against the Northern Confederation, the armed neutrality of the Baltic; and the fleet, having its rendezvous in the first instance at Yarmouth, sailed on 12 March, and on the 24th anchored outside Elsinore. Nelson was strongly in favour of at once sending a strong detachment through the Belt and up the Baltic to seize or destroy the Russian squadron at Revel, while the remainder of the fleet held in check or—if thought necessary—reduced the Danes at Copenhagen; and on 24 March he wrote to the commander-in-chief, urging the advantage of such a course. The northern league, he said, was like a tree, ‘of which Paul was the trunk, and Sweden and Denmark the branches;’ if the trunk was cut down the branches followed as a matter of course, but the branches might be lopped off without any injury to the trunk. ‘Nelson's suggestion,’ writes Captain Mahan, ‘worthy of Napoleon himself, would, if adopted, have brought down the Baltic confederacy with a crash that would have resounded through Europe’ (Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution, ii. 46); but Parker was unable to grasp the novel and daring strategy proposed to him. He refused to leave a strong enemy in his rear, even though held in check by a sufficient force, and determined that the first blow must be struck against Copenhagen; and Nelson, seeing that the only way to get to the Gulf of Finland was by first shattering the Danish force, readily accepted Parker's proposal that he should command the attack with a detachment of the smaller ships of the fleet, which, by their draught of water, were better suited to the shallow and intricate navigation. He shifted his flag to the Elephant, then commanded by Captain Foley, and during the last days of March carefully examined the approaches of the town and the formidable defences prepared by the Danes, who had placed a line of heavily armed hulks to support the batteries.
On 1 April Nelson took his squadron past Copenhagen to the eastern entrance of the King's Channel, and the following forenoon made the signal to weigh. The plan of the attack had been carefully drawn out the night before, the position of each ship being prescribed, with a certain amount of latitude for unforeseen casualties. Unluckily some of the ships struck on the Middle Ground, and were virtually out of the action; but the others closed up, so that no gap was left. The action began about 10 a.m. The fire of the Danes was exceedingly heavy and well sustained, and after three hours showed no evident signs of abating. It was then that Parker hoisted the signal to ‘discontinue the action.’ Nelson did not obey the signal. Clapping his telescope to his blind eye, he declared that he could not see it, and his conduct has often been adduced as an instance of glorious fearlessness. It does not detract from the real merit of Nelson, who never sought to avoid responsibility, to learn that the performance was merely a jest, and that the commander-in-chief had sent a private message that the signal should be considered optional—to be obeyed or not at the discretion of Nelson, who might be supposed to have a better knowledge of the circumstances than he could possibly have at a distance (Ralfe, Nav. Biog. iv. 12; Recollections of the Life of the Rev. A. J. Scott, p. 70). Nelson's judgment proved correct. About 2 P.M. many of the Danish ships were silenced, but it was difficult to take possession of them under the fire of the batteries and the other ships, so that they continually received reinforcements of men from the shore, and renewed the action. It was thus rendered impossible to spare even the beaten ships, and the carnage was very great. The Dannebrog, the flagship, had nearly every man killed or wounded; she caught fire, broke from her moorings, spread terror and confusion along the Danish line, and, drifting away to leeward, finally blew up. About half-past two Nelson, anxious to put an end to the slaughter, which seemed useless, sent a flag of truce on shore, with a note to the crown prince, to the effect that if the firing was continued he would be obliged to set on fire the floating batteries he had taken, without having the power of saving their crews. The flag of truce brought on a cessation of firing while a reference was made to Parker, some four miles off; this was followed by a suspension of hostilities for twenty-four hours, which was extended for some few days, and ended in an armistice for fourteen weeks. That this happy result was due to the flag of truce seemed certain; but Nelson had no doubt that the same result would have been arrived at had the battle been fought out as long as any of the Danes were able to resist, the only difference being that the loss of men on both sides would have been considerably and needlessly increased. There were, however, some who asserted that the position of the English fleet at half-past two was very critical; that though the Danish floating batteries were silenced or suffered severely; that with the wind as it was they could not get out without passing under the guns of the Three Crowns battery, which, in their captured, the English ships had disabled state, they were in no condition to engage; and that Nelson's flag of truce, with the letter and the affected hu-
