Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/1067

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ENGLISH HISTORY
1011


Blockade

of

Germany.

There were other matters relating to the conduct of the war on which the press and the public and the two Parliamentary War Committees were dissatisfied with what seemed to them the slackness and hesitation of ministers. Dis- satisfaction was particularly acute in regard to two questions, which had long given anxiety, the block- ade of Germany, and the development of the British air force. It was pointed out that excessive quantities of food- stuffs and other sources of military supply were going to neutral ports adjacent to Germany, and it was suggested that the navy was hampered in the strict enforcement of the blockade by the interference of the Foreign Office. This latter charge Sir E. Grey denied on Jan. 26, but he appealed to neutral countries to make it easy for Great Britain to distinguish and discrimi- nate. Business men were not reassured, and an excited meet- ing was held in the City of London on Feb. 14, with Lord Devonport in the chair, to demand a fuller and more effectual use of British sea-power. Thereupon a Ministry of Blockade was set up, with Lord Robert Cecil as its Parliamentary chief, and he shortly afterwards issued a very comprehensive list of contraband articles, and increased the stringency of the blockade. In June, after consultation with the Allies, he took the further important step of abandoning the Declaration of London, which hitherto, contrary to its interests, the British Government had observed.

Evidences of discontent with the position and development of the air forces were constantly recurring. The Germans were known to be- very active in building and developing Develop- Zeppelins, and a great raid over the centre of England on J an - 3 1 I 9 I 6 called attention to their capacity for destruction. The system which made the British air forces ancillary to the army and navy, and divided the responsi- bility between Admiralty and War Office, was vehemently called in question. A demand was made for an Air Ministry; but the only changes which the Government announced in February were the transference of the British defences against aircraft from the Admiralty to the War Office, and the appoint- ment of a joint naval and military committee to stimulate production, under the chairmanship of Lord Derby. Public dissatisfaction was strikingly shown by the return on March 10 to Parliament of a flying man, Mr. Pemberton Billing who had no local connexion but who advocated a strong air policy for the conservative constituency of East Herts by a large majority over a Coalition candidate. The new member took an active, if somewhat indiscriminate, part in stimulating the Govern- ment, who shortly added Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, a keen promoter of aviation, to Lord Derby's committee. But this arrangement did not last long, and in the second week in April Lord Derby and Lord Montagu both resigned, as they found the committee had no real power. Accordingly in May the Government went further, and established a Joint Air Board representing both army and navy, with Lord Curzon as president and Maj. Baird as parliamentary secre- tary. This departure was welcomed, though it was doubted whether even this Board would have sufficient independ- ent power; and not only the critics, such as Mr. Winston Church- ill, but Lord Curzon himself, proclaimed that an Air Ministry was destined to come a prediction fulfilled in the following December, when Mr. Lloyd George formed his Government. The reforms already effected bore fruit in the autumn, when a Zeppelin was brought down at Cuffley by an intrepid British airman, the first of a long series of successes which constrained the enemy to rely upon aeroplanes rather than airships.

It began to be realized in the winter of 1915-6 that it was not only in arms that it was necessary to conquer Germany, but also in the field of economics. Success in arms might be compati- ble with defeat in the economic sphere. In January a resolution, proposed by Mr. Hewins, who had been secretary of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Commission, and supported by Mr. Prothero, a great agricultural authority, demanding meas- ures to bring the whole economic strength of the empire to bear in the struggle against Germany, was accepted by Mr. Runciman,

An Air Board.

President of the Board of Trade, and carried without a divi- sion. This conflicted with the free-trade tradition, but even in Manchester, the home of free trade, the Chamber of Com- merce came into line. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. McKenna, addressing the Association of Chambers of Commerce in February, said that the Government Economic were prepared to assist in the development of foreign Germany. trade so as to ensure that England's bitterest foes and rivals should not have their former control; and Mr. Bonar Law next day announced that an economic conference would be held in Paris in the summer on this vital question. Lord Selborne, President of the Board of Agriculture, said in March that the whole attitude of Parliament towards agriculture would have to be changed; the agricultural laws must be so framed as to obtain the greatest possible national security. A great reen- forcement of this propaganda was found in Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia, who had come on a visit to England, and who made several speeches on the text that not merely must Germany's military power be destroyed, but that German control and influence in British trade and industry must be extirpated. Mr. Hughes's public appearances were received with acclamation; and he was appointed one of the British representatives at the Paris Conference, which met in the middle of June. In its final conclusions the Conference recommended (i) during the war period, coordina- Allied tion of regulations of allied countries prohibiting ^ac^at trading with the enemy, absolute embargo on importa- Paris. tion of enemy goods, sequestration of enemy busi- nesses, and stringent measures for restriction of enemy supplies; (2) in the reconstruction period after the war, restoration and reequipment for despoiled countries, denial of most favoured treatment to enemy powers, and measures for conservation of allied resources and against enemy dumping; and (3) for the peace period, measures to render allied countries independent of enemy countries in raw materials and key industries, to facili- tate interchange of allied products, and to assimilate allied legislation as to patents, trademarks and copyrights. These recommendations were received enthusiastically in England; but a minority objected to the idea of " war after the war."

The stringency of war conditions began to grip England and particularly London this spring. Public museums and galleries were to a great extent closed; and, in order to econo- mize tonnage, the importation of many bulky cargoes, stringency especially paper pulp and grass for paper-making, ^^f. r was prohibited. To ensure rapidity of production the tions. Whitsuntide bank holiday was postponed. Econ- omy in all directions was preached and practised; to economize coal and gas and electricity a " Summer time " Act was passed giving people an extra hour of daylight in the summer evenings; the King, whose example throughout the war was most inspirit- ing, made a free gift of 100,000 to the national exchequer; an elaborate system of war savings was set up, under which 155. 6d. lent to the Government was to mature into i in five years. None of these restrictions or economies affected the spirit of the country; a debate raised in Parliament in February, by the small body of pacifists who ingeminated peace, only drew from the Prime Minister a repetition, amid enthusiastic cheers, of his declaration at the Guildhall on Nov. 9 1914, that Britain would never sheathe the sword until the military domination of Prussia was wholly and finally destroyed. The only criticism of the navy estimates was Mr. Churchill's complaint that the Board of Admiralty which had succeeded him was deficient in energy and push.

Once again, perhaps the most satisfactory feature of the ministerial policy was the resolute way in which the financial problem was faced. On Feb. 21 the Prime Minister introduced and carried two votes of credit one a Mr. Mc- supplementary vote of 120,000,000 to cover the re- ^ond* mainder of the current financial year, and the other Budget. of 300,000,000 to start the new year on April i. This brought the total votes of credit since the outbreak of war to 1,782,000,000. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his