Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/1096

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1042
MUNSEY, F. A.

materials. The munition production was most affected, as it used by far the greatest proportion of them. The Central Powers had in no way prepared for the supply of imported raw materials; and only the rigid organization subsequently set up, the technical skill in adaptation, and above all the creations of German chemistry, rendered it at all possible for the Central Powers to continue the struggle after the first three months. This applies especially to the administration of nitrogen and the " husbanded " metals. The extension of the area admin- istered by the Central Powers by the occupation of territory had, apart from the supply of mineral oils, only eased the situation principally in respect of foodstuffs. The production of coal and iron was subjected to the least change in relation to peace-time conditions, as these minerals were far from being purely import materials. Germany herself possessed sufficient coal and iron supplies. It is true that Austria-Hungary, whose peace-time requirements were 54 million tons 4 million im- ported from Germany had a desperate struggle for the neces- sary quantity throughout the whole war, and the failure of supplies was bound to reduce her iron production.

It was particularly on these products that the demand rose in comparison to those of peace-time, and the output from the German mines was not such as to meet the needs of an ally in addition. The lack of coal in Austria-Hungary pressed heavily on all her war industries, but most heavily of all on her munition industry. Had the Supreme Army Command not been able to exploit the Polish coal-mines the production of munitions would have had to be reduced even in 1916. Germany's iron supplies could not everywhere in every case meet the demand for special quality. The substitution of inferior steel for high-quality kinds has already been mentioned. Similar conditions prevailed in Austria-Hungary, intensified by the coal shortage, and only the strictest economy prevented the break-down of the iron industry.

Finally in 1918 the coal shortage, due to the necessary demands of the food industry and the railways, forced such a reduction of iron and explosives production that several works had to close down, and the manufacture of products of a similar nature had to be concentrated in the best-equipped factories.

In both the Central Powers the production of the other metals the " husbanded metals " was inadequate. Germany's own production of copper in peace-time amounted to 2,000 tons per month; in war the expenditure rose to 15,000 per month; in Austria-Hungary the production amounted to 150 tons per month as against a war demand of 3,000 tons per month.

For this metal, as well as for nickel, lead, zinc, tin and aluminium, central administration began early. This, with the fact that, at the outbreak of war, supplies were to hand in the industry, and, later on, the requisitioning of all " husbanded " metals even to those used in household utensils, saved muni- tion production from the breakdown that shortage of these metals would infallibly have produced. Even the church bells were utilized. Great electrolysing plants separated the pure copper. Consumption in the munition industry was opportunely reduced to a fraction through the above-mentioned use of substitutes in the designs.

The production of aluminium, of course, was substantially increased through the exploitation of the Austrian bauxite works.

At the outbreak of war the production of nitrogen threatened to be the most difficult. Both Powers had procured more than half their peace-time supplies from overseas in the form of Chile saltpetre. Nine-tenths of the whole consumption was consigned to agriculture. The yearly home production amounted in Germany to 110,000 tons free nitrogen held in ammonium sulphate from the coke and gas works, and 10,000 tons pro- cured from the air in the form of "lime nitrogen" containing 20% nitrogen by the Caso-Frank method. The processes for obtaining nitric oxide through combustion of the air were, on account of the great demand they made upon electrical energy, dependent upon efficient water-power, and therefore never rose to great importance in Germany. Of minor importance also were the similar Austrian works at Patsch in Tirol.

The Austrian home production was 20,000 tons in peace- time from the coke and gas works, and a small quantity from a lime-nitrogen plant at Sebenico.

At the outbreak of war the situation was frankly deplorable. Both countries had just made their allocations to agriculture. Thus Germany, for example, had only 9,000 tons of nitrogen in hand in July 1914; on account of the lack of the most important raw stuffs the production of explosives seemed doubtful. More- over, the stock of explosives themselves was extremely small Austria, for instance, had hardly enough explosive for her 30-5- cm. mortar-shells. Apart altogether from this the lack of nitrogen manure must adversely affect the whole food produc- tion. Thus the chemical industry had before it a wide field of action and it was in this very sphere that most was accomplished. Of all the achievements of German chemistry during the war the production of nitrogen out of atmospheric air alone is of permanent importance.

The methods of obtaining nitric acid which were in operation at the beginning of the war were of small extent and by no means on an industrial footing. This, however, was put right in a short time, partly according to the Ostwald and Haber and other processes, but mainly according to the Caso-Frank method. Great plants were erected. Austria-Hungary likewise built a large plant.

Germany was able to obtain from the air by the lime-nitrogen method 110,000 tons of nitrogen yearly, and Austria-Hungary 40,000 tons; direct production by combustion of the air or by the method of Prof. Dr. Linde from liquid air was also very largely employed. The combined nitrogen production in both States was finally 2\ times the peace-time supply (imports included), and the agricultural industries as well as that of munitions could be kept supplied.

Of the remaining raw materials the most important in relation to production were glycerin, acetone and alcohol. Hitherto glycerin had been produced through the decomposition of fat stuffs. With the growing necessity of preserving these means of subsistence the employment of other methods became imperative; of these, however, only that of extraction from sugar was of importance, and sugar itself was also scarce; therefore, in the interests of economy, the use of powder rich in glycerin was restricted to the uttermost.

The acetone obtained from wood distillation (which had increased considerably, especially in Austria-Hungary) was economized by alterations in her methods of powder manufacture. The same was the case with alcohol. The attempt to produce these stuffs from cellulose certainly produced interesting results, but never attained to a vast production.

In these ways the production of munitions interfered seriously with the nation's food economy.

To increase the production of toluol necessary for the produc- tion of T.N.T., and obtained from the derivatives of coal-tar, the Edelmann method was applied, in which toluol was produced from mineral oil. In this way the chemical industry played a considerable r&le in the supply of explosives, quite apart from the importance it acquired with the coming of gas warfare.

Most of the technical achievements of the industries of the Central Powers in the war lost their significance with the termination of the war. Their great value lay in the wide experience gained in adapting everything to the imperative needs of the situation. But at any rate the setting of nitrogen extraction on an industrial footing was an achievement of permanent significance and value. (J. K.*; W. J.*)

MUNSEY, FRANK ANDREW (1854- ), American publisher and newspaper proprietor, was born at Mercer, Me., Aug. 21 1854. He was educated in the public schools and became a telegraph operator in Augusta, Me. In 1882 he went to New York City and established The Golden Argosy, a magazine for children, later changing this to The Argosy, a magazine for adult readers. In 1889 he founded Munsey's Weekly, replaced two years later by Munsey's Magazine, the first monthly of its class to sell for the popular price of ten cents. He also founded The All-Story Weekly (1904) and The Railroad Man's Magazine