regulars; and Wolfe wished ‘for nothing so much as to fight’ them on fairly equal terms.
On 30 June he occupied Point Levi, on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, with one brigade. This allowed the fleet to move up into the basin of Quebec, and on 12 July batteries near Point Levi began to bombard the town. On the 9th Wolfe had transferred his two other brigades from the Isle of Orleans to a camp on the left bank, separated from the French camp only by the Montmorenci. Here his guns were able to enfilade some of their intrenchments; but though he had tempted them by dividing his forces, the French would not attack him, but confined themselves to skirmishes and Indian warfare. On his first arrival Wolfe had issued a manifesto informing the Canadian peasantry that they would be unmolested if they took no part in the contest, but finding that they helped to harass his troops, he retaliated by burning their settlements.
In the night of 18 July two English frigates and some smaller vessels passed the batteries of Quebec and ran up the St. Lawrence. Wolfe joined them and carefully reconnoitred the left bank above the town. He found it well guarded and very difficult to land on, and, as troops landed might be beaten before they could be supported from below, he thought the attempt too hazardous.
On 31 July he made an attack upon the east end of the camp at Beauport. It was begun by troops brought over from Point Levi and the Isle of Orleans, and was to be supported by those on the left bank, who were to cross the Montmorenci by a ford below the falls. A redoubt was taken, but the grenadiers, who headed the attack, hurried on in disorder against a stronger position without waiting for their supports. They were repulsed; and as the operation depended on the tide, it had to be given up, with a loss of more than four hundred men. Wolfe blamed the grenadiers, who ‘could not suppose that they alone could beat the French army;’ but he also blamed himself for putting too many men into boats, ‘who might have been landed the day before and might have crossed the ford with certainty’ (30 Aug.)
Immediately after this check Brigadier Murray was sent up the St. Lawrence with twelve hundred men, to assist in the destruction of the French flotilla, and try to get news of Amherst. He learnt that Amherst was still at Crown Point, so that little help was to be had from him during the few weeks that the fleet could remain in the St. Lawrence. By this time Wolfe's incessant activity, with anxiety and the heat of the weather, had overtaxed ‘a body unequal (as Burke said) to the vigorous and enterprising soul that it lodged;’ in the latter part of August he was laid up with fever, and was suffering much. ‘I know perfectly well,’ he said to the doctor, ‘you cannot cure my complaint; but pray make me up so that I may be without pain for a few days, and able to do my duty; that is all I want’ (Wright, p. 543).
Hitherto he had taken his own course, but he now thought it best to consult his brigadiers. He suggested three different methods of attack upon the French camp, but the brigadiers were against them all, and were of opinion that ‘the most probable method of striking an effectual blow is to bring the troops to the south shore, and to carry the operations above the town.’ Wolfe acquiesced. He wrote to the admiral, ‘My ill state of health hinders me from executing my own plan; it is of too desperate a nature to order others to execute’ (30 Aug.); and at once made arrangements with him to carry out their recommendation. The Montmorenci camp was abandoned; more ships were sent up the river, and 3,600 men were marched up the right bank, and were embarked in them on 5 Sept.
The proposal of the brigadiers was that they should land on the left bank, somewhere above Cap Rouge, which is eight miles above Quebec, perhaps at two points simultaneously (Addit. MS. 32895, fol. 91). On 8 Sept. orders were issued accordingly. Some of the vessels were to go to Point au Tremble, ten miles higher up, and make a feint there, while five battalions were to be thrown ashore nearer to Cap Rouge. Bad weather caused the postponement of this attempt. Wolfe was not hopeful of it, and wrote next day to Lord Holderness: ‘I am so far recovered as to do business, but my constitution is entirely ruined, without the consolation of having done any considerable service to the state, or without any prospect of it.’ Montcalm, the French commander, had detached a corps of three thousand men to Cap Rouge to oppose a landing; and even if the landing were accomplished, the Cap Rouge river and several miles of woody country would still lie between the British and Quebec, and would give Montcalm time to bring up reinforcements.
By the 10th Wolfe had formed a new plan, the very audacity of which had its charm. He chose a landing-place, the ‘Anse du Foulon,’ now called Wolfe's Cove,
