Refuses to think strategically unless compelled to do so for defence, 35; Must fail unless it reckons with both geographical and economic Reality, 36.
III.—The Unity of the Ocean, the first geographical Reality, 38; The consequences not yet fully accepted, 40; Therefore necessary to take a historical view, 41; Contending river-powers in Egypt, 43; The Nile 'closed' by land-power, 44; Contending sea-powers in the Mediterranean, 44; The Mediterranean 'closed' by land-power, 54; The Latin Peninsula as a sea-base, 55; The encompassing of the World-Promontory by sea-power from the Latin peninsular base, 67; Division within the Latin European Peninsula, 69; Hence the opportunity for sea-power from the lesser but insular sea-base of Britain, 70; Of sea-bases in general, 76; Of sea-power in the Great War, 77; The World-Island, 81; The ultimate base of sea-power, 91/
IV.—The World-Island seen from within, 93; The Heartland physically defined, 96; The other Natural Regions, 98; The Arabian Centreland, 112; The mobile riders and the plough-men, 118; The Arab bid for World Empire, 119; The Steppes-belt, 122; The Tartar invasions and their consequences, 125; The Tibetan Heights and the N.W. entries to China and India, 129; The open access from the Heartland to Arabia and to Europe, 134; The Heartland strategically defined, 135; The Black Sea basin included, 136; The Baltic basin included, 140; The Heartland as real a physical fact as the World-Island, 143; The ultimate citadel of land-power, 143.
V.—The Cossack advance over the Heartland, 147; The Russian Homeland, sharply delimited, 148; The real Europe, 153; Divided into East and West Europe, 154; History of the relations of East and West Europe, 155; Their fundamental opposition, 160; Their essential difference, 161; German and Slav in East Europe, 162; Trafalgar seemed to split the stream of history into two for a century, 170; Britain and the Not-Europe, 171; But East Europe is really within the Heartland, and there were no two streams, 176; British and French policy agreed in the Nineteenth Century, 177; The Great War caused by German attempt to control East Europe and the Heartland, 178; The Economic Reality of organised man-power—the Going Concern, 179; Political Economy and National Economy, 180; The great Economic change of 1878, 181; The German policy was to stimulate growth of man-power and then use it
