Chamber, Dec. 23; (c) Caillaux arrested, Jan. 14 1918; (d) decision to try him before High Court of Senate, Oct. 1918; (e) Senate Committee's report on case, Sept. 17 1919. All the time that Caillaux was under arrest, a part of which period he spent in a nursing home, he was under constant examination, either by the military authorities, or by Senator Peres, who was appointed to report on his case. The indictment against Caillaux was one of having " since the declaration of war, in 1914-5-6-7, in France and especially in Paris, and abroad, sought to undermine the security of the State abroad by manreuvres, machinations, and intelli- gence with the enemy, favouring the undertakings of the enemy against France or against her allies fighting against a common enemy, and of such a character as to favour the progress of enemy arms; crimes punishable by Arts. 77 and 79 of the Penal Code, and by Arts. 205 and 64 of the Code of Military Justice." The act of accusation reproached Caillaux with the fact that while the rest of his colleagues in Parliament were pursuing a common national policy, Caillaux remained outside that com- munity and was indeed the man upon whom Germany pinned her hopes of a premature peace. This document maintained that when Germany gave 20,000,000 francs for the purchase of the Journal to Lenoir, whose father had been employed by Caillaux during his secret Moroccan negotiations, she saw behind Lenoir Caillaux himself, and that the same thought inspired them in their dealings with Bolo. This tendency of the German Govern- ment to look upon Caillaux as their man was further shown by German censorship and army orders forbidding any praise of Caillaux which might compromise a person " whose activities may still be useful to us." This German trust in Caillaux was, according to the prosecution, based upon his pre-war negotiations with Germany in connexion with Morocco, and was further explained by Caillaux's connexion with the Bonnet Rouge and its group of defeatist newspapers. Caillaux, the act of accusation roundly declared, was " the pivot of treason." His own actions in S. America in 1914, and in Italy in 1916, went to support the arguments of the prosecution. In S. America, whither he was sent on a mission created in order to keep him out of mischief in France, he fell straight into the hands of a German agent, who kept his Government informed of Caillaux's actions and conversations. On his return from S. America at the beginning of 1 9 1 5 he received the visit of Hungarian agents acting the part of Germany, who desired to engage in peace negotiations with him. During his Italian journeys Caillaux was again the centre of all the disaffected elements, and his conversation was such as to arouse alarm in the minds of the Italian Government and the foreign embassies and legations. He spoke freely of France being exhausted by the war, and of the time when he would assume power again and conclude peace with Germany.
In a safe which Caillaux had rented in a Florence bank, a number of extremely important documents were discovered, among them being a plan for a coup d'etat. This plan provided for a complete change of all army commanders and generals; for the dismissal of the Chamber; for the summoning to Paris of certain regiments; for the arrest of a number of the chief patriotic politicians and newspaper directors; and the creation of a small ministry composed of dependable men. Peace, according to these notes, was only to be made after a referendum, and a law, which Caillaux himself called the Rubicon, was to be passed according to which for a period of 10 months the President of the republic could govern by decree. The document included a list of possible collaborators, and mentioned among those people who might be used, Landau, who was serving a sentence for treason, and Almeyreda, who committed suicide in prison while awaiting his trial on the same charge. Ceccaldi, a Corsican friend of Caillaux, was to be appointed prefect of police, in control of all the Secret Service of France. All the people belonging to the Royalist Action Franfaise were to be arrested and tried for treason.
Caillaux defended himself with the utmost vigour. He de- clared that it was not his fault, or by his desire, that all the undesirable agents of Germany looked upon him as their prey; that he was a patriot who had a policy. That policy might be right or wrong, but the mere fact of having opinions could not be
regarded as a crime. As to the plan for the coup d'etat, it consisted simply of notes jotted down with the natural detachment of a politician, and there was nothing to show that they represented his real convictions. He vigorously fought witnesses from Italy and S. America, but in spite of all his mental ability, was unable to furnish the High Court with a plausible excuse or explanation of the fact that he had been, throughout the war, the magnet for every intriguer for premature peace. On April 23 1920, Caillaux was condemned to three years' imprisonment, for ten years to the loss of his civic rights, and for five years to reside within a zone to be indicated to him by the Government, as well as to the costs of the case, amounting to about 53,000 francs. This verdict meant, since he had been already imprisoned for three years, that he was released the next morning. He went to live at Mamers, and was forbidden to come to the capital without permission from the Government. The formal verdict of the Court found him guilty of having been in relation with enemy agents in S. America, in Paris, and in Italy; with having been in correspondence with the enemy; and with having, owing to " guilty thoughts or am- bitions," given to the enemy information of the greatest value to him for the conduct of his defeatist propaganda in France; but exonerated him from the guilty intention required by Art. 77 of the Penal Code. The verdict was given at a time when the whole trial had ceased to have the burning importance it would have had during the war, and when Caillaux, in any case, would have had to disappear from French political life.
The Journal, In addition to Bolo, Senator Charles Hum- bert, who had played an important part in the Army Com- mittee of the Senate; Pierre Lenoir, the son of a wealthy pub- licity agent, who had been employed "by Caillaux; Desouches, an ex-barrister; and Georges Ladoux, captain of infantry, employed at the Central Intelligence Department in Paris, were involved in the charges arising from the purchase of the Jour- nal. They were brought to trial before the Third Court-Martial, on March 31 1919. After sitting for 34 days, the Court found Lenoir guilty of intelligence with the enemy; Desouches guilty of commerce with the enemy; and acquitted Charles Humbert and Capt. Ladoux. Pierre Lenoir was condemned to death on May 8 and Desouches was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, and a fine of 20,000 francs. These were the main treason cases, but a host of minor treasonable fry was brought to trial by the energy of Clemenceau's military justice.
Clemenceau and Man-power. He was no less vigorous in keeping the promises of his ministerial declaration in other directions, and the country was given an example of what resolute government can achieve when it has a clear aim before it, and takes its courage in both hands. The Painleve Govern- ment, in a desperate effort to cling on in office, had declared it impossible not to release the older men from service in the army. Clemenceau tackled the man-power nettle in quite another man- ner. He roundly informed the Chamber that, in spite of ap- proaching American aid, thanks to the disaffection of Russia and the general losses suffered by the French armies, the outlook for the future was not bright. The army demanded more men, and Clemenceau, who declared that his only war aim was to conquer, lost no time in getting them. The debate on Dec. 28 1918 showed that the Chamber intended to support Clemenceau who, far from holding out hopes of release to the older men with the colours, reminded the House that there were 1,200,000 mobilized men working in the rear who would if it were at all necessary have to return to the colours. He announced that the 1919 class would at once be got ready for active service, and that two classes of released conscripts would at once be called back to the army for a period of six weeks or two months, in order to carry through the programme of defensive works declared by G.H.Q. to be indispensable. A rigorous comb-out of all Government offices was carried through by M. Jeanenney, and all mobilized men of the 1914 class employed in State establishments in the rear were placed at the disposal of the commander-in-chief. Heavy in- creases in taxation, and a rain of decrees restricting consumption, closing shops and suspending manufacture of certain goods, were further evidences of the Draconian nature of the Government's
