Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/197

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FRONTIERS, BATTLES OF THE
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French survivor has left on record a vivid description of the scene in the town. " In the narrow streets the Germans pushed on in close order, and the French guns made such havoc in their ranks that the air was full of flying arms and heads and legs, of boots and helmets and swords and guns, that it did not seem to be real it looked like some burlesque. Even one of the gunners turned sick at the sight and turned to his commander saying, For the love of God, Colonel, shall I go on?' And the Colonel, with folded arms, replied, ' Fire away.' "

As for the XVIII. Corps, it came upon the field, but was S. of the Sambre between Thuin and Malines instead of being, as Gen. Lanrezac had hoped, on the Mons-Charleroi road in touch with the British. The Cavalry Corps of Gen. Sordet had fallen back during the night to Solre, and in the afternoon was sent to guard the crossings from Jeumont to Thuin, and also to hold the cross-roads at Mcrbes Ste. Marie on the far side of the river. The night march following on long and arduous work in Belgium had been fatiguing to the horses, and the cavalry corps was in need of rest. Gen. Joffre had prescribed that it was to move to the British left, but Gen. Lanrezac considered that it was not in a fit state to move until the evening of the 23rd. It was not, however, until the 26th that it arrived on the outer flank of the British in the battle of Le Cateau.

To Gen. Lanrezac on the evening of the 22nd the situation of the V. Army seemed grave, but by no means desperate. Only two of his corps, the X. and III., had been engaged, and if these had suffered heavily they had also made the enemy pay the price. Withdrawn to more open terrain, where their artillery could render better support, they could re-form and, so he hoped, in their turn take the offensive. Further, the I. Corps was intact and now becoming available on the right, as was also the case with the XVIII. Corps on the other flank; and the reserve divisions of Gen. Valabregue were coming up to support it. And as for the British, they were now arriving in position on the left round Mons. In one way Gen. Lanrezac was much more fortu- nate than he knew. Gen. von Billow had attacked prematurely by forcing the Sambre on the 2 2nd instead of waiting for the attack of the III. Army against the Namur-Givet section of the Meuse to take effect, and the retirement of the V. Army during the 22nd had seriously discounted the German chances of enveloping it.

The chief interest in the battle of Charleroi is bound up with the narrative of the operations of Aug. 23, the day on which the British forces were engaged in the battle of Mons on the left of Gen. Lanrezac's army. Particulars of the battle were long shrouded in mystery, and the phrase "L'enigme de Charleroi " even came into current use.

On the morning of Aug. 23 the situation of the French V. Army was as follows: The I. Corps had one division echelonned from Sart St. Laurent to Lesves; the main body were assembling in the area Ermerton-sur-Biert-Anthee; three battalions were detached to Namur; the 5ist Reserve Div. was holding the Meuse from Hermeton to Yvoir; all bridges had been destroyed except those at Dinant and Hastiere. The X. Corps had its right on the high ground S. of Fosse and Vitrivel, left at Scry. The III. Corps (reenforced by a brigade from the XVIII. Corps) was deployed on the line Gerpinnes-Nalines-Claquedent. The XVIII. Corps was on the line Ham-sur-Heure-Thuin, with detachments on the Sambre as far as Merbes-le-Chateau. The cavalry corps of Gen. Sordet was holding the passages of the Sambre from the left of the XVIII. Corps to Maubeuge. The 53rd and 6gth Reserve Divs. (Gen. Valabregue) were about Solre le Chateau.

Gen. Lanrezac's orders were to the effect that the X., III., and XVIII. Corps should hold on to their positions; the I. Corps should form up on the right of the X., and, if possible, act against the left flank of the Germans attacking the corps. The reserve divisions of Gen. Valabregue were to relieve the cavalry corps of Gen. Sordet, which was to make for Maubeuge with the object of emerging eventually on the left flank of the British army.

