bauchery (Rebellion, x. 169). He imputes entirely to Goring's negligence the escape of Essex's cavalry when the foot were obliged to surrender. The notice of their escape and the order to pursue ‘came to Goring,’ according to Clarendon, ‘when he was in one of his jovial exercises … and he continued his delights till all the enemy's horse were passed through his quarters, nor did he then pursue them in any time’ (viii. 116). Though the charge has been generally accepted, it hardly deserves the credit it has obtained. No contemporary authority mentions Goring's drunkenness on this occasion, it is not proved that Goring was negligent in the pursuit of the parliamentary horse, and it is certain that they did not pass through his quarters. Goring gives a brief account of the pursuit in a letter to Prince Rupert (Sussex Archæological Collections, xxiii. 323). During the remainder of the campaign of 1644 his chief exploits were the beating up of Waller's quarters at Andover on 18 Oct., and a very gallant and successful charge at the second battle of Newbury (Walker, Historical Discourses, pp. 106, 112; Diary of Richard Symonds, p. 141). On 6 Nov. 1644 Prince Rupert was appointed commander-in-chief, and though Goring professed the greatest affection for Rupert (Warburton, Prince Rupert, iii. 16), he began from that moment to intrigue for an independent command. He owed his present post mainly to Digby, with whom he had now contracted a fast friendship, ‘either of them believing he could deceive the other and so with equal passion embracing that engagement’ (Clarendon, Rebellion, viii. 95, 180). The results of these intrigues were in the highest degree disastrous to the king's cause. In December 1644 Goring was sent into Hampshire ‘upon a design of his own of making an incursion into Sussex, where he pretended he had correspondence, and that very many well-affected persons promised to rise and declare for the king, and that Kent would do the same’ (ib. ix. 7). A commission was at the same time granted to him as lieutenant-general of Hampshire, Sussex, Surrey, and Kent (21 Dec. 1644, Black, Oxford Docquets, p. 244). In pursuance of this design he advanced as far as Farnham, attacked Christchurch, and was repulsed, and then took up his winter quarters at Salisbury. He laid the blame of his ill-success on the defects of his army and the disobedience of his officers, and used these pretexts to obtain greater independence and larger powers (Warburton, iii. 46, 52). In February he was ordered into Dorsetshire to assist in the capture of Weymouth, but negligently allowed it to be recaptured by the parliamentarians. In the same way he failed to prevent the relief of Taunton, though he succeeded in inflicting a number of trifling defeats on Waller. Some attributed these miscarriages to a fixed plan to make the presence of his forces in the west indispensable (Clarendon, ix. 21). In March Prince Charles arrived at Bristol to take command of the west, and disputes at once began between Goring and his councillors. It was speedily discovered that Goring aimed at ousting Hopton from his command, and becoming himself lieutenant-general of the western army (ib. ix. 20). The history of the disputes between Goring and the prince's council, disputes which paralysed the western army throughout 1645, is told in detail by Clarendon in the ninth book of his ‘History of the Rebellion.’ This portion of his narrative was written in 1646, and is founded throughout on authentic documents. At the end of April Goring was summoned to Oxford with all his cavalry in order to cover the junction of Rupert and the king. Some of the king's advisers wished to strengthen the field army by retaining Goring's division, a course which might possibly have altered the fate of the campaign. Rupert, however, ‘was jealous of having a rival in the command, and feared Goring, who had the master wit, and had by his late actions gotten much reputation’ (Walker, p. 126). Accordingly he was sent back to the west with authority which, thanks to Lord Digby, was greatly increased. Commissions were to run in his name, he was to have a seat in the prince's council, and the council was to have the power of advising, but not of ordering him (Clarendon, Rebellion, ix. 31). On 14 May he was further authorised to command in chief all the forces in the west (ib. 43). Hardly, however, had Goring returned to the blockade of Taunton when he was summoned either to join the king or to raise the siege of Oxford (Cal. Clarendon Papers, i. 266). Goring promised to come as soon as he had reduced Taunton, and begged the king to avoid an engagement till he was able to join him, but his letter was intercepted by Fairfax (Bulstrode, Memoirs, p. 125; Rushworth, vi. 49). After Naseby Fairfax marched west, and Goring was obliged to raise the siege of Taunton, and give battle at Langport in Somersetshire, where he was defeated with the loss of a large part of his infantry (10 July 1645). He then retired into North Devonshire, where he remained completely idle, making no attempt to reorganise his troops, and permitting Fairfax to capture fortress after fortress without opposition. His time was spent partly in ‘jollity’ and debauchery,
