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appeared only to open the way for the Legislative Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory to define it if, and as, it chose to do so. That was what Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 (Re Wakim) made clear could not be done. Accordingly, s 9(3) did not confer jurisdiction pursuant to s 77(i). The respondent submitted that Spinks v Prentice (1999) 198 CLR 511 and Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553 (GPAO) were distinguishable as in those cases there was another law made under s 122. In any event, the respondent submitted, the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) was intended to facilitate hearing by the Federal Court of a matter transferred to it and it was not intended to create a whole new source of original jurisdiction. The respondent placed reliance on paragraph (b) of the preamble to that Act. It was submitted that the cross-vesting scheme was not directed to enabling a plaintiff simply to commence proceedings in any court he chose.
20 The applicants, by their revised submissions, contended relevantly that the Federal Court had jurisdiction by the combined operation of s 4(2) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1993 (ACT) and s 9(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth). The applicants submitted that Re Wakim (above) had no application to the Australian Capital Territory and referred to GPAO (above). The applicants submitted that, contrary to the respondent's submission, the jurisdiction of the Federal Court could be "defined" by reference to the laws of the Australian Capital Territory. The applicants also submitted that the effect of the cross-vesting legislation was to confer additional jurisdiction on courts otherwise lacking that jurisdiction.
21 The Attorneys-General of the Australian Capital Territory and of the Northern Territory, intervening under s 78A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), filed a joint written outline of submissions. They submitted that the Federal Court may exercise jurisdiction in this matter by operation of s 9(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) which conferred the jurisdiction described in s 4(1) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1993 (ACT). They relied on GPAO (above) at [87]–[91], [128]–[132], [171] and [254]–[255]; Re Wakim (above) at [25] and [29]; and Spinks v Prentice (above) at [82] and [175] for the proposition that ss 76(ii) and 77(i) permitted the conferral of original and appellate jurisdiction on the Federal Court in respect of matters arising under a Commonwealth Act made pursuant to s 122 of the Constitution. They also submitted, in reliance on Re Wakim (above) at [105], that there was no objection to the conferral of such jurisdiction that is
