other points in Cape Colony. But the whole of the British force could not reach South Africa before December, so that the Boers had the advantage of the initiative.
They declared war on 11 Oct., and invaded Natal with 23,000 men. When Buller arrived at Cape Town at the end of the month, he learnt that Sir George White not only had been unable to drive them back but was shut up in Ladysmith. The situation was of the gravest, and Buller decided to sacrifice the organisation of his army corps, to send most of the regiments on to Natal as the transports came in, and to go there himself. He hoped to return to Cape Colony and resume his plan of advance, after relieving Ladysmith; and in the meanwhile Lord Methuen was to relieve Kimberley, which was also invested, and Generals French and Gatacre [q. v. Suppl. II] were to cover Cape Colony. His decision was much criticised, but in the circumstances he 'had absolutely no alternative but to attempt to relieve both garrisons simultaneously' (Henderson, Science of War, p. 368).
On 15 December, having assembled 18,000 men, he moved on Colenso, and made a frontal attack on the Boer position behind the Tugela. There were only 6000 Boers, but they were well hidden, and their fire was so heavy that the attack was not pressed. It cost the British 1100 men and 10 guns. Three days before, Buller had reported that a direct assault on this position would be too costly, and that he meant to turn it by a flank march westward. News of the checks met with by General Gatacre at Stormberg and Lord Methuen at Magersfontein led him to change his mind; he did not like to expose his communications to an enemy elated by success.
In the battle of Colenso he was himself under fire, and was hit by a shrapnel bullet, while he was trying to save the guns. In the evening he reported that he was not strong enough to relieve White, adding 'My view is that I ought to let Ladysmith go, and occupy good positions for the defence of South Natal.' Next day he sent a cipher message to White, asking how long he could hold out, and suggesting that he should make the best terms he could. The reply of the Government was, that the abandonment of White's force would be a national disaster of the greatest magnitude. They urged him to devise another attempt to relieve it, and promised reinforcements. They also decided to send out Lord Roberts as commander-in -chief in South Africa, leaving Buller to devote himself exclusively to the operations in Natal.
Lord Roberts arrived at Cape Town on 10 Jan. 1900. Buller, having been joined by a fresh division under Sir Charles Warren, had just begun an attempt to reach Ladysmith by a wide sweep westward. But the Boers had ample time to shift their ground, and the attempt ended in failure at Spion Kop on 24 January. Warren was in immediate command of the principal force engaged, but Buller was often present, and exercised some control. There was divided responsibility, and Warren's report, forwarded with Buller's comments and those of Lord Roberts, led to much subsequent recrimination. Buller was invited to write a fresh despatch better suited for publication, but this he flatly refused to do. The papers were at first published with large omissions, but ultimately in full (Cd. 968, 17 April 1902).
A third attempt to penetrate the Boer positions, by way of Vaal Krantz, had no better success; but in the middle of February the British began to get possession of the Hlangwane heights, east of Colenso, and after a fortnight of obstinate fighting they entered Ladysmith on 28 February. It was the day after the surrender of Cronje at Paardeberg, and Lord Roberts's progress in the Free State had drawn away some of the Boers from Natal. The relief of Ladysmith had taken nearly three months, and cost 5000 men.
Buller's leadership was severely criticised at the time and afterwards. He showed instability of view and purpose. His care for his men, which was incessant, made him shrink from staking heavily for success. 'The men are splendid,' he reported during the fight at Spion Kop; and they remained staunch to him in spite of failures, recognising the extreme difficulty of his task, and regarding disparagement of him as a slur on themselves.
Two months were spent in recuperation and re-equipment. In April a division was sent to join the main army, leaving three divisions in Natal. In May, after much discussion with Lord Roberts as to his line of advance, Buller moved on the Biggarsberg; and skilfully turning the Boer positions, which were not strongly held, he entered Dundee on 15 May. At the end of the month he opened negotiations with Christian Botha, who was in command of the Boers at Laing's Nek, but they came to nothing. Instead of a direct attack on the Nek, Buller turned it by way of
