BKABRIAOE
714
BIAR&IAOC
est grounds are adduced for the opinion which, in
regard to marriage contracted by unbelievers, claims
sacramentallty and the sacramental grace after bap-
tism for the party who, subsequently to the marriage,
is baptized. These grounds are mostly negative; for
example, there is no reason why an unbaptizcd person
should not administer a sacrament, as is clcarlv done
in the case in baptism; or wHy the sacramental efifect
should not take place in one party which cannot take
place in the other, as in the case oi a marriage between
baptized persons where one party is in the state of
grace ana the other is not, so that the sacrament of
marriage confers grace on the former, but not on the
latter. Besides, it is not fitting that the baptized per-
son should be altogether deprived of grace. As ajgamst
this view, there seems to be a weighty reason in the
fact that such a marriage contracted in infidelity is
still dissoluble, even after years of continuation, either
through the Pauline Privilege or through the plenary
authority of the Holy See. And yet it has always
been a principle with theologians that a matrtviontum
ratum et consummaium (i. e. a marriage that bears the
sacramental character and is afterwards consum-
mated) is by Divine Law absolutely indissoluble, so
that not even the Holy See can on any groimds what-
soever dissolve it. Hence, it seems to follow that the
marriage in question is not a sacrament.
This argument reversed, together with the reason of fitness mentioned above, tells in favour of the sacra- mentality of a marriage contracted with ecclesiastical dispensation between a baptized and an unbaptized person. Such a marriage, once it is consummated, is absolutely indissoluble, just as a consummated maiv riage between two baptized persons; under no circum- stances may recourse be had to the Pauline Privilege, nor will any other dissolution be granted by Rome (for documents see Lehmkuhl, "Theol. mor. , II, 928). A further reason is that the Church claims jurisdiction over such mixed marriages, institutes diriment imped- iments to them, and grants dispensations. This authority regarding marriages Pius VI bases on their sacramentality; hence it seems that the marriage in question should be included among marriages that are sacraments. The words of Pius Vl in his letter to the Bishop of Mutila are as follows: "If, therefore, these matters (he is speaking of marriage) belong exclusi\'ely to the ecclesiastical forum for no other reason than that the marriage contract is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the Law of the Gospel, then, since this sacramental character is inherent in all marriage-matters, they must all be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church."
However, these arguments likewise fail to carry conviction. In the first place, many deny that the mixed marriages in question pertain exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Church, but claim a certain right for the State as well; only in case of conflict the Cliurch has the preference; the exclusive right of the Church is confined to marriages between two baptized persons. The Church also possesses some authority, no doubt, over all marriages contracted in infidelity, as soon as one party receives baptism, but this does not prove the sacramentality, after the conversion of one party, of a marriage contracted by infidels. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether matters affecting the nature of Christian marriage are subject to ecclesiastical author- ity for the sole reason that Christian marriage was raised to the dignity of a sacrament, or for the more general reason that it is a holy and religious thing. In the document cited above Pius VI gives no decision on the point. In case the latter reason is of itself suffi- cient, then the conclusion is all the more secure if, as Pius VI says, 'Hhe raising to the dignity of a sacra- ment" is taken as a reason. In fact the elevation of marriage to a sacrament can well serve as a ground for ecclesiastical authority, even in regard to a marriage which is only an inchoate sacrament.
As positive proof against the sacramentality of the
mixecT marriages with which we are dealing, the advo-
cates of the third opinion emphasize the, nature of
marriage as a contract. Marriage is an indivisible
contract which cannot be one thing for one party and
another thing for the other party. If it cannot be a
sacrament for one, then it cannot be a sacrament for
the other. The contract in facto ease is not really an
entity that exists in the parties, but rather a relation
between, them, and indecil a relation of the same sort
on both sides. Now, this cannot be a sacrament in
fadto esse, if in one of the parties the basis of the rela-
tion has no sacramental character. But, if the con-
tract in /ado esse be no sacrament, then the actual
contractmg of marriape cannot be a sacrament in fieri.
Were the opposite opinion correct, the contract would
be rather lame, i. e. firmer in the believing party than
in the unbaptized ^ since the greater constancy of Chris-
tian marriage arises precisely from its character as
a sacrament. But such an uneven condition seems
opposed to the nature of marria^. Should it be urged
on the contrary that as a result in extraordinary cases
these mixed marriages might be dissolved just as in
the case of those contracted by two unbaptized per-
sons, this inference is to be rejected. Apart from the
question whether the inner constancy does not of itself
exclude such a dissolution, it is quite certain that,
externally, the most complete indissolubility is secured
for such mixed marriages, or, in other words, that the
Church, which by its approval has made them possible,
also makes them by its laws indissoluble. A dissolu-
tion in \'irtue of the Pauline Privilege is thus not cer-
tainly available, since it might be utilized in odium
fidei, instead of in favorem fidei. In any case, as to
the application of this privilege, the Church is the au-
thoritative interpreter and judge. These arguments,
though not perhaps decisive, may serve to recommend
the third opinion as the most probable and best
founded.
There still remains the one question, on which also Catholic theologians are still to some extent divided, as to whether and at what moment marriages legiti- mately contracted between the unbaptized become a sacrament on the subsequent baptism of the two parties. That they never become a sacrament was taught in his day by Vasquez, and also by the canon- ists Weistner and Schmalzgriiber. This view may to-day l>e regarded as abandoned, and cannot lie reconciled with the official decisions since given by the Holy See. The discussion must, therefore, be confined to the question, whether through the baptism alone (i. e. at the moment when the baptism of the later baptized of the two partners is completed) the mar- riage becomes a sacrament, or whether for this purpose the renewal of their mutual consent is necessary. Bellarmine, La3^mann, and other theologians defended the latter view; the former, which was already main- tained by Sanchez, is to-day generally accepted, and is followed by Sape, Rasset, Billot, Pesch, Wema etc. This opinion is base<l on the ecclesiastical teaching which declares that among the baptized there can be no true marriage which is not also a sacrament. Now, immediately after the baptism of both partners, the already contracted marriage, which is not dissolved by baptism, becomes a "marriage of the baptized"; for were it not immediately a "sacrament"^he above- mentioned general principle, which Pius iX and Leo XIII proclaimed as incontestable doctrine, would be untrue. Consequently we must say that, through the baptism itself, the existing marriage passes mto a sacrament. A difficulty may arise only in the detfei^ mination as to where in such a case the matter and form of the sacrament are to be sought, and what act of the minister completes the sacrament. This prob- lem, it would seem, is most readily solved by falling back on the virtually continuing mutual consent of the parties, which has been already formally given. This
