council in which the war was decided upon the emperor threw himself, weeping, into the arms of Princess Mathilde. The empress was delighted at this war, which she thought would secure her son’s inheritance.
On the 28th of July father and son set out for the army. They found it in a state of utter disorder, and added to the difficulties by their presence. The emperor was suffering from stone and could hardly sit his horse. After the defeat of Reichshoffen, when Bazaine was thrown back upon Metz, he wished to retreat upon Paris. But the empress represented to him that if he retreated it would mean a revolution. An advance was decided upon which ended in Sedan. On the 2nd of September, Napoleon III. surrendered with 80,000 men, and on the 4th of September the Empire fell. He was taken as a prisoner to the castle of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel, where he stayed till the end of the war. After the intrigues of Bazaine, of Bismarck, and of the empress, the Germans having held negotiations with the Republic, he was de facto deposed. On the 1st of March the assembly of Bordeaux confirmed this deposition, and declared him “responsible for the ruin, invasion and dismemberment of France.”
Restored to liberty, he retired with his wife and son to Chislehurst in England. Unwilling even now to despair of the future, he still sought to rally his friends for a fresh propaganda. He had at his service publicists such as Cassagnac, J. Amigues and Hugelmann. He himself also wrote unsigned pamphlets justifying the campaign of 1870. It may be noted that, true to his ideas, he did not attempt to throw upon others the responsibility which he had always claimed for himself. He dreamed of his son's future. But he no longer occupied himself with any definite plans. He interested himself in pensions for workmen and economical stoves. At the end of 1872 his disease became more acute, and a surgical operation became necessary. He died on the 9th of January 1873, leaving his son in the charge of the empress and of Rouher. The young prince was educated at Woolwich from 1872 to 1875, and in 1879 took part in the English expedition against the Zulus in South Africa, in which he was killed. By his death vanished all hope of renewing the extraordinary fortune which for twenty years placed the descendant of the great emperor, the Carbonaro and dreamer, at once obstinate and hesitating, on the throne of France.
Bibliography.—The Œuvres of Napoleon III. have been published in four volumes (1854–1857) and his Histoire de Jules César in two volumes (1865–1869); this latter work has been translated into English by T. Wright. See also Ebeling, Napoleon III. und sein Hof (1891–1894); H. Thirria, Napoléon III. avant l’Empire (1895); Sylvain-Blot, Napoléon III. (1899); Giraudeau, Napoléon III. intime (1895); Sir W. A. Fraser, Napoleon III. (London, 1895); A. Forbes, Life of Napoleon III. (1898) A. Lebey, Les Trois coups d’état de Louis Napoléon Bonaparte (1906); Louis Napoléon Bonaparte et la révolution de 1848 (1908); and F. A. Simpson, The Rise of Louis Napoleon (1909). General works which may be consulted are Taxile-Delord, Histoire du second Empire (1868–1875); P. de La Gorce, Histoire du second Empire (1894–1905); Thomas, Le Second Empire (1907); and E. Ollivier, L’Empire libéral (14 vols., 1895–1909). (A. Ts.)
NAPOLEON, a round game of cards (known colloquially as “Nap”). Any number may play. The cards rank as at whist, and five are dealt to each player. The deal being completed, the player to the dealer’s left looks at his hand and declares how many tricks he would play to win against all the rest, the usual rule being that more than one must be declared; in default of declaring he says “I pass,” and the next player has a similar option of either declaring to make more tricks or passing, and so on all round. A declaration of five tricks is called “going Nap.” The player who declares to make most has to try to make them, and the others, but without consultation, to prevent him. The declaring hand has the first lead, and the first card he leads makes the trump suit. The players, in rotation, must follow suit if able. If the declarer succeeds in making at least the number of tricks he stood for he wins whatever stakes are played for; if not he loses. If the player declaring Nap wins he receives double stakes all round; if he loses he only pays single stakes all round. Sometimes, however, a player is allowed to go “Wellington” over “Nap,” and even “Blucher” over “Wellington.” In these cases the caller of “Wellington” wins four times the stake and loses twice the stake, the caller of “Blucher” receives six times and loses three times the stake. Sometimes a player is allowed to declare misère, i.e. no tricks. This ranks, as a declaration, between three and four, but the player pays a double stake on three, if he wins a trick, and receives a single on three if he takes none.
NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS.—1. The era of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars falls into two main divisions, the first of which (1792–1802) is dealt with under the heading French Revolutionary Wars. In the present article are described the campaigns in central and eastern Europe, directed by Napoleon no longer one amongst many French generals, nor even a simple primus inter pares, but “Emperor” in the fullest sense between the years 1804 and 1814. Napoleon’s short Spanish Campaign of 1809 is dealt with under Peninsular War (this article covering the campaigns in Spain, Portugal and southern France 1808–1814), and for the final drama of Waterloo the reader is referred to Waterloo Campaign.
The campaigns described below are therefore—
(a) The Austrian War of 1805 (Ulm and Austerlitz).
(b) The Conquest of Prussia and the Polish Campaign (Jena, Auerstädt, Eylau, and Friedland).
(c) The Austrian War of 1809 (Eckmühl, Aspern, and Wagram),
(d) The Russian War of 1812 (Borodino and the retreat from Moscow).
(e) The German “War of Liberation,” culminating in the Battle of the Nations around Leipzig 1813.
(f) The last campaign in France, 1814.
The naval history of 1803–1815 includes the culmination and the sequel of the struggle for command of the sea which began in 1793 and reached its maximum intensity on the day of Trafalgar.
2. The Campaign of 1805 may be regarded as a measure of self-defence forced upon Napoleon by the alliance of Russia (April 11th), Austria (August 9th) and other powers with Great Britain. The possibility had long been before the emperor, and his intention in that event to march straight on Vienna by the valley of the Danube is clearly indicated in his reply (November 27th, 1803) to a Prussian proposal for the neutralization of the South German states. In this he says, “It is on the road from Strassburg to Vienna that the French must force peace on Austria, and it is this road which you wish us to renounce.” When, therefore, on the 25th of August 1805, he learnt definitely that Villeneuve (see Naval operations below) had failed in his purpose of securing the command of the Channel, which was the necessary preliminary to the invasion of England, it was but the affair of a few hours to dictate the dispositions necessary to transfer his whole army to the Rhine frontier as the first step in its march to the Danube. On this date the army actually lay in the following positions:—
| I. | Corps | Bernadotte | Hanover (Göttingen) | |
| II. | Corps„ | Marmont | Holland | |
| III. | Corps„ | Davout | Camp of Boulogne and other points on the English Channel | |
| IV. | Corps„ | Soult | ||
| V. | Corps„ | Lannes | ||
| VI. | Corps„ | Ney | ||
| VII. | Corps„ | Augereau | ||
| Guard | Bessères | Paris. | ||
The corps were, however, by no means fit for immediate service. Bernadotte’s corps in Hanover was almost in the position of a beleaguered garrison, and the marshal could only obtain his transport by giving out that he was ordered to withdraw to France. Marmont and Davout were deficient in horses for cavalry and artillery, and the troops in Boulogne, having been drawn together for the invasion of England, had hardly any transport at all, as it was considered this want could be readily supplied on landing. The composition of the army, however, was excellent. The generals were in the prime of life, had not yet learnt to distrust one another, and were accustomed to work under the emperor and with one another. The regimental officers had all acquired their rank before the enemy and knew how to manage their men, and of the men themselves nearly two-thirds had seen active service. The strength of the army lay in its infantry, for both cavalry and artillery were short of horses, and the latter had not yet acquired mobility and skill
