March 16, the last, number 95, on Sept. 4; of the whole series over 12 million leaflets were sent to France.
Later, in 1918, when, under the energetic direction of Lord Northcliffe, the machinery for propaganda in enemy countries was greatly increased, there was a further extension of distribution by balloons. The military successes of the Allies were being concealed from their troops by the Germans, and it was thought that quick and accurate information would further demoralize the Germans. In conference with the War Office, Lord Northcliffe's department arranged that the leaflets should be divided into two categories, “stock leaflets,” the contents of which would not deteriorate by a little delay, and “priority leaflets” containing matter of urgent importance. The latter were printed three times a week and sent in editions of 100,000 direct to Messrs. Gamage, who were manufacturing the balloons and the “releases.” They were at once prepared for distribution, handed over to the Military Transport Department and sent via Boulogne direct to the distributing stations. In favourable weather they were thus actually in the hands of the Germans 60 hours after being written.
But even with the best arrangements, distribution by balloon is subject to many delays from weather and other conditions. Lord Northcliffe continued to urge on the Cabinet the need of distribution by aeroplane, and was at last successful in breaking down the resistance. The writer of this article, then liaison officer between Lord Northcliffe's department, the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Air Force, in the second half of 1918 carried through the final stages of the negotiations. The last obstacle was the fear of the Air Ministry that bundles of leaflets suddenly scattered in the air might foul the steering guys of the aeroplanes; he devised a simple mode of packing the leaflets so that they would fall as a solid bundle for 20 ft. before dispersing. On the morning of the Armistice, the first packets of propaganda made up on this system were delivered to the Air Force in France.
The methods of distributing propaganda by the Allies were ascertained in a conference held in August 1918 at Crewe House under the chairmanship of Lord Northcliffe. Aeroplanes were used by the British forces in the Near East, and by the Italians, French and Belgians on the western front. But it was clear that either lack of aeroplanes or of personnel limited their use even by those who had no objection to it. The Italians used special devices such as rockets and shells, the French were experimenting with shells and trench-mortars and were trying to manufacture balloons on the British model, and both the French and Belgians sent large quantities of newspapers and of other matter to be distributed by the British balloons. The Americans had hardly reached the actual stage of distribution before the end of the war, but they had developed a small rubber balloon with a very ingenious timing device for releasing the load. It is a reasonable assumption, however, that all these methods would be replaced by aeroplanes in any later war.
Lord Northcliffe's Directorate.—In Feb. 1918 the Prime Minister appointed Lord Northcliffe to be Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Lord Northcliffe brought to the task a limitless faith in the possibility of controlling public opinion, a unique experience in the methods of publicity, and direct access to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. He selected a council of advisors and an executive staff of remarkable authority and talent, and Crewe House, in Mayfair, London, the headquarters of the new Department, quickly became the centre of far-reaching activity. A mere catalogue of the operations undertaken, and of the men who carried them out would occupy many pages.[1] But two names must be mentioned, as without them Crewe House would have been little more than a powerful addition to the existing propagandist agencies. Sir Campbell Stuart, a young Canadian who had been of great assistance to Lord Northcliffe on his mission to the United States of America, was selected as deputy-director of the de- partment and deputy-chairman of the committee. Lord Northcliffe's choice was fully justified by the remarkable powers of tact and conciliation shown by Stuart, who rapidly disarmed all suspicion on the part of existing organizations, found out how to get the best work out of all of them and how to combine their efforts towards a single resolute purpose. Lord Northcliffe selected Mr. H. Wickham Steed as his chief political adviser. Steed at the time was foreign editor of The Times, and for many years had been the representative of that journal in Rome and Vienna. He had an exceptional knowledge of the political personalities of modern Europe, the open policies and the secret aspirations of all the nationalities great or small. He was an idealist, believing that truth and justice could bring ordered peace to chaotic Europe; a realist, conscious of the stubborn obstinacy that would yield only to force and of the ignorance that misled the accepted leaders of men. Steed provided the knowledge and lofty enthusiasm which shaped the policy of Crewe House, Stuart the conciliatory tact which made concerted action possible, Lord Northcliffe the swift judgment between contending views, the experienced instinct for what was practical, and the driving force to make the practical actual. The present writer assisted at many intimate deliberations at Crewe House; he desires to add his own observations to the varying estimates that have been made of Lord Northcliffe. The Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries was patient in listening to the facts and arguments put before him, decisive in coming to a judgment on them, swift and powerful when action began. Steed's knowledge, Stuart's organizing tact, and Lord Northcliffe's driving force and far-reaching influence, made Crewe House different in quality and energy from any preëxisting agency.
The inspiring principle of the new organization was that propaganda should depend upon policy. It may be argued, although not convincingly, that a definite constructive Allied policy could not have existed in the earlier stages of the war, when fortunes were changing and the nature of the ultimate decision was uncertain. In any case, if a concerted policy did exist, it was unknown to those who were conducting propaganda. The wiser propagandists in most countries therefore endeavoured to limit themselves to a restricted field from which declared “war aims” and ultimate terms of peace were excluded. Rasher agents plunged, with results that were often ludicrous and sometimes disastrous. Dr. Lamprecht, the German historian, for example, confessed that the consequences of the German propaganda were often gruesome. Probably, he wrote, more harm came to the German cause from the efforts of the German professors than from all the efforts of the enemy. “None the less it was done with the best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German case without preparation. What was wanted was organization.” A single example will illustrate the results of lack of organization amongst the Allies. The French military authorities complained to the War Office that German propaganda appeared to be entering France in large quantities through England. They sent examples, and asked that precautions should be taken. On enquiry it was found that the incriminated documents were the product of one of the British civilian propagandist agencies. Doubtless it was a matter of opinion whether the French or English judgment of the efficacy of the leaflets was the more correct, but the real fault was the absence of harmonious effort. In 1918, the fifth year of the war, it became of vital importance that the Allied peace aims should be explained with a clear and unanimous voice to the war-weary enemy. It was to this purpose that Lord Northcliffe addressed himself. He used his influence first to extract from the British Government the broad lines of a definite policy, in order that the propaganda of his Department might not be in conflict with the casual and sporadic utterances of ministers, next to secure unity of purpose among the British and Allied propagandist agencies.
The first campaign was against Austria-Hungary. The British Government, hampered by the secret Treaty of London, hesi-
- ↑ Secrets of Crewe House, by Sir Campbell Stuart (London, 1920), gives an account of Lord Northcliffe's undertaking.