On the German side the orders of Gen. von Biilow were briefly as follows: The attack was to be continued on the 23rd on the

following frontages: the VII. Corps, left of the line Thuin- Boussu-Cerfontaine, was -to cover the right of the II. Army from Maubeuge and to reconnoitre in the direction of Avesnes; the X. Reserve Corps was to attack E. of the line Charleroi- Philippeville; the X. Corps was to attack E. of line Tamines- Mette-Rosee; the Guard Corps was to attack on the left of the X.; the line Fontaine-Valmont-Mettet was to be crossed at 8 A.M.

In his published account of the battle Gen. Lanrezac divides it into two distinct phases, the first from daybreak until 4 P.M., and the second from that hour until nightfall. In the first phase the course of the battle was as follows: The right wing of the X. Corps was driven back, and it re-formed between Scry and St. Gerard; the I. Corps deployed on the high ground round St. Gerard with its right about Sart-St. Laurent. This operation was completed about midday, and the I. Corps was then well placed to act against the flank of the Guard Corps, which was then attacking the X. Corps sharply. Gen. Franchet d'Esperey, commanding the I. Corps, instantly resolved to seize the opportunity and to attack an fond. His artillery pre- pared the way by an intense fire, and the Germans, apparently taken by surprise, suspended their attack to deal with this new danger. It was now about one o'clock, and Gen. Franchet d'Esperey was about to launch his infantry when disquieting news reached him from his right rear. The 5ist Reserve Div., which had relieved the I. Corps on the Meuse, had failed in its task, and had allowed troops of the German III. Army to cross the river. The report went on to say that the reserve battalions had fallen back in disorder and that a detachment of the enemy had occupied Onhaye behind the V. Army. Gen. Franchet d'Esperey had no alternative but to suspend his attack and to send a division and a brigade to deal with the peril behind. Emboldened by the enforced inaction of the French the Guard Corps again pressed on, its artillery maintaining a very severe fire. The French X. Corps and the fraction left of the I. Corps resisted energetically, with the result that in this portion of the field but little ground was lost, and connexion was still main- tained with the fortress of Namur.

While such was the state of affairs on the right wing, little was, in this first phase, taking place on the left wing. But after four o'clock a change for the worse set in in that portion of the field. The left wing of the III. Corps was taken by surprise and driven back by a sharp attack, with the result that the whole III. Corps fell back in confusion to the line Chastres-Morialme, while the XVIII. Corps, with its right now uncovered by the retirement of the III. Corps, was forced to withdraw to the stream which runs from Thuilles to Thuin. The reserve divisions of Gen. Valabregue, however, had come up to Bousignies and Thirimont. On the right wing, in this second phase of the bat tie, the X. Corps had been forced to admit a loss of ground, but it was only slight, and when night fell the corps was holding the line Graux-Mettet-Wagnee. As for the I. Corps the portion left at St. Gerard was holding its ground.

Reference has been made to the danger which was threatening the right rear of the V. Army by a German advance across the Meuse. The attack in this quarter was being carried out by the German III. Army in which the XII. Corps had been ordered to force the passage of the river at Houx and Dinant. To the right the XII. Reserve Corps had been directed to seize Yvoir, while on the left the XIX. Corps was ascending the river on the right bank towards Givet and Fumay.

During the 23rd, as already related, Gen. Franchet d'Esperey had been called upon to deal with the presence of a detachment of the III. Army which had forced its way over the river. A brigade was directed upon Anthee, and to it was attached the provisional cavalry brigade from the X. Corps. On arrival at Anthee, about 6 P.M., the cavalry proceeded to reconnoitre in the direction of Dinant, as well as the villages of Onhaye and Leune. Some sharp fighting took place,' and about 10 P.M. the French infantry carried Onhaye with the bayonet. It appears that this attack by the French came upon the Germans some- what by surprise, and the units of the III. on the right bank of the Meuse were in consequence retained there for the moment.