Page:EB1911 - Volume 19.djvu/283

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268
NATIONAL DEBT
  


at 4% at par, with the additional benefit of an annuity of £1, 16s. 3d.% for eighty years. Even so late as the Crimean War in 1855, a loan of 16 millions at 3% at par was contracted, the contributors receiving in addition an annuity of 14s. 6d.% for thirty years.

The third method of contracting terminable loans, that of gradual repayment or amortization within a certain limit of years, has been a favourite one among certain nations, and specially commends itself to those whose credit is at a low ebb. When the final term of repayment is fixed upon, a calculation is easily made as to how much is to be paid half-yearly until the expiry of the term, so that at the end the whole, principal and interest, will have been paid. At first, of course, the amount paid will largely represent interest, but, as at each half-yearly drawing of the numbers of the bonds to be finally paid off the principal will be gradually reduced, there will be more and more money set free from interest for the reduction of the actual debt. This method, as we have said, has its advantages, and when conjoined with stipulations as to liberty of conversion to debt bearing a lower rate of interest than that originally offered, and when the bonds are not issued at a figure much below par, might be the most satisfactory method of raising money for a state under certain emergencies. What is known as the “Morgan loan” of France in 1870 was contracted on such conditions.

The last form of temporary loan, that repayable in bulk at a fixed date, is one which, when the sum is of considerable amount, is apt to be attended with serious disadvantages. The repayment may have to be made at a time when a state may not be in a position to meet it, and so to keep faith with its creditors may have to borrow at a higher rate in order to pay their claims. It has, however, worked well in the United States, most of the debt of which has been contracted on the principle of optional payment at the end of a short period, say five years, and compulsory payment at the end of a longer period, say twenty years. Thus the loan of 515 millions of dollars contracted in 1862 was issued on this principle, at 6%, and so with other loans between that year and 1868. In European states, however, the risks of embarrassment are too great to permit of the application of this method on an extensive scale; and for loans of great amount the methods most likely to yield satisfactory results are loans bearing quasi-perpetual interest, or those repayable by instalments on the basis of half-yearly drawings within a certain period.

What are known as lottery loans are greatly favoured on the continent, either as an independent means of raising money, or as an adjunct to any of the methods referred to above. These must not be confounded with the lottery pure and simple, in which the contributors run the risk of losing the whole of their investment. The lottery loan has been found to work well for small sums, when the interest is but little below what it would have been in an ordinary loan, and when the percentage thus set aside to form prizes of varying amounts forms but a small fraction of the whole interest payable. The principle is that each contributor of such a loan has a greater or less chance of drawing a prize of varying amount, over and above the repayment of his capital with interest.

What are known in England as exchequer bills and treasury bills may be regarded as loans payable at a fixed period of short duration, from three months upwards, and bearing very insignificant interest, even so low as 1/2%. They are a useful means of raising money for immediate wants and for local loans, and form handy investments for capitalists who are reserving their funds for a special purpose. Exchequer bonds are simply a special form of the funded debt, to be paid off generally within a certain period of years.

