lieved possible, and had thus contributed in no small degree to the victory on the Marne. But though this result had been achieved the first promise of their operations had not been ful- filled, and their initial success had been followed by a crushing defeat. It was thus of the first importance to hold fast on the western front as many as possible of those enemy troops who might be diverted eastwards if the situation there permitted it.
French G.H.Q. was, however, deceived with regard to the hostile situation. It was believed that the Germans too were suffering as acutely as the Allies from shortage of munitions, while the supposed losses in men and wastage of material were much in excess of the truth. All these causes contributed to Gen. Joffre's decision to adopt offensive policy, which was ex- pressed in a general order issued to his armies on Dec. 17. " The hour for attack has sounded," it ran. " We have hitherto checked the enemy's effort; and now it is a question of breaking it and definitely freeing our violated national territory." It seemed as if a general offensive was to be undertaken on the whole front from the Swiss frontier to the North Sea; but as a matter of fact all that took place was a few isolated operations, notably in Flanders, Artois and Champagne.
The IV. Army, under Gen. de Langle de Gary, this time held the line between the V. and III. Armies from Marquirez farm near Prunay to a point between Boureuilles and Chalad in the Argonne. From left to right the front was held by the XII. Corps (to which were provisionally attached the gist and p6th Territorial Div.), the 6oth Reserve Div., the XVII. Corps, the Colonial Corps, and the II. Corps.
The operations began on Dec. 20 after a short artillery prep- aration, and although they were carried out on a wide front from Prosnes to the Argonne the results were not great. The offensive continued on the 2ist and met with no better success. The XII. Corps lost heavily and was compelled to cease its attacks; the XVII. and Colonial Corps continued their efforts on Dec. 22, 23 and 24, capturing a part of the first German line at the price of numerous casualties. On the 25th the operations were suspended, and the enemy in his turn delivered a series of counter-blows which were repulsed. Towards the end of the month the IV. Army was reinforced by the IV. Corps from Picardy, which for the time being was held in reserve. At this period portions or the whole of eight enemy army corps (III., V. Armies) were opposed to the Allies in Champagne; from left to right these were a fraction of the VI., the XII. Reserve, the VIII., the VIII. Reserve, the XVIII. Reserve, a fraction of the VI., the XIII. and the XVI. Corps, besides Landwehr formations.
At the beginning of 1915 the situation was still very delicate in the Argonne, where the Germans reported every day captures of men and material, which French communiques were unable effectively to dispute. This succession of minor checks could not fail to exercise some effect on the position in Champagne and to hinder Allied progress there. The enemy's resistance was very stubborn, and he passed from defence to attack on more than one occasion. Up to the end of Jan. the Allies continued the same monotonous series of small attacks in the Perthes-Beause- jour area, the net result of which was a small gain of ground to the N. of Beausejour and Massiges. Continual bad weather and fogs then induced the command to order their cessation. By Jan. 15 the line had been pushed some 2,000 yd. to the N. of that held on Dec. 20; this had been effected after some 12 attacks and about 20 counter-attacks had been beaten off. In comparison with the terms of the general order for the offensive the smallness of the results achieved was striking, and the German High Com- mand did not fail to use its opportunity of pointing this out, affirming that their opponents' losses on the whole front during this period were 26,000 dead and 17,860 prisoners, and the total casualties, including the wounded, 150,000 men at least, while their own losses were less than a quarter of this figure. It was stated that the German estimate of Allied casualties was 100% too large; but it seems certain that even so they were much in excess of those suffered by the enemy.
From Feb. i to 4 the front in Champagne became even more active; the French continued to progress slowly in the Perthes
district, but on the 3rd there took place three German counter- attacks, to the W. of that village, N. of Mesnil and N. of Mas- siges, and in the last-named alone they met with some success, breaking the French main position on a 2,ooo-yd. front, and capturing over 600 prisoners, 9 machine-guns and 9 guns of small calibre. On Feb. 10, by a misunderstanding, an isolated attack was delivered near Souain by the 6oth Reserve Div. against Sabot wood; the enemy reconquered the lost ground in the afternoon and captured over 500 prisoners.
The general offensive which was to take place on this date was postponed to the I2th, and then to the i6th. The Russians had just been defeated in the Masurian winter battle, and their X. Army had been practically destroyed. French G.H.Q. con- sidered it essential to assume the offensive on a consider- able scale in order to hold fast the German troops on the western front; an easy victory was expected and Vouziers was given as the ultimate objective of the advance. On Feb. 16 3,000 yd. of trenches were captured between a point N.W. of Perthes and N. of Beausejour, with over 400 prisoners. The IV. Corps was held behind the XVII., ready to intervene. During that night ten German counter-attacks were repulsed; further prog- ress was made on the I7th N.W. of Perthes, and prisoners were taken belonging to six different German corps a singular mixture of units on so narrow a front. Two violent counter- strokes took place that night and the next morning between Souain and Beausejour, but met with no success; five further efforts were equally repulsed during the night of Feb. 18-19. Fighting continued all next day, the advancing French troops meeting everywhere with stubborn resistance; they succeeded, however, in capturing a redoubt N. of Beausejour, and another work N. of Le Mesnil. These partial attacks naturally proved unduly expensive in view of the results achieved; by the 27th the total of German prisoners taken since the i6th amounted only to 1,000, and the initial hopes with which the operations had been begun had thus in no sense been fulfilled. Meanwhile a new corps, the XVI., had been brought up from the Ypres area, "and it was for the moment intended to use it in a new and power- ful effort on the left of the battle front.
After the capture of the redoubt N. of Beausejour on the 27th, units of the Prussian Guard which had recently arrived in Champagne delivered a night attack N. of Le Mesnil, but lost heavily and were defeated. French progress between Perthes and Beausejour continued and by March the crest of the ridge parallel to the front of attack was secured. On the 3rd again the whole of the German trench system was taken to a depth of 1,000 yd. on a front of 6,000. On the 7th there commenced a series of attacks against a small copse Sabot wood which con- tinued till the 1 5th; every day saw the same monotonous repeti- tion of partial attacks and counter-attacks, every gain of ground being dearly purchased from the stubborn enemy.
On March 10 the German High Command announced that the winter battle in Champagne was virtually at an end, and that it had brought no change whatever as far as concerned the final result of the war. The main object of the French, to relieve the pressure on the Russians, had not been realized, any more than the proposed penetration to Vouziers. The Germans had made more than 2,450 prisoners; they had certainly lost heavily, more heavily even than in the Masurian battles, but still hardly more than one-third of the French casualties, which exceeded 45,000; and the new front in Champagne was more firmly es- tablished than ever. French G.H.Q. affirmed not less definitely, in a note issued on March 12, that the operations had attained all their objectives both local and general; the French had ad- vanced to a depth of some 2,000 to 3,000 yd. on a front of 7,000 and had obliged the enemy to throw in reinforcements equiva- lent to a new army corps.
Both these assertions are disputable. The principal French objective, the relief of the Russian front, had been only imper- fectly achieved. What were these 20-odd battalions diverted to Champagne in comparison with the masses engaged on the two fronts? Vouziers was still far off. The effect of the French attacks was greater than the enemy were willing to admit, it is
