battle was adopted by the king in preference to that of the general, the Earl of Lindsey, to the great discontent of the latter (Clarendon, vi. 78). Rupert took command of the right wing of the king's horse, entrusting the left to his lieutenant-general, Wilmot. He completely routed the parliamentary cavalry opposed to him and four regiments of their foot, but followed the chase so far that Essex was enabled to crush the king's foot before the royalist horse returned. Wilmot was equally successful, but committed the same error as his commander. Yet while Rupert's inability to keep his men in hand, or to bring them to a second charge after their return to the field, was disastrous in its consequences, the success of the royal cavalry was mainly due to an innovation which the prince introduced into their tactics. He taught them to charge home, instead of halting to fire their pistols and carbines. ‘Just before we began our march,’ writes one of his soldiers, ‘Prince Rupert passed from one wing to the other, giving positive orders to the horse to march as close as was possible, keeping their ranks with sword in hand, to receive the enemy's shot, without firing either carbine or pistol till we broke in amongst the enemy, and then to make use of our firearms as need should require’ (Memoirs of Sir Richard Bulstrode, p. 81). After the battle Essex retreated to Warwick, and Rupert proposed to march to London with the king's cavalry, and dissolve the parliament; but the scheme, which had little prospect of success, was frustrated by the opposition of the king's councillors (Warburton, ii. 37). The king established himself at Oxford, while Rupert's cavalry took up their quarters at Abingdon and captured Reading. In November the king advanced on London, and the parliament opened negotiations for peace. On 12 Nov., while negotiations were in progress, Rupert fell upon two regiments of parliamentary infantry at Brentford and cut them in pieces. But the next day Essex, with superior forces, barred the way to London, and obliged the king's troops to evacuate Brentford and retreat on Reading. Politically the victory was unfortunate to the king's cause, for it brought upon him the charge of treachery. Clarendon asserts that Rupert attacked without orders from the king, being ‘exalted with the terror he heard his name gave the enemy … and too much neglecting the council of state;’ but Charles himself was probably responsible for the movement (Clarendon, Rebellion, vi. 134; Gardiner, Great Civil War, i. 59).
During the winter Rupert's chief object was to extend the king's quarters round Oxford, and to open up communications with the royalists of the west. A pamphleteer described him as defeated by Skippon in an attack on Marlborough, but he was not present at the capture of that town, which was taken by Wilmot and a party from Oxford on Dec. 5 (Waylen, History of Marlborough, p. 174). Towards the end of December he relieved Banbury (Clark, Life of Anthony Wood, i. 74). On 7 Jan. 1643 he unsuccessfully threatened Cirencester, which he took by storm on 2 Feb. (Washbourne, Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, pp. 153, 159). The consequences of its capture were the evacuation of Sudely and Berkeley castles, the abandonment of Tewkesbury and Devizes, and the surrender of Malmesbury, while Gloucestershire began to pay contributions to the support of the royal forces. Rupert followed up his victory by summoning Gloucester, but there he met with a refusal (ib. pp. 22, 173). He next attempted Bristol, hoping to be admitted by the royalists of the city (7 March); but their timely arrest by the governor prevented the execution of the plot (Seyer, Memorials of Bristol, ii. 341–400). In April he turned his attention to the midland counties, took Birmingham after a stubborn resistance (3 April), and recaptured Lichfield Close, after nearly a fortnight's siege (Prince Rupert's burning Love for England discovered in Birmingham's Flames, 1643, 4to; A true Relation of Prince Rupert's barbarous Cruelty against the Town of Birmingham, 1643, 4to; Warburton, ii. 161).
On 16 April the king recalled Rupert to Oxford to assist in the relief of Reading, but he was repulsed by the besiegers in a fight at Caversham bridge (25 April), and the town capitulated the next day (ib. ii. 165, 178; Coates, History of Reading, p. 35). At the beginning of the summer Essex advanced on Oxford, and threatened to besiege the city. On 17 June Rupert, with about two thousand men, sallied forth intending to intercept a convoy which was coming to Essex's army; he missed the convoy, but surprised some parliamentary troops in their quarters, and defeated at Chalgrove Field (18 June) an attempt to obstruct his return. In the action Rupert's personal daring was conspicuous; he headed the charge in which Hampden was wounded, and Hampden's subsequent death rendered a trifling defeat a political disaster for the parliamentarians (Prince Rupert's late beating up the Rebels' Quarters at Postcombe and Chinnor and his Victory at Chalgrove Field, Oxford, 1643, 4to). On 11 July Rupert met the queen at Stratford-on-Avon, and escorted her to