There are two principal methods of issuing or effecting a loan. Either the state may appeal directly to capitalists and invite subscriptions, or it may delegate the negotiation to one or more bankers. The former method has been occasionally followed in France and Russia, but in practice it has been found to be attended with so many disadvantages to the borrowing state or city that the best financial authorities consider it unsound. The great banking-houses have such a command over the money-market that it is difficult to keep even a direct loan out of their hands. The majority of loans, therefore, are negotiated by one or more of these houses, and the name of Rothschild is familiar to every one in connexion with such transactions. By this method a borrowing state can assure itself of having the proceeds of the loan with the least possible delay and with the minimum of trouble. A loan may be issued at, above, or below par, though generally it is either at or below par—“par” being the normal or theoretical price of a single share in the loan, the sum which the borrowing government undertakes to pay back for each share on reimbursement, without discount or premium. Very generally, as an inducement to investors, a loan is offered at a greater or less discount, according to the credit of the borrowing government. Sometimes a state may offer a loan to the highest bidders; for example, the city of Auckland in 1875 invited subscriptions through the Bank of New Zealand to a loan of £100,000 at 6%; offers were made of six times the amount, but only those were accepted which were at the rate of 98% or above. The rate of interest offered generally depends on the credit of the state issuing the loan. England, for example, would have no difficulty in raising any amount at 3% or even less, while less stable states may have to pay 8 or 9%. The nominal percentage is by no means, however, always an index of the cost of a loan to a state, as the history of the debt of England disastrously shows. During the 18th century various expedients were employed, besides that of terminable annuities already referred to, to raise money for the great wars of the period, at an apparently low percentage. For example, from 3 to 5% would be offered for a loan, the actual amount of stock per cent. allotted being sometimes 1071/2 or even 111; so that between 1776 and 1785, for the £91,763,842 actually borrowed by the government, £115,267,993 was to be paid back. In 1797 a loan of £1,620,000 was contracted, for every £100 of which actually subscribed, at 3%, the sum of £219 was allotted to the lender. In 1793 a 3% loan of 41/2 millions was offered at the price of £72%, the government thus making itself liable for £6,250,000. Greatly owing to this reckless method the debt of Great Britain in 1815 amounted to over 900 millions. France in this respect has been quite as extravagant as England; many of her loans during the 19th century were issued at from 521/2 to 84%, one indeed (1848) so low as 45%—as a rule with 5% interest. The enormous and embarrassing increase of the French debt during the 19th century was doubtless greatly due to this disastrous system. Nearly every European state and most of the Central and South American states have at one time or another aggravated their debts by this method of borrowing, and got themselves into difficulty with their creditors. Financiers almost unanimously maintain that in the long run it is much better for a state to borrow at high interest at or near par, than at an apparently low interest much below par. A state of even the highest rank may find itself in the midst of a crisis that will for a time shake its credit; but when the crisis is past and its credit revives it will be in a much more sound position with a high interest for a debt contracted at par than with a comparatively low interest on a debt much in excess of what it really received. If a state, for example, borrows at par at 6% when its credit is low, it may easily when again in a flourishing condition reduce the interest on its debt to 4 or even 3%. The United States government actually did so with the debt it had to contract at the time of the Civil War. This method of reducing the burden. of a debt is evidently no injustice to the creditors of a government, when used in a legitimate way. A state is at liberty at any time to pay off its debts, and, if it can borrow at 3% to pay off a 6% debt, it may with perfect justice offer its creditors the option of payment of the principal or of holding it at a reduced interest. Government debts are, however, sometimes reduced after a fashion by no means so legitimate as this. Other states have been even more unprincipled, and have got rid of their debts at one sweep by the simple method of repudiation.

When a state has a variety of loans at varying rates of interest, it may consolidate them into a single debt at a uniform interest. For example, in 1751 several descriptions of English debt were consolidated into one fund bearing a uniform interest of 3%, an operation which gave origin to the familiar term “consols” (“consolidated annuities”). In the early days of the English national debt, a special tax or fund was appropriated to the payment of the interest on each particular loan. This was the original meaning of “the funds,” a term which has now come to signify the national debt generally. So also the origin of the term “funded,” as applied to a debt which has been recognized as at least quasi-permanent, and for the payment of the interest on which regular provision is made. Unfunded or floating debt, on the other hand, means strictly loans for which no permanent provision requires to be made, which have been obtained for temporary purposes with the intention of paying them off within a brief period. Exchequer and treasury bills are included in this category, and such other moneys in the hands of a government as it may be required to reimburse at any moment. Where a government is the recipient of savings banks deposits, these may be included in its floating debt, and so also may the paper-money which has been issued so largely by some governments. A state with an excessive floating debt must be regarded as in a very critical financial condition.

National debt, again, is divided into external and internal, according

as the loans have been raised within or without the country—some