MITHRTDATES. his escape. He fled to Comana, where he was again aUIe to assemble a body of 2000 horse, but he despaired of opposing the farther progress of Lucullus, and accordingly sent his faithful eunuch Bacchides to put to death his wives and sisters whom he had left at Pharnacia, while he himself took refuge in the dominions of his son-in- law Tigranes. It appears that these events took place before the close of the year b. c. 72. (Plut. LuculL 14 — 18 ; Appian, Mithr. 78 — 82 ; Mem- non, 43, 44 ; concerning the chronology see Lu- cullus, Vol. II. p. 834, note.) Tigranes was at this moment the most powerful monarch of Asia [Tigranes] ; but though he had previously promised assistance to Mithridates, he appears to have been unwilling to engage openly in war with Rome ; and on this account, while he re- ceived the fugitive monarch in a friendly manner, and assigned him all that was requisite for main- taining his royal dignity, he refused to admit him to his presence, and showed no disposition to attempt his restoration. But the arrogance of the Romans brought about a change in his policy ; and Tigranes, offended at the haughty conduct of Appius Claudius, whom Lucullus had sent to demand the surrender of Mithridates, not only refused this request, but determined at once to prepare for war with the Romans. Community of interests now led to a complete reconciliation between the two monarchs ; and Mithridates, who had spent a year and eight months in the dominions of his son-in- law without being admitted to a personal interview, was now made to participate in all the councils of Tigranes, and appointed to levy an army to unite in the war. But it was in vain that in the ensuing campaign (b. c. 69) he urged upon his son-in-law the lessons of his own experience, and advised him to shun a regular action with Lucullus : Tigranes, confident in the multitude of his forces, gave battle at Tigranocerta and was defeated, before Mithri- dates had been able to join him. But this disaster, so precisely in accordance with the warnings of Mithridates, served to raise the latter so high in the estimation of Tigranes, that from this time for- ward the whole conduct of the war was entrusted to the direction of the king of Pontus. During the ensuing winter both monarchs were busily engaged in raising a fresh army, into which Mithridates endeavoured to introduce some dis- cipline, as well as to arm a large body of them after the Roman fashion. They at the same time endeavoured to procure the important assistance of the Parthian king, to whom Mithridates addressed a letter, urging him to consult his true interest by espousing their cause before it was too late, and not to wait until the Romans attacked him in his turn. Whether the epistle to this effect preserved among the fragments of Sallust really bears any resemblance to that composed by the king of Pontus we have unfortunately no means of deter- mining. (Plut. LuculL 19, 21-23, 25—30 ; Ap- pian, Mithr. 84—87 ; Memnon, 46, bb— 58; Dion Cass. Fr. 178, xxxv. 1 — 3 ; Liv. Epit. xcviii.; Oros. vi. 3 ; Eutrop. vi. 8, 9 ; Plpist. Mithr. ad Arsacem, up. Sail. Hist. iv. p. 238, ed. Gerlach.) But the Parthian king still wavered, and in the following summer (b. c. 68), Lucullus crossed the Taurus, penetrated into the heart of Armenia, and again defeated the allied monarchs near the city of Artaxata. But the early severity of the season. Bud the discontent of his own troops, checked the MITHRIDATES. HOI farther advance of the Roman general, who turned aside into Mesopotamia. Here Mithridates left him to lay siege to the fortress of Nisibis, which was supposed impregnable, while he himself took advantage of his absence to invade Pontus, at the head of a large army, and endeavour to regain pos- session of his former dominions. The defence of Pontus was confided to Fabius, one of the lieute- nants of Lucullus ; but the oppressions of the Ro- mans had excited a general spirit of disaffection, and the people crowded around the standard of Mithridates. Even the Thracian mercenaries in the army of Fabius turned against their general, who was totally defeated by Mithridates, and com- pelled to shut himself up in the fortress of Cabeira. Triarius, another of the Roman generals, now ad- vanced to his support with a fresh armj', and the king retreated before this new adversary, and withdrew to Comana, where he took up his winter- quarters. But the following spring (b. c. 67) hos- tilities were resumed on both sides ; and Triarius, who was anxious to engage Mithridates before Lucullus himself should arrive, allowed himself to be attacked at disadvantage, and was totally de- feated. The destruction of the Roman army would have been complete had not the king himself been wounded in the pursuit, which was in consequence checked for a time ; but even thus the blow was one of the severest which the Roman arms had sus- tained for a long period : 7000 of their troops fell, among which was an unprecedented number of officers ; and their camp itself was taken. (Dion Cass. xxxv. 4 — 6, 8 — 13; Appian, AfjVAr. 87 — 89 ; Plut. Lmull 31, 32, 35 j Cic. pro Leg. Manil. 9.) The advance of Lucullus himself from Mesopo- tamia prevented Mithridates from following up his advantage, and he withdrew into Lesser Armenia, where he took up a strong position near Talaura, to await the approach of Tigranes. He doubtless expected that the Roman general would quickly resume the offensive ; but the farther proceedings of Lucullus were paralysed by the mutinous and disaffected spirit of his own soldiers ; and on the arrival of Tigranes the two monarchs found them- selves able to overrun almost the whole of Pontus and Cappadocia without opposition. Before the close of the year 67 Mithridates s<iw himself once more in possession of the greater part of his here- ditary dominions. (Plut. LuculL 35 ; Appian, Mithr. 90 ; Dion Cass. xxxv. 14, 1 7 ; Cic. pro Leg. Mmiil. 3.) But early in the following year (66) the conduct of the war was entrusted by the Romans to the general whose fame was at this moment eclipsing all others — the illustrious Pompey, and one of the first measures of the new commander was to secure the friendship and alliance of the Parthian king Phraates III,, a step by which he not only de- prived Mithridates of all hopes of the co-operation of that monarch, but precluded him from the sup- port of Tigranes also, by compelling the Armenian king to look to the defence of his own dominions against the Parthian. Thus thrown back upon his own resources, Mithridates made overtures for peace ; but Pompey would listen to no terms ex- cept those of unqualified submission and the sur- render of all Roman deserters, and these conditions the king of Pontus rejected with scorn. He still found himself at the head of an army of 30,000 foot and 2000 horse, with which, however, he did
