AFTER GETTYSBURG AND VICKSBURG.
During the day following Lee's last attack at Gettysburg his army remained in line twenty-four hours, within easy reach of Meade without being assailed. It was afterward stated in testimony before the committee of the United States Congress "on the conduct of the war," that in a council of Meade with his corps generals the propriety of the withdrawal from Gettysburg of the Federal army was earnestly discussed. To what extent any such withdrawal was considered at any time is not known, but it is clear that Meade 's army had been seriously shattered and was not in a condition which made an immediate advance advisable. The Gettysburg battle was indeed very nearly a Confederate victory. Prompt pursuit of the flying foe on the first day would have made triumph easy. Resolute attack on the morning of the second day by all divisions must have given the field to the Confederates. The fortunes of battle were uncertain on the third day, after all the Federal forces were on intrenched elevations which they were to hold by superior numbers of infantry and artillery. It was still possible by concerted heroic movement to have captured the intrenchments; and this possibility is suggested by the fact that wherever the Confederate attack was heroic and concerted the Federal lines were broken, but where concerted action and due support were lacking the movement failed. So nearly was Meade beaten that he was forced to let the recoiled line of Lee lie undisturbed while its great commander arranged the withdrawal of his army into Virginia. The issue at Gettysburg between a Confederate army of 62,000 and a Federal army (fighting on its own soil) of 105,000, reached this stage of doubt after three days of battle, with loss of Confederates 19,000 and of Federals 20,000.
On the day when Lee and Meade were thus contemplating their respective situations, the central strategic position in the West—Vicksburg and the Mississippi
