lericans whose troops were for the most part not yet suffi-
- ntly trained for a war of movement would merely be swept
ito the general debacle. Entirely inexperienced in the leading of great masses, they would hardly change the decrees of fate. The Germans had of course to take into account the fact that
-even a complete military victory by the Central Powers in 1918 the continent would not end the war, so long as the will of lyd George in. England was- unbroken. Again, should the tente by a great effort succeed in readjusting the situation on continent, the war of starvation could be carried on with ater effect in proportion as the submarine menace diminished. ie question was therefore whether the Central Powers, after subduing their enemies on the continent of Europe, could still hold out economically. The opening of the Ukraine had come so late that it was extremely doubtful whether its resources would be available in time to stave off the threatened economic collapse of the nations of the Quadruple Alliance. Ludendorff had no illu- sions upon this point, being convinced that it was absolutely
I essential to have his military offensive in the west accompanied and supported simultaneously by a political offensive on a large scale on the English home front. This would be directed toward bringing about the fall of Lloyd George and persuading the English nation to accept rather Lord Lansdowne's efforts in the direction of peace. It was for the political leaders to call into being and carry out a propaganda offensive of this nature. The commander-in-chief could only demand it and this he did.
As early as the middle of Jan. 1918, Ludendorff had handed in to the Imperial Chancellor, with a strong personal recommenda- tion, a memorandum for a German political offensive drawn up by Colonel von Haeften. But this urgent warning to the political leaders of the State met with no response. The politicians were unmoved. Once more, on June 3 1918, Ludendorff made another passionate appeal to the Chancellor to undertake a political offensive against the English home front, again sending a memo- randum by Colonel vori Haeften, which this time included a detailed plan of campaign. But it was unavailing.
The question arises here whether the German Supreme Com- mand would not have done better, at a moment when they were militarily strong, to attempt their utmost to induce the political heads of State to prepare the way for peace. Ludendorff 's pub- lished memoirs show that it was never opposed to efforts aiming at an honourable peace that would safeguard the existence of the German Empire. But all the attempts in this direction made by the political leaders found the Allied Governments unresponsive, and were regarded merely as signs of internal weakening in the Central Powers. Ludendorff was to see for himself, shortly before the beginning of the great spring offensive, how little the attitude of the Entente statesmen had changed and how hopeless and damaging the renewal of any such attempt would prove. According to a credible report from a neutral country, Washing- ton's readiness to enter into official peace negotiations depended upon the following preliminary conditions: the unconditional evacuation of northern France and Belgium; the payment of reconstruction expenses; Alsace and Lorraine to be made inde- pendent; the annulling of the treaty of Brest Litovsk, just
1 concluded in the east; reference of all eastern questions to a peace conference to be summoned by the Entente; and a complete change of the Government system in Germany on lines to be laid
. down and enforced by President Wilson later. A commander- in-chief who, in the spring of 1918, should have pressed the politi- cal leaders to pave the way for peace negotiations under such conditions, without having tried for a decision on the field, would have been cursed by his fatherland.
Plan for a Break-through at St. Quentin. Suggestions for an offensive had been made by the higher command of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria's army group after the English offensive in Flanders had died down in the beginning of Nov. 1917. The suggestions culminated in the proposal to launch the main attack from the Armentieres-La Bassee front in the direction of Hazebrouck against the right flank and rear of the British, on the assumption that they would certainly concentrate their forces in Flanders in the coming spring for a renewed break-through xxxii. 32
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operation in the direction of the German submarine base. The Allies would then obviously be in a difficult operative position. The mass of their fighting forces would be crowded up on the extreme N. wing of the whole western front. To bring up strate- gic reserves would take time. On their left flank and rear lay the sea. For the British in particular, strategically less trained as they were, it would not be easy to deploy their closely packed masses in the direction of the right flank and to cover their threatened communications, all the more so as a large part of their non-mobile righting material was rigidly fixed. Tactically the prospect of breaking through the front was a good one, since the attackers would be faced by few positions technically very strong. It was, however, recognized that the country would be a difficult one in which to follow up the attack, which would be hemmed in between two commanding ranges of hills, and still further confined to the left by the La Bassee canal. It would therefore have to advance mainly in the wet Lys depression, and the ascent to the Bailleul and Hazebrouck heights would have to be carried by fighting. On account of the wet ground the opera- tion would probably have to wait until the middle of April. General Ludendorff fully acknowledged the advantages of the proposed operation, but laid stress on the serious difficulties presented by the ground, and above all on the point that the attack, being dependent on the weather, could not be made early enough. He considered that an attack in the region of St. Quentin offered better prospects. When the line of the Somme- Peronne-Ham had been captured, the attack could proceed in a N.W. direction, resting its flank on the Somme, and might succeed in rolling up the British front. The higher command of Crown Prince Rupprecht's army group held to its own point of view, however, that the attack on the line Armentieres-La Bas- see in the direction of Hazebrouck code name "St. George" was to be preferred on tactical and strategical grounds to any other offensive setting in farther to the south. Their reasons were thus stated in a memorandum of Nov. 20:
" In consideration of the general political situation and the appear- ance on the scene of the Americans, the attack should clearly be made as soon as possible. On the other hand a decisive effect can only be attained if the objective, i.e. the mass of the British army, is securely united in massed groups in Flanders. This condition of security can only exist when the British in Flanders are preparing to attack. Our offensive can only set in when this has become a cer- tainty. The British must .attack in Flanders again in the coming year. They are forced to do so by our submarine base. We may therefore count on it with certainty and make a strategic use of the situation. Side by side with these considerations arises that of the difficult nature of the ground in the Lys depression, which makes it imperative not to attack too early. From previous experience and observation it would appear that considerable difficulty may be expected with the ground and the water up to about the middle of April. . . . The British in Flanders have similar ground conditions to consider. If they proceed to the offensive, our attack at Armen- tieres Estaires would presumably be possible also. We should do best therefore both as regards the operative effect and the state of the ground to wait until the British attack in Flanders. It will then be necessary at first for us to give way before the enemy offen- sive in Flanders and so far as possible on the French front also. If we accept the defensive battle, we shall have to tie up such strong forces in the process that we shall not be powerful enough for an attack. We can without hesitation afford to retire as far as the line Vladsloe-W. of Roselare Werwicq, as the submarine base will still be covered."
Opposition was also raised in some quarters to an attack from the La Bassee canal front to the corner of Bullecourt, on the ground that it would come up against a strongly fortified system, and that no rapid result at the start could be expected. The enemy would, it might be assumed, gain time for bringing up his reserves from the north and the south. " Unless the circum- stances change considerably in our favour there is a danger of the operations resulting in a pocket being formed in the front and not in a decision in the war of movement."
The idea of an attack delivered from the II. Army's front code name " Michael " was criticized as follows by the higher command of Prince Rupprecht's army group:
" Decisive operations by the II. Army can only aim at a break- through of the enemy front and the attainment of the best possible results in the war of movement against the enemy's reserves. The
