistic philoso- phers who oppose the common belief of mankind, these are comparatively few and their dissent only serves to emphasize more strongly the consent of normal humanity. Their existence is an abnormality to be accounted for as such things usually are. Could it be claimed on their behalf, iiulividually or collec- tively, that in ability, education, character, or life they excel the infinitely larger number of cultured men who adhere on conviction to what the race at large has believed, then indeed it might be admitted that their opposition would be somewhat formidable. But no such claim can be made; on the contrary, if a comparison were called for, it would be easy to make out an overwhelming case for the other side. Or again, if it were true that the progress of knowledge had brought to light any new and serious difficulties against religion, there would, especially in view of the modern vogue of Agnosticism, be some reason for alarm as to the soimdness of the traditional belief. But so far is this from being the case that in the words of Professor Huxley — an luisuspcctcd witness "not a .solitary problem presents itself 1^) the pliilosopliical Theist at the present day which has not existed from the time that philosophers began to think out the logical grounds and the logical consequences of The-
ism" ("Life and Letters of Ch. Darwin", by F. Dar-
win, II, p. 203). Substantially the same arguments
as are used to-day were employed by old-time scep-
tical Atheists in the effort to overthrow man's belief
in the existence of the Divine, and the fact that this
belief has withstood repeated assaults during so many
ages in the past is the best guarantee of its perma-
nency in the future. It is too firmly implanted in the
depths of man's soul for little surface storms to
uproot it.
(b) A Priori or Ontological Argument. — This argu- ment undertakes to deduce the existence of God from the idea of Him as the Infinite which is present to the human mind ; but, as already stated, theistic philoso- phers are not agreed as to the logical validity of this deduction. As stated by St. Anselm the argument runs thus: The idea of God as the Infinite means the greatest Being that can be thought of; but unless actual existence outside the mind is included in this idea God would not be the greatest conceivable Being, since a Being that exists both in the mind as an object of thought and outside the mind or objectively would be greater than a Being that exists in the mind only; therefore God exists not only in the mind but outside of it. Descartes states the argument in a slightly different way as follows: Whatever is contained in a clear and distinct idea of a thing must be predicated of that thing; but a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely perfect Being contains the notion of actual existence ; therefore, since we have the idea of an ab- .solutely perfect Being, such a Being must really exist. To mention a third form of statement, Leibniz would put the .argument thus: God is at least possible since the concept of Ilim as the Infinite implies no contra- diction ; but if He is possible He must exist, because the concept of Him involves existence. In St. An- selm's own day this argument was objected to by Gaimilo, who maintained, as a reductio ad absurdum, that were it valid one could prove by means of it the actual existence somewhere of an ideal island far surpassing in riches and delights the fabled Isles of the Blessed. But this criticism, however smart it may seem, is clearly unsound, for it overlooks the fact that the argument is not intended to apply to finite ideals, but only to the strictly infinite; and if it is admitted that we possess a true idea of the infinite, and that this idea is not self-contradictory, it does not seem possible to find any flaw in the argument. Actual existence is certainly included in any true concept of the Infinite, and the person who admits that he has a concept of an Infinite Being cannot deny that he conceives it as actually existmg. But the difficulty is with regard to this preliminary admission, which if challenged, as it is in fact challenged by Agnostics, requires to be justi- fied by recurring to the a posteriori argument, i. e. to the inference by way of causality from contingency to self-existence, and thence by way of deduction to infinity. Hence the great majority of scholastic philosophers have rejected the ontological argument as propoimded by St. Anselm and Descartes, nor as put forward by Leibniz does it escape the difficulty that has been stated.
B. Nature and Fundamcntid Attributes of God. — Having established by iniluctive inference the self-existence of a personal First Cause, distinct from matter and from the Innnan mind, we now proceed by deductive analysis to examine the nature and attri- butes of this Being to the extent required by our limited philosophical scope. We will treat accordingly of (1) the infinity, (2) unity or unicity, and (3) sim- plicity of God, adding (4) some remarks on Divine personality.
(1) Infinity of God. — (a) When we say that God is infinite we mean that He is unlimited in every kind of perfection, or that every conceivable perfection be- longs to Him in the highest conceivable way. In a different sense we sometimes speak, for instance, of
