vring could perform. At the same time a flank-protecting force,
of sufficient strength to guard against any possible attack by the
defeated V. Russian Army, would have to be told off from the
main body. At the IV. Army headquarters this flank-protecting
force was calculated, in consideration of all the determining
factors, at 4 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, so that 8 infantry
and 1-2 cavalry divisions would still be available for the blow
towards the south. But the Army Higher Command, in its
anxiety to keep the attacking force as powerful as possible,
wanted the protecting force reduced to 3 infantry and one cavalry
division. In view of the sharp defeat suffered by the V. Russian-
Army even such a force might possibly have sufficed had their
task been exclusively that of protecting the IV. Army, but this,
as will be seen, was not the case. If all the conditions here out-
lined were fulfilled, there was certainly reason to hope for a
favourable decision which would undeniably have great tactical,
and possibly even greater political, results. It was absolutely
essential, however, (i) " to have an unconditional guarantee of
the I. Army's power to hold out N. of the San-Tanew region, at
least up to the line of the For; (2) that the wheel manoeuvre of
the IV. Army should succeed completely; (3) that this army
should be covered by the pinning down of the V. Russian Army
on the lower Huczwa; (4) that the main attack from N. to S.
in the area E. of the Wereszyca should be successful." 1
Turning to a consideration of the scheme of operations under (6), the " concentration of all four armies on the San," it would seem that the obvious drawback was that it would rob the two victories of Krasnik and Komarow of their strategical impor- tance. To give up yet another slice of Galicia would have been a disadvantage from the military and still more from the political standpoint. Yet the plan was not without considerable advan- tages. First and foremost the II. and III. Armies would have a still longer respite from the enemy's attentions and could have all the available reinforcements and supplies sent to them at leisure. The Russian opponent would then find himself opposed by an entrenched front, which as far as could be foreseeen he would be unable to overpower with his first- and second-line forces on the spot; while the time gained would certainly give the Austro-Hungarian armies opportunities for an offensive attack from the manoeuvre area on the San. Finally the IV. Army would have one or two days in which to pursue and rout the defeated enemy before wheeling from the battle-field. In addition this scheme of operations offered the least risk in con- trast to (a), in which practically everything was staked on one throw, a risk for which no absolute necessity could be pleaded. Nor could the fact be overlooked that unlike Russia the Dual Monarchy had, in the united armies at that moment in Galicia, practically all its available military forces assembled and could still absolutely rely on them. The Army Higher Command decided to solve the problem by the first scheme. It was by far the more daring, and yet, given the four conditions just enu- merated, it was not unreasonable, so long as these conditions obtained, to count upon that measure of luck which must al- ways attend the execution of a resolve to force a direct decision.
First of all the advance of the IV. Army's main body was expedited to the utmost by order of the Army Higher Command. It will be remembered that the battle of Komarow was brought to a complete finish only on Sept. 2, early in the morning. In order to carry out the Army Higher Command's instructions the heads of the newly grouped army columns would have to reach the line Belzec-Uhnow by the evening of the following day. But this line lay 30 km. to the S. of the axis of the battle-field, that is, in precisely the opposite direction from that of the previous advance.
The immense difficulties which arose out of this re-grouping, particularly in the case of the mass of transport, need not be dwelt on here. It is enough to say that by Sept. 5 everything was in order, and the army began its prescribed march south- wards in three great columns. The western column (IX. Corps) was composed of 3 divisions (the 25th, loth and 26th), the centre
'Extract from Auffenberg-Komarow's A us Osterreich-Ungarns Teilnahme am Weltkrieg, Berlin, 1920.
(VI. Corps) also had 3 divisions (the 3Qth, 27th and isth), the eastern (XVII. Corps) 2 divisions (the igth and 4ist) as well as 2 march brigades. These three columns, marching towards the line Magierow-Niemirow, given as their first destination, were preceded by the 6th Cav. Div. and followed by the 3rd Infantry Div. echeloned to the left, and by the 2nd Cav. Div. still further behind. Protection in rear was provided by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's newly formed army group, consisting of the 4th and I3th Divs. of the II. Corps, and the 8th Inf. and gth Cav. Divisions. The Army Higher Command's original order was that the IV. Army should continue the pursuit of the defeated enemy as long as possible and then wheel to the S., but it was also to protect the I. Army's right flank against which the enemy's attacks were becoming more and more alarming. Indeed this question of protection assumed an ever-growing importance in the eyes of the Army Higher Command and an order was pres- ently issued placing the whole of the Archduke Joseph Ferdi- nand's army group under the I. Army command with the excep- tion of certain detachments to be left behind. On these detach- ments the IV. Army would now depend entirely for protection in its rear. But the circumstances did not as will be seen admit of such a splitting up of the army group as this entailed, and the double task had undoubtedly an adverse influence on the measures taken by the group commanders. The idea of transferring the whole of the Archduke's army group to the W. was probably inspired mainly by a captured radio-telegram from the Russian Supreme Command which led the Army Higher Command to assume that " the V. Russian Army (Plehwe) was being transported by train from Wladimir Wostok to Brest Litovsk and that any danger threatening the IV. Army from the N. was therefore removed." One more example of a false or misinterpreted report which was to lead to fateful decisions!
Meanwhile, from Sept. 3 onwards, all the II. and III. Army detachments which had been thrown back behind the Wereszyca line were concentrating in preparation for a prolonged defence. On the left (northern) wing of the III. Army in particular 6 infantry divisions, ready for action, were assembled, and here too the 4th, loth and nth Cav. Divs. were brought together for recuperation. From this time on, these cavalry divisions were to be under the IV. Army Command. Lastly the IV. Corps was assigned to the II. Army, or rather to its right wing. Thus apart from the Landsturm formations the II. Army (forming the right wing of the united front) could now take the field with 9 divisions and the adjacent III. Army with 7 divisions.
The IV. Army, once it had overcome all the obstacles caused by its wheel through 180 degrees, made its advance southwards in good style, bringing up the heads of the armies to their proper destinations each day, though the left wing column (XVII. Corps) came sharply into contact with some enemy units coming from the east.
The forward push of the I. Army towards the Lublin area came to an end on Sept. 2. On the 3rd and 4th there were local battles along the line of its advance, but from Sept. 5 onwards pressure on the I. Army's right wing was so strong that it was forced to give ground and had to be withdrawn behind the line of the Por. This involved a retirement on the other parts of the front, which even the appearance on the scene of Gen. von Woyrsch's Prussian Landwehr corps failed to prevent. Even so the enemy's pressure on the I. Army's right wing was still so strong that both the I. Army Command and the Army Higher Command appealed to Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's group for help an appeal to which it was now impossible to respond. It is evident from the map that the enemy columns, curving outward to the N., had begun to be a menace to the advancing IV. Army, while the 3rd and 8th Divs. echeloned in rear were forced to deploy fully in an eastward direction against enemy columns su- perior in numbers. The 8th Div. was hereby compelled to fight a very sharp and costly action. The 3rd Div. during the night of Sept. 6-7 succeeded in surprising a Russian division in the wood N. of Hujcze, but in the general fighting that ensued was forced to retire westwards and" join up with the XVII. Corps.
The Army Higher Command, to whom all these events were
