and effectually preventing his taking any part in the battle of that day. While Jackson was thundering at Franklin with his artillery, and Franklin was preventing his passage of White Oak, McClellan was posting the divisions of Hooker, McCall, Sedgwick, Kearny and Slocum in line of battle across the Long Bridge road, confronting the expected advance of Lee down the Charles City and Darbytown roads.
The troops of Lee that had won the bloody battle of the 27th, north of the Chickahominy, did not cross that river in pursuit of McClellan until the morning of the 29th, at which time General Lee became assured that his able antagonist was retreating upon the James. His orders, as in the case of the first assault on the 26th, were faultless. Jackson was to cross at Grapevine bridge and press the rear of the retreat; Magruder was to attack the flank on the Williamsburg road; Huger to move down the Charles City road, and Longstreet and A. P. Hill down the Darbytown to the Long Bridge road; and Holmes to cross from the south side of the James and march down the New Market road. A glance at a good map will show that this plan was perfect in its conception. But McClellan was fully equal to this great emergency, and put White Oak swamp on his right, guarded by Franklin, and his five divisions in his center to meet the advance upon him down the Charles City and Darbytown roads, and selected a veritable Gibraltar for his left, crowned by artillery and defended by a fleet of gunboats and Porter’s and Keyes’ corps.
In carrying out Lee’s plan, everything miscarried but the movements of Longstreet and A. P. Hill. We have seen how Kershaw and Semmes and Kemper alone carried out Magruder’s flank attack on the Williamsburg road. On the 30th he was ordered to the Darbytown road and reached it in time to come into effective battle on Longstreet’s right, but Holmes, moving on Malvern hill, saw that he had not force sufficient to attack, sent for aid,
