failure Boroevid abandoned his attacks. The river was a serious obstacle; the Italian defence was sound; it was clear that prolonged and careful preparation was necessary.
Conrad and Boroevic were making no headway, but a more dangerous attack was being conducted by Krauss, between the Brenta and the Piave. Krauss, who now had Krobatin's troops under his orders, and subsequently drew reinforcements from Stein's group, wished to organize a double drive through the Brenta and Piave gorges, and reach the plain by the tactics he had successfully employed in the Plezzo basin. Attempts to break through by the valley roads were quickly frustrated. Krauss blames his divisional commanders, who, he says, were opposed to these tactics, and could not make up their minds to a resolute attempt. An effort was finally made in the Quero gorge on Nov. 17 and failed badly. Nor were the numerous gallant attempts to capture the all-important ridge of Monte Tomba-Monfenera, which ran down from the Grappa massif to the Piave, more successful in breaking through the thin Italian lines. The struggle at this point lasted for five days, from Nov. 18 to 22, and the Italian IX. Corps, under Ruggcri Laderchi, fought a great fight. The critical day was Nov. 22. In the morning Krauss's troops, the Bosnians and the German Jager, who had both been heavily punished already, made a great effort to break through. The attacking columns reached the crest of Monte Tomba, but their bolt was shot; and Mon- fenera still held firm and raked their left flank. The Italian position, however, was critical in the extreme, for the line had become very thin, and there were no reserves to speak of. At dusk a message came from Di Robilant that he was sending up a brigade of the VI. Corps, which had been drawn from the reserve of the III. Army. A later message promised another brigade. Ruggeri Laderchi took his courage in both hands, and, without waiting, counter-attacked with his own battle-worn troops. He drove the enemy off the ridge, except at one point where a gallant handful of men still clung to a knob of hill that had been made into a machine-gun redoubt. Next day the reserves arrived, and the line was firmly established. Only one more attack was made in this sector and both Jager and Bosnian divisions had to be withdrawn and re-made.
When he failed in his first attempt to go through in the valleys, Krauss resigned himself to a frontal attack upon the mountain lines between the Brenta and the Piave. He claims justly that the conditions were very difficult, but he made a big effort. The attack with his centre and right began on Nov. 21, while he was still hammering against Monte Tomba with his left, and he gained ground to begin with, driving back the Italian outpost lines in the Grappa sector. For a week the attack lasted, but little progress was made. The 22nd Schiitzen and Edelweiss Divs. who had broken through at Plezzo, and the 94th, from Krobatin's army, gained a little ground on the right, the Alpine troops of the 22nd capturing the summit of Monte Pertica, but the German Alpenkorps and the Austrian 5oth, which had passed to Krauss from Stein's group, to replace the battered Bosnian and Jager divisions, made no headway against the salient of Solarolo and Spinoncia, or against the Tomba- Monfenera line. They succeeded in taking various positions, among them Spinoncia, but they could not hold them against the Italian counter-attacks, and further attempts to extend the success gained on the right were equally unsuccessful. On Nov. 26 the Edelweiss made a great attempt to capture Col della Berretta, but were repulsed, and a pause followed.
The breathing-space was needed by Di Robilant's troops, for the XVIII. and IX. Corps had been very highly tried, especially the latter. On Nov. 22 the situation in the Grappa sector had been improved by the arrival in line of the XXVII. Corps, already re-made, under the command of Di Giorgio; and the Corps distinguished itself greatly in the fighting which followed. But a new attack was preparing, when the situation was eased by the arrival in line of the British and French divi- sions which .had hitherto been waiting in reserve. On Dec. 2 three British divisions under Lord Cavan took over the Mon- tello sector, and a similar French force under Gen. Duchesne
relieved Ruggeri Laderchi's IX. Corps in the Monte Tomba region. It was expected that both these points would be the object of early attack, but as it turned out they were both left unmolested. Conrad and Krauss continued their attempts to break through on the mountain front, but Krauss confined his efforts to the positions west of Monte Grappa and the worrying Solarolo salient. Boroevic remained quiet on the Piave front, and the rest of Below's army was now practically a reservoir for Krauss, who drew divisions both from Scotti and from Hofacher, as well as from Stein. Krauss was finding the question of com- munications very difficult, especially for his artillery ammunition, and could not open his new attack till Dec. 10. On Dec. 3 Conrad, reenforced by fresh troops but still complaining that he was starved for means of attack, opened a heavy bombardment on the curve of the Italian front from Monte Sisemol to E. of Monte Badenecche. Next day, by a skilfully conducted attack following a liberal use of gas shells, he pinched up the Meletta-Badenecche salient, occupying both Tondarecar and Badenecche and taking Monte Fior and Castelgomberto in the rear. Next day Conrad's eastern columns pushed down quickly towards Foza, but were held by a rearguard of Bersaglieri and Alpini who fought off the attack until a new line was established farther S., covering Valstagna and the mouth of the Frenzela valley. But more than 11,000 prisoners were taken as a result of the gas bombard- ment and the breaking of the line at the base of the salient. It should be said that on this occasion as at Caporetto the Italian gas mask proved very unsatisfactory. The army was shortly afterwards equipped with the British mask.
The loss of the Meletta-Badenecche positions left another salient exposed to Austrian attack. The hills S. of the Valle dei Bonchi were now open to artillery fire and infantry attack on three sides, and, after a fortnight's preparation, on Dec. 23 Conrad launched a new attack on the Italian lines between Monte Sisemol and the Frenzela valley. The salient was quickly wiped out, several thousand prisoners were taken, and both Col del Rosso and Monte Melago were captured. Next day the Italians counter-attacked, and re-took Col del Rosso and Monte Melago. They established themselves firmly in their reserve lines, and repulsed another attack, the last, on Christmas Day.
Between Conrad's two efforts Krauss had made a determined attempt to drive the Italians off the Grappa line. His command was now increased to the strength of 10 divisions, six Austro- Hungarian and four German, and he did not spare his troops. He opened his attack on Dec. 1 1 by a push on each wing of his front, from the Brenta valley and Monte Pertica against Col della Berretta, and against both sides of the Solarolo salient. The attack from the N.E. was carried out by German troops, while W. of Solarolo and Col dell' Orso were picked Austro-Hungarian divisions. After the first day, when the Brandenburgers of the 5th Div. took Monte Spinoncia, the N.E. outwork of the salient, the Germans could make no more headway, in spite of repeated attacks, in which they were supported by the 94th Austrian Div. on the other side of the salient. Besides the sth, the 2ooth and the Jager also took part in the attack, which was renewed again and again during 10 days, but no further progress was made. Krauss, who reports that he was not allowed to have the German troops on the spot more than 48 hours before they were to attack, claims that this " excessive sparing " of the troops worked out badly, for they suffered from insufficient acquaintance with the terrain. However that may be, the German divisions, in spite of a great expenditure of shells, could gain no ground. Sometimes a position was gained for a few minutes, only to be lost again. The fighting was very stubborn.
Krauss had better success with his right wing. At the end of four days' hard fighting the Austrian 4th Div. had taken Col della Berretta and Col Caprile, though their occupation was not firmly established, and the Italians were continually counter- attacking. Four days more, and Krauss's men had captured Monte Asolone, which looks down the Valle di Santa Felicita to the longed-for haven of the plain. This was the term of the Aus- trian advance. On Dec. 20 the Italians counter-attacked, and won back a good deal of th,e lost ground, the last move in the
