Page:EB1911 - Volume 19.djvu/323

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NAVY AND NAVIES
[UNITED STATES


were appointed by the local boards. No regular method of recruiting the corps of officers existed.

This compromise was in itself a bad system. With the exception of the board of North Holland, which was supported by the wealth of Amsterdam, the admiralties were commonly distressed for money. Unity of action was difficult to obtain. Much of the work of convoy which the state squadrons should have performed was thrown in the 17th century on directorates (Directiën) of merchants who fitted out privateers at their own expense. When there was no stadtholder, the local governing bodies trenched on the authority of the states-general, and indulged in a great deal of favouritism. In one respect the navy of the Dutch republic might have been taken as a model by its neighbours. The feeding of the crews was contracted for by the captains, who were required to enter into securities for the execution of the contract, and who had a reputation for probity. The Dutch crews, being better fed and looked after than the English, suffered less from disease. The clumsy organization of the Dutch navy put it at a disadvantage in its wars with England, but the seamanship of the crews, their good gunnery, and the great ability of many of their admirals made them at all times formidable enemies. No organic change was made till 1795, when the victories of the French revolutionary armies led to the formation of the Batavian republic. The five admiralties were then swept away and replaced by a committee for the direction of naval affairs, with a unified administration, organized by Pieter Paulus, a former official of the board of the Maas. As Holland was now swept into the general convulsion of the French Revolution, it followed the fortunes of France. Its navy, after belonging to the Batavian republic, passed to the ephemeral kingdom of Holland, created by Napoleon in favour of his brother Louis in 1806 and annexed to France in 1810. The Dutch navy then became absorbed in the French. After the fall of Napoleon a navy was created for the kingdom of the Netherlands out of the Dutch fragments of the Imperial force.

The United States.

The American navy came into existence shortly after the Declaration of Independence. As early as October 1775 Congress authorized the construction of two national cruisers, and, at the same time, appointed a marine committee to administer naval affairs. The first force, consisting of purchased vessels, badly fitted and built, and insufficiently equipped and manned, embraced two ships of 24 guns each, six brigs carrying from 10 to 12 guns, two schooners each with 8 guns, and four sloops, three of 10 guns and one of 4 guns. On December 22nd a personnel of officers was selected, one of the lieutenants being the well-known Paul Jones. Esek Hopkins was made commander-in-chief, but, having incurred the censure of Congress, he was dismissed early in 1777, and since then the title has never been revived except in the person of the president. In November 1776 the grades of admiral, vice-admiral, rear-admiral and commodore were assimilated in rank and precedence to relative army titles, but they were never created by law until 1862. During the war a number of spirited engagements occurred, but there was a great lack of efficient material at home, and agents abroad were not able to enlist the active sympathies of nations or rulers. Benjamin Franklin did manage to equip one good squadron, but this was rendered almost useless by internal dissensions, and it required the victory of Paul Jones in the “Bon Homme Richard” over the “Serapis” to bring about any tangible result for the risk taken. During the war 800 vessels of all classes were made prizes, but the navy lost by capture 11 vessels of war and a little squadron of gunboats on the lakes; and, with 13 ships destroyed to avoid capture by the British, 5 condemned, and 3 wrecked at sea, the country was practically without a naval force between 1780 and 1785.

Owing to the depredations upon commerce of the Barbary powers, Congress in 1794 ordered the construction of six frigates, prescribing that four of them should be armed with 44 guns and two with 36 guns; but, the Berbers having made peace, the number of vessels was reduced one-half, and no additions were made until 1797, when the “Constitution,” “United States” and “Constellation” were built. The navy was at first placed under the war department, but a navy department with a secretary of its own was created in 1798. From 1815 to 1842 the secretary was aided by a board of commissioners chosen from among the naval officers, but in the latter year the department was reorganized into five bureaus, which were increased to eight in 1862. Each has a naval officer at its head. They deal with navigation, ordnance, equipment, navy yards, medicines, provisions, steam engineering and construction. The excellent naval academy at Annapolis was founded in 1845 by the then secretary of the navy, G. Bancroft. The war college for officers at Coasters Harbor, Newport, R.I., dates from 1884.

The Balance of Navies in History.

The five navies above discussed claim special notice on various grounds: the British, Dutch and French because they have been leaders and models; the Spanish because it has been closely associated with the others; the American because it was the first of the extra-European sea forces. But these great examples by no means exhaust the list of navies, old and new, which have played or now play a part. Every state which has a coast has also desired to possess forces on the sea. Even the papacy maintained a fighting force of galleys which took part in the naval transactions of the Mediterranean for centuries. The Turkish sultans have fitted out fleets which once were a menace to southern Europe. But in a survey of general naval history it is not necessary to give all these navies special mention, even though some of them have a certain intrinsic interest. Some, the Scandinavian navies for instance, have been confined to narrow limits, and have had no influence either by their organization, nor, save locally, by action. Others again have been the purely artificial creation of governments. Instances of these on a small scale are the navies of the grand duchy of Tuscany, or of the Bourbon kings of Naples.

A much greater instance is the navy of Russia. Founded by Peter the Great (1689–1725), it has been mainly organized and has been most successfully led by foreigners. When the Russian government has desired for political reasons to make a show of naval strength, it has been numerous. In 1770, during the reign of Catherine II. (1762–1796), a Russian Russia. fleet, nominally commanded by the empress’s favourite Orloff, but in reality directed by two former officers of the British navy, John Elphinston (1722–1785) and Samuel Greig (1735–1788), gained some successes against the Turks in the Levant. But when opposed to formidable enemies, as in the Crimean War, it has either remained in port, or has, as in the case of the war with Japan (1904–1905), proved that its vitality was not in proportion to its size.

The innumerable navies of South American republics are small copies of older forces.

The 19th century did indeed see the rise of three navies, which are of a very different character—the Italian, which was the result of the unification of Italy, the German, which followed the creation of the German Empire, and the Japanese. But all three are contemporary in their origin, and have inevitably been modelled Italy, Germany, Japan, Austria.on older forces—the British and the French. With them must go the Austrian navy, excellent but unavoidably small.

If we look at the relations which the navies of the modern world have had to one another, it will be seen that the great discoveries of the later 15th century shifted the seat of naval power to the ocean for two reasons. In the first place they imposed on all who wished to sail the wider seas opened to European enterprise by Vasco Influence of
sea power.
de Gama and Columbus the obligation to use a vessel which could carry water and provisions sufficient for a large crew during a long voyage. The Mediterranean states and their seamen were not prepared by resources or habit to meet the call. But there was a second and equally effective reason. The powers which had an Atlantic coast were incomparably better placed