LYnia
469
LYnm
work is not vague. It is certain that he was a learned
and industrious poet who wrote much verse on varied
subject-matter. His poetry, however, though inter-
esting from other points of view than the poetical,
never rises much above mediocrity. A blight seemed
at that period to have fallen upon poetry in England,
though m Scotland the Chaucerian tradition was fol-
low^ still with dignity and force. The writings of
Lydffate are very numerous. Ritson, in his "Biblio-
graphica Poetica", numbers 251 poems, some of them
of enormous length, such as the Troy Book of 30,000
lines. It is fairly certain, too, that much of what he
wrote has been lost. A eood deal of his existing work
is still in MS. He is said to have written one piece of
prose — an account of Csesar's wars and death. Most
modern critics agree as to the general mediocrity of his
work, but Lydgate has not wanted admirers in the
past such as Chatterton, who imitated him, and Gray,
who was impressed by the carefulness of his phrase-
ology and the smootnness of his verse. Among his
poetical compositions may be mentioned: —
" Falls or Princes," " Troy Book ", " Story of Thebes", narrative poems; "The Life of Our Lady" and "The Dance of Death", devotionalpoems; "The Temple of Glass", and imitations of Cnauccr. The well-Kiiown poem of " London Lackpenny ", which has been for long reckoned as Lydgate's, is now almost certainlv proved not to be by him.
Lee in^J^tc*. Nat. Biog. 0. v. (London, 1909); Schick., Prefitee to the Temple ofGlaea in Eaxiy English Text Soc. Series (Lon- don, 19 — ); Mac^'katken. The Lydgate Canon m Philolooieal Soe. Traneaeliona (Ix>ndon, 1908); Saintsbury in Cambridge Hid, Eng. LU., voL II, art. I^ydgate (Cambridse. 1908.)
K. M7 Warren.
Lying, as defined by St. Thomas Aquinas, is a statement at variance with the mind. This definition is more accurate than most others which are current. Thus a recent authority defines a lie as a false state- ment made with the intention of deceiving. But it is possible to lie without making a false statement and without any intention of decei\'in^. For if a man makes a statement which he thinks is false, but which in reality is true he certainly lies inasmuch as he in« tends to say what is false, and although a well-known liar may have no intention of deceiving others — for he knows that no one believes a word he says — yet if he speaks at variance with his mind he does not cease to He. FoUowing St. Augustine and St. Thomas, CathoUc divines and ethical writers commonlv make a distinction between (1) injurious, or hurtful, (2) officious, and (3) jocose lies. Jocose lies are told for the purpose of affording amusement. Of course what is said merely and obviously in joke cannot be a lie: in order to have any malice in it, what is said must be naturaUy capable of deceiving others and must be said with the intention of saying what is false. An offi- cious, or w^hite, lie is such that it does nobody any in- jury: it is a lie of excuse, or a lie told to benefit somebody. An in j urious lie is one which does harm.
It has always been admitted that the (juestion of lying creates great difficulties for the morabst. From the dawn of ethical speculation there have been two different opinions on the question as to whether lying is ever permissible Aristotle, in his *' Ethics ", seems to hold that it is never allowable to tell a lie, while Plato, in his '* Republic *\ is more accommodating; he allows doctors and statesmen to lie occasionally for the good of their patients and for the common weaL Modern philosophers are divided in the same way. Kant allowed a lie under no circumstance. Paulw^ and most modern non-Catholic writers admit the law- fulness of the lie of necessity. Lideed the pragmatic tendency of the day, which denies that there is such a thing as absolute truth, and measures the mondity of actions by their effect on society and on the individual, would seem to open wide the gates to all but injurious Ues. But even on the ground of pragmatism it is well
for us to bear in mind that white lies are apt to prepare
the way for others of a darker hue. Tnere is some
difference of opinion among the Fathers of the Chris-
tian Church. Oripen quotes Plato and approves of
his doctrine on this point (Stromata, VI). He says
that a man who is under the necessity of lying should
diligentlv consider the matter so as not to exceed.
He shoufd gulp the lie as a sick man does his medicine.
He should be guided by the example of Judith, Esther,
and Jacob. If he exceed, he will oe judged the enemy
of Him who said, " I am the Truth ". St. John Chry-
sostom held that it is lawful to deceive others for their
benefit, and Cassian taught that we may sometimes lie
as we take medicine, driven to it by sheer necessity.
St. Augustine, however, took the opposite side, and wrote two short treatises to prove that it is never law- ful to tell a lie. His doctrine on this point has been generally followed in the Western Church, and it has been defended as the common opinion by the School- men, and by modern divines. It rests in the first pku^ on Holy Scripture. In places almost innumer- able Holy Scripture seems to condemn lying as abso- lutely and unreservedly as it condemns murder and fornication. Innocent III gives expression in one of his decretals to this interpretation, when he says that Holy Scripture forbids us to lie even to save a man's life. If, then, we allow the lie of necessity, there seems to be no reason from the theological point of view for not allowing occasional murder and fornica- tion when these crimes would procure great temporal advantage; the absolute character of the moral law will be undermined, it will be reduced to a matter of mere expediency. The chief argument from reason which St. Thomas and other theologians have used to
Erove their doctrine is drawn from the nature of truth, lying is opposed to the virtue of truth or veracity. Truth consists in a correspondence between the thing signified and the signification of it. Man has the power as a reasonable and social being of manifesting nis thoughts to his fellow-men. Right order demands that in doing this he should be truthful. If the ex- ternal manifestation is at variance with the inward thought, the result is a want of right order, a mon- strosity in nature, a machine which is out of gear, whose parts do not work together liarmoniously. As we are dealing with something which belongs to the moral order and with virtue, the want of right order, which is of the essence of a lie, has a special moral turpi- tude of its own. There is precisely the same malice in hypocrisy, and in this vice we see the moral turpitude more dearly. A hsrpocrite pretends to have a good quality which he knows that he does not possess. There is the same want of correspondence between the mind and the external expression of it that constitutes the essence of a lie. The turpitude and malice of hy- pocrisy are obvious to everyoody. If it is more diffi- cult to realise the malice of a lie, the partial reason, at least, may be because we are more familiar with it* Truth is primarily a self-regarding virtue: it is some- thing which man owes to his own rational nature, and no one who has any regard for his own dignity and self-respect will be guilty of the turpitude of a he. As the hypocrite is justly detested and despised, so should the liar be. As no honest man would consent to play the hypocrite, so no honest man will ever be guilty of a he.
The absolute malice of l^ing is also shown from the evil consequences which it has for society. These are evident enough in lies which injuriously affect the rights and reputations of others. But mutual confi- dence, intercourse, and friendship, which are of suoh great importance lor society, suner much even from officious and jocose lying. In this, as in other monl questions, in order to see clearly the moral quality of an action we must consider what the effect would be if the action in question were regarded as perfectly ri^t and were commonly practised. Applying tibi& iMdw^
