heavy counter-attack. In consequence the right wing of the 42nd Div. was somewhat checked in its advance, and whereas the left of that division, starting off at 7:52 A.M., was well beyond its third objective by midday the right wing had only just completed the first stage of its advance. By 2:30 P.M. the left of the 42nd in conjunction with the right of the 4th Div. (VI. Corps) had captured Ribecourt, but the final stages of the advance had to be postponed till next morning.
The VI. Corps met with more success. The 3rd Div., over-running the hostile defences with little difficulty, shortly after midday seized Flesquieres and Ribecourt and established itself east of these villages, where the 62nd Div. passed through to continue the advance and carried the line to the outskirts of Marcoing, thus attaining all the corps' objectives for the day. On the left the Guards, despite heavy losses from flanking fire against their left, owing to the fact that the XVII. Corps was unable to keep up with their rapid progress, pressed forward between Flesquieres and Graincourt and reached the neighbourhood of Premy chapel (N.W. of Marcoing). They were relieved by the 2nd Div. on that evening.
The XVII. Corps had first to clear the W. bank of the Canal du Nord W. of Graincourt before it could attempt to pass it and get forward to its day's objectives. The right division, the 52nd, successfully carried out this operation with a portion of its forces, while other units crossed the canal on the right in conjunction with the 63rd Div., and met with severe resistance. It was not till late in the afternoon that Anneux and Graincourt fell into Allied hands and the 57th Div. passed into first line for the further advance on Cantaing, which proved to be impracticable before nightfall.
On the night of Sept. 27, then, the Third Army front ran from W. of Beaucamp by Ribecourt, Premy chapel and Anneux to W. of Fontaine Notre Dame, where it connected with the right of the Canadian Corps a maximum penetration of some 35 m. from the jumping-off line. Operations were resumed next day. The IV. Corps began its attack at 2:30 A.M. under cover of darkness; Beaucamp was once more secured, Highland Ridge was carried by storm, and parties pushed forward to Welsh Ridge which was cleared of the enemy by 6 P.M. The VI. Corps, attacking with the 62nd and and Div. as soon as it was light enough to see, cleared the Germans from the W. bank of the Scheldt canal and established itself on the line Marcoing-Noyelles; it was found impossible, however, to get over the canal at the moment. The line of the canal was also reached on the XVII. Corps' front, E. of Cantaing, and her parties succeeded in getting over the obstacle and establishing themselves there despite the counter-attacks of the enemy.
September 29 saw the V. Corps on the Army right joining in the attack in conjunction with the Fourth Army to the south. Little progress was made in this sector, but on all the rest of the front considerable results were achieved. The IV. Corps, advancing with the 5th Div. on the right and the New Zealanders on the left, carried Gonnelieu and Banteux in the right section, securing a bridge-head at Crevecoeur in the left section of its zone of attack. The VI. Corps to its left had passed the canal in force before the end of the day and established itself to the E. of Masnieres; the XVII. Corps also got the 63rd Div. over the obstacle, while the 57th Div. on the left cleared the Marcoing line between the canal and the Bapaume-Cambrai road and pushed on to the outskirts of the city itself.
On Sept. 30 and Oct. 1 the advance was continued, but more slowly and with greater difficulty. The Germans, menaced on either flank, as had been foreseen, withdrew from their salient on the V. Corps' front, and the latter were able to get forward to the canal line and commence preparations for forcing it. The IV. Corps secured its footing on the E. bank about Crevecceur, while the VI. Corps occupied Rumilly after two attempts, and the XVII. Corps on the left flank reached the suburbs of Cambrai on both banks of the Scheldt canal.
The battle on the Third Army front was now over. The Hindenburg line had been breached on a front of nine miles, and an average advance of seven miles effected in the face of the most formidable obstacles, both natural and artificial. Thirteen German divisions had been forced to give ground before 12 British, and had left behind them many prisoners and guns during the five days' fighting. The fate of Cambrai was sealed and only a part of the incompletely constructed Masnieres-Beaurevoir line, already broken in its northern sector by the Third Army and in its southern sector by the Fourth Army, was left as a dyke to stem the further British advance. That line, as the attack of Oct. 8 was to show, was destined to prove quite insufficient to hold up those troops who had stormed the immensely powerful defences of the Hindenburg system.
7. Storming of Hindenburg Line by Fourth Army (Sept. 27-Oct. 5). The forces at the disposal of the Fourth Army for the attack of the formidable defences of the Hindenburg line on the front of 12 m. from Selency to Vendhuille consisted of the IX. Corps (Braithwaite) (1st and 46th Div. inline, 32nd in support); the composite American-Australian Corps (Monash) (27th and 30th U.S. Div. in line, sth and 3rd Australian in support, 2nd Australian in reserve) ; and the III. Corps (Butler) (12th and 58th Div. in line, 18th in support). The IX. Corps' zone of attack included the Canal du Nord and the defences on either side of Bellenglise, while that of the composite corps was the canal tunnel on either side of Bellicourt. The III. Corps had the subsidiary role of covering and securing the left flank of the composite corps. The first objective assigned to be captured by the divisions in line included the Hindenburg system on both banks of the canal and the Hindenburg reserve line a mile to the E.; once these had been secured the supporting divisions were to pass through and carry the last line of defence, the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line, between the latter village and Le Tronquoy.
The German Second Army, facing the Fourth Army, consisted at this time of the LIV., IV. Reserve and LI. Corps in line, and the XL Corps in reserve. The III. Corps on the right of the German Eighteenth Army was also partly on the Allied front. Ninety-eight divisions were in line and others in support, but neither physically nor morally were these troops all that could be desired. Moreover, though they must have been well aware that an attack was coming, the date and time were unknown and remained unknown till the moment of the assault.
The preliminary bombardment commenced at 10 P.M. on Sept. 26 and went on for 56 hours; about 1,600 guns of all calibres took part in it, yet so formidable were the hostile defences that the task of the infantry still remained one of great difficulty. This was enhanced by the fact that only in certain sectors where the canal passed under the Belh'court tunnel was it possible to employ tanks, of which some 130 were allotted to the left of the IX. Corps and to the Composite Corps.
Nevertheless, when the infantry broke forward to the attack at 5:55 A. M. on Sept. 29 under cover of the morning mist their advance made rapid progress.
On the IX. Corps front, while the 6th Div. on the right secured the army flank about Gricourt, the 46th Div. overran all obstacles in its front, swam or crossed the canal, stormed Bellenglise village and the defences beyond, and by 3 P.M. was in possession of its objectives everywhere. At the cost of only 800 casualties it had penetrated some 3½ m. deep into the most formidable part of the hostile fortress, routed the four enemy divisions in its front and taken 4,200 prisoners and 70 guns. It was perhaps the most astonishing single feat of arms in the World War. The 32nd Div. passing through found its task much sim- plified, and before nightfall had carried the Hindenburg reserve line on practically the whole of its front, taking a further 800 men and 20 guns in its advance.
Farther to the left, however, matters had gone less well on the front of the composite Australian-American Corps. Gallantry and inexperience induced the U.S. Div. in the front line, handicapped 'from the start owing to confusion in the preliminary assembly of their units, to push too far forward without making sure of the ground in their rear. The supporting Australian divisions therefore found themselves in a difficult situation, which was only redeemed by hard and skilful infantry fighting. On the right of the corps sector the 5th Australian Div. finally
