turned a full report on the following week. The work on the several forts was increased through the energies of Captain Foster and Major Robert Anderson. Major Anderson, under instructions from Secretary Floyd, reported the improved condition of the forts, made further suggestions as to the best means of making any attack from Charleston futile, and said significantly, " There is not so much feverish excitement as there was last week, but that there is a settled determination to leave the Union and to obtain possession of this work (Fort Moultrie) is apparent to all. . . I do, therefore, most earnestly entreat that a reinforcement be immediately sent to this garrison, and that at least two companies be sent at the same time to Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney half a company under a judicious commander sufficing, I think, for the latter work. I feel the full responsibility of making the above suggestions, because I firmly believe that as soon as the people of South Carolina learn that I have demanded reinforcements and that they have been ordered, they will occupy Castle Pinckney and attack this fort. It is, therefore, of vital importance that the troops embarked, say in war steamers, shall be designated for other duty. " (Records, I, 75.)
Thus early the administration was brought to consider the question of reinforcement as an act of war. Maj. Anderson advised the reinforcement secretly by the strategy of designating in public orders the expedition for other duty, but in reality to relieve and strengthen the forts in Charleston Harbor. Captain Foster advised that " in case the department does not consider it expedient to send troops there should be a corps of employes armed to be effective as soldiers in an emergency. The administration adopted Foster s suggestion at once and took that of Maj. Anderson into the consideration which its gravity demanded. (Records, I, 77.)
It thus appears that during two months before the withdrawal of South Carolina, the administration, through
