PLATO. any evidence (comp. Hermann, i. pp. 544, r44, note 755), the verbal lectures of Plato certainly did contain an extension and partial alteration of the doctrines discussed in the dialogues, with an ap- proach to the number-theory of the Pythagoreans ; for to this we should probably refer the "unwritten assumptions" (aypa<pa Soyfiara), and perliaps also the divisions (diaipecreis), which Aristotle mentions (Pk7/s. iv. 2, ib. Simpl. f. 127, de General, et Cor- rupt, ii. 3 ; ib. Joh. Philop. f. 50 ; Diog. Laert. iii. 80). His lectures on the doctrine of the good, Aristotle, Hemcleides Ponticus, and Hestiaeus, had noted down, and from the notes of Aristotle some valuable fragments have come down to us (Arist. de Aidma, i. 2 ; ib. Simpl. et Joh. Philop. ; Aristox. Harmonica, ii. p. 30 ; comp. Brandis, de Perditis Aristotelis Lihris, p. 3, &c. ; and Trende- lenburg, l^lat07iis de Ideis et Numeris Dodrina). The Aristotelic monography on ideas was also at least in part drawn from lectures of Plato, or con- versations with him. (Aristot. Metaph. i. 9. p. 990, b. 11, &c, ; ib. Alex. Aphrod. in Schol. in Arist. p. 5G4, b. 14, &c.; Brandis, /. c. p. 14, &c.) III. The Philosophy of Plato. The attempt to combine poetry and philosophy (the two fundamental tendencies of the Greek mind), gives to the Platonic dialogues a charm, which irresistibly attracts us, though we may have but a deficient comprehension of their subject- matter. Even the greatest of the Grecian poets are censured by Plato, not without some degree of passion and partiality, for their want of clear ideas, and of true insight (de Rep. iii. p. 387, a., ii. p. 377, X. pp. 597, c, 605, a., G08, a., v. p. 476, b., 479, 472, d., vi. p. 507, a., de Leg. iv. p. 719, c, Gorg. p. 501, b.). Art is to be regarded as the capacity of creating a wliole that is inspired by an invisible order {Phileh. pp. 64, 67, Phaedr. p. 264, d.) ; its aim, to guide the human soid {Phaedr. pp. 261, a, 277, c. 278, a., de Rep. x. p. 605, c). The living, unconsciously-creative impulse of the poet, when purified by science, should, on its part, bring this to a full development. Carrying the Socratic dialogue to greater perfection, Plato endeavours to draw his hearers, by means of a dramatic intuition, into the circle of the investigation ; to bring them, by the spur of irony, to a consciousness either of know- ledge or of ignorance ; by means of myths, partly to waken up the spirit of scientific inquiry, partly to express hopes and anticipations which science is not yet able to confirm. (See Alb. Jahn, Disser- tatio Platonica qua turn de Causa et Naiura Mytho- ruiii Platonicorum disputuiur, turn Mythus deAmoris Ortu Sorte et Indole eccplicatur. Beniae, 1839.) Plato, like Socrates, was penetrated with the idea that wisdom is the attribute of the Godhead, tliat philosophy, springing from the impulse to know, is the necessity of the intellectual man, and tne greatest of the goods in which he participates {Phaedr. p. 278, d.. Lysis, p. 218, a., Apolog. p. 23, Theaet. p. 155, d., Sympos. p. 204, a., Tivi. p. 47, a.). When once we strive after Wisdom with the in- tensity of a lover, she becomes the true consecra- tion and purification of the soul {Phaedr. p. 60, e., Symp. p. 21 8, b.), adapted to lead us from the night- like to the true day {deRep.y'n. p.521,d. vi. p. 485, b.). An approach to wisdom, however, presupposes an original communion with Being, truly so called ; and this communion again presupposes the divine nature or imraortJility of the soul, and the impulse PLATO. 399 to become like the Eternal. This impulse is the love which generates in Truth, and the develop- ment of it is termed Dialectics. Tiie hints re- specting the constitution of the soul, as independent of the body ; respecting its higher and lower na- ture ; respecting the mode of apprehension of the former, and its objects, the eternal and the self- existent ; respecting its corporisation, and its longing by purification to raise itself again to its higher existence : these hints, clothed in the form of mythus {Phaedr. p. 245, c), are followed up in the Phaedrus by panegyrics on the love of beauty, and discussions on dialectics (pp. 251 — 255), here understood more immediately as the art of discoursing (pp.265, d. 266, b. 269, c. ). Out of the philosophical impulse which is developed by Dialectics not only correct knowledge, but also correct action springs forth. Socrates' doctrine re- specting the unity of virtue, and that it consists in true, vigorous, and practical knowledge ; that this knowledge, however, lying beyond sensuous per- ception and experience, is rooted in self-conscious- ness and has perfect happiness (as the inward har- mony of the soul) for its inevitable consequence : — this doctrine is intended to be set forth in a pre- liminary manner in the Protagoras and the smaller dialogues attached to it. They are designed, there- fore, to introduce a foundation for ethics, by the refutation of the common views that were enter- tained of morals and of virtue. For although not even the words ethics and physics occur in Plato (to say nothing of any independent delineation of the one or the other of these sciences), and even dia- lectics are not treated of as a distinct and separate province, yet he must rightly be regarded as the originator of the threefold division of philosophy (Aristocles, ap. Euseb. Praep. Ev. xi. 33 ; comp. Aristot. Top. i. 14, Anal. Post. i. 33), inasmuch as he had before him the decided object to develop the Socratic method into a scientific system of dia- lectics, that should supply the grounds of our knowledge as Avell as of our moral action (physics and ethics), and therefore separates the general investigations on knowledge and understanding, at least relative!}', from those which refer to physics and ethics. Accordingly, the Theaetetus, Sophistes,Parmenides, and Cratylus, are principally dialectical ; the Protagoras, Gorgias, Politicus, Plii- lebus, and the Politics, principally ethical ; while the Timaeus is exclusively physical. Plato's dia- lectics and ethics, however, have been more success- ful than his physics. The question, " What is knowledge," had been brought forward more and more definitely, in pro- portion as the development of philosoph}' generally advanced. Each of the three main branches of the ancient philosophy, when at their culminating point, had made a trial at the solution of that question, and considered themselves bound to penetrate beneath the phenomenal surface of the affections and per- ceptions. Hcracleitus, for example, in order to gain a sufficient ground for the common {^vv6v), or, as we should say, for the universally admitted, though in contradiction to his fundamental prin- ciple of an eternal generation, postulates a world- consciousness ; Parmenides believed that he had discovered knowledge in the identity of simple, unchangeable Being, and thought ; Philolaus, and with him the flower of the Pythagoreans generally, in the consciousness we have of the unchangeable relations of number and measure. Wlien, however.
