to the Constitution. Lord Lyons wrote his own opinion "that the present moment is not a favorable one for making an offer of mediation. It might embarrass the peace party." "It would," he says, "in all probability be rejected by the President, who appears to have thrown himself into the arms of an extreme radical party." The views of that party, thus mentioned by the British minister, were clear and defined. "They declared that there was no hope of reconciliation with the Southern people, that the war must be pressed per fas et nefas until the disloyal men of the South shall be ruined and subjugated, if not exterminated; that not an inch of the old territory must be given up, and that foreign intervention in any shape must be rejected and resented." Commenting on the war policy, his Lordship remarks, "the political interests of the party now in power render the continuance of the war a necessity for it. Its only chance of regaining its lost popularity lies in successful military operations. Unless it can obtain a much higher place in public estimation than it now occupics, not only will its tenure of power become extremely precarious, but some of its leading members may be called to a severe account for their extra-legal proceedings."
The French secretary for foreign affairs sent a note on the part of his government to the French minister at Washington in January, 1863, restating the desire of France to proffer its offices in restoring peace and regretting the little success which its overtures had gained at Washington. On receiving the note M. Mercier, the French minister, made a special visit to Mr. Seward, to present the dispatch, the reply to which was made in the United States secretary's letter to Mr. Dayton, minister at Paris. Mr. Seward answered the French suggestion that commissioners be appointed by the two peoples at war to meet on neutral ground and adjust their difficulties, by saying that however benevolent the desire of France, the suggestions which it has proposed " amount
