Activity in Cyrenaica. While continuing hostilities against the French, the Senussi sheikh Sayed (Sidi) Ahmad esh Sherif in 191 1 aided the Turks in Cyrenaica, then commanded by Enver Bey (later Pasha) in the campaign against Italy. The traditional policy of the Senussites was one of suspicion in regard to the Turks but they had been won over by Pan-Islamic propaganda. By the Treaty of Lausanne, Oct. 1912, the Turks agreed to evacuate Tripoli and Cyrenaica. At that time the Italians held only the chief seaports of Cyrenaica, the rest of the country being in the military occupation of the Senussites and their allies. Sidi Ahmad continued the war with Italy, aided by a body of Turkish troops, which, contrary to treaty engagements, remained in Cyrenaica. The Italians devoted their attention to the occu- pation of the hinterland of Tripoli (including Fezzan), a process completed in Aug. 1914. In Cyrenaica they remained mainly on the defensive. General Ameglio, appointed governor of Cyre- naica towards the end of 1913, had however begun a vigorous campaign against the Senussites, when in Feb. 1914, in conse- quence of the threatening situation in the Balkans, orders were issued from Rome to suspend operations.
' When the World War began, and while Italy still remained neutral, Turkish agents, with German support, sought to make Cyrenaica and Tripoli bases of action against the French and British. To the tribes which rose in revolt in Tripoli and its hinterland the Senussites gave some support, but Sidi Ahmad, through the intermediary of chiefs friendly to Italy, was con- ducting unofficial negotiations, and had the Italians been willing to acknowledge his independence an accommodation with them might have been reached. He refused however to accept the position of "a protected Bey." By the spring of 1915 he was again attacking Italian posts. Strong efforts had been made for some time by the Turks and their German advisers to induce the Senussites to invade western Egypt; a special Turkish mis- sion now visited Sidi Ahmad and endeavoured to get him to proclaim a jihad. The Senussi sheikh was disinclined to take the advice offered him. The Senussites had always maintained good relations with Egypt for much of their trade they were depen- dent upon the good-will of the Egyptian authorities. It was the demonstration that the Turco-Germans could give him sub- stantial military and financial aid which finally changed Sidi Ahmad's views. A large number of Turkish officers and some Arabic-speaking German officers from the German garrison at Constantinople were smuggled into Cyrenaica, a matter of little difficulty. Among the arrivals was Nuri Bey, a half brother of Enver Pasha who exercised much influence. Nuri was joined in April 1915 by Ga'far Pasha, an Europeanized Arab of consider- able ability, and with and after Ga'far came arms, ammunition and other stores, including wireless and telephonic apparatus. 1 By Aug. 1915 the Germans were using the landing places be- tween Sollum and Tobruk as submarine bases. The time for putting the Turco-German plans into operation was approach- ing. These plans were, mainly through Senussite instrumentality, to threaten at once French north and central Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. It was also designed to penetrate to Cameroon and establish land communication between the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea. The Ger- man Emperor, as " Islam's Protector," exhorted Sidi Ahmad to "expel infidels from territory which belonged to true be- lievers." But besides the Senussi sheikh the only important chief won over to the cause was 'All Dinar, Sultan of Darfur, a trib- utary state of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the plan failed.
French determination to secure their position in the central Sudan contributed largely to the localization of the conflict. In 1909-10 the French had conquered Wadai (see 28.225), which adjoins Darfur, thereby withdrawing from the Senussite sphere a country in which they had been all powerful. In 1913, push- ing N. from Kanem into the Saharan borderland, Colonel Largeau conquered Borku, capturing 'Ain Galakka, the Senussite south-
l The German political agent was a certain Mannismann, who after the defeat of Sidi Ahmad endeavoured to persuade the Senus- sites to continue the war. He was attacked and killed in the desert by tribesmen hostile to Ahmad.
ern base, in November, of that year. In the middle of 1914 Bardai, the chief settlement in the Tibesti highlands, was occu- pied. 2 These newly conquered regions on the southern fringe of the Libyan Desert were placed under the control of Lt.-Col. J. Tilho. Though risings against their authority by chiefs acting on Senussite instructions, and raids by nomads continued up to the early months of 1917, the French posts formed an effective barrier against any Senussite advance into central Africa.
Campaign in Western Egypt. Since May 1915 the danger of a Senussite invasion of western Egypt had existed. It was due to the great tact with which Lt.-Col. C. L. Snow, 3 who com- manded the small force stationed in western Egypt, handled a very delicate situation that the rupture with the Senussites was delayed till Nov. 1915. At the last moment, early in November, a final effort was made to avoid a break, Sidi Mohammed el Idris, Senussite envoy in Egypt, being sent to Cyrenaica to arrange for the Senussi sheikh " to get rid of his Turkish advisers in return for a sum of money." It was too late; Sidi Ahmad was already well supplied with German gold as well as arms.
The enemy plan of campaign was to advance in parallel lines with two forces, one across the Libyan plateau, a great lime- stone tableland the other farther S. along the string of oases leading from Siwa to the Nile. Simultaneously the Sultan of Darfur was to rise in revolt, invade Kordofan and advance on Khartum. The plan was boldly conceived, but the danger to Egypt and the Sudan was not chiefly in the military force at the command of the Senussi sheikh and his allies. That danger lay in the spiritual authority exercised by Sidi Ahmad and the high prestige he enjoyed in Egypt. Many if not most of the 200,000 Bedouins of western Egypt were adherents of the Senussi sect and should the Senussi forces gain any strik- ing success it "might lead to serious religious and internal dis- orders." So wrote Gen. Sir John Maxwell, then commanding the forces in Egypt, who added that the Senussi peril was his principal source of anxiety not the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal.
The opening of the campaign was accompanied by great ac- tivity by German submarines off the Cyrenaican coast and in the Gulf of Sollum; among the boats sunk were the British aux- iliary cruiser " Tara " and the horse transport " Moorina." Sur- vivors of the crews were handed over to the Senussi and suffered great privations (Cyrenaica is a very desolate country and the Senussites themselves were often short of food). Land hostilities began on Nov. 15 but in view of the isolation and smallness of the Egyptian garrisons at Sollum and other advanced posts they were withdrawn, and a stretch of country 200 m. or more in length was at once overrun by the Senussites. They advanced as far as Dabya (90 m. W. of Alexandria and the terminus of the railway along the coast), sweeping past, but not attacking Mersa Matruh, the chief port of western Egypt and reached by boat from Alexandria in 1 2 hours. This port was made the base for the British operations.
General Maxwell's endeavour, in view of the internal situation, was to avoid anything in the nature of a reverse, to keep the enemy as far as possible from the Nile valley, and, as soon as possible, to strike a decisive blow at the Senussi and by his defeat to diminish his influence as a spiritual potentate. These aims were achieved, but at the outset the difficulty was to get together a force strong enough to undertake operation. In Aug. 1915, when the situation on the western Egyptian frontier became critical, the Gallipoli campaign was being vigorously prosecuted, while the Turks had again advanced towards the Suez Canal. When the Senussi invasion occurred the decision to evacuate Gallipoli had not yet been taken, while the British Government had just committed itself to the Salonika campaign. In these circumstances Sir John Maxwell had to content himself with collecting a " scratch " force to oppose the Senussi. The strength
2 Turkish troops had occupied Tibesti in 1910 and Borku in 1911. They were recalled at the outbreak of the war with Italy.
3 Col. Snow was killed in the first action (Dec. II 1915) by an Arab whom he was endeavouring to persuade to surrender. He had served over 20 years in the Egyptian coastguard and was intimately acquainted with the desert tribes.
