TACNA-ARICA QUESTION. Among long-standing disputes between states, the question of Tacna-Arica, between Chile and Peru, still remained unsolved in 1921. Its history can be summarized as follows.-
The Treaty of Ancon, which, ratified on March 28 1884, put an end to the war of 1879 between Chile and Peru, was carried out in its entirety with the single exception of Clause 3, dealing with the fate of the provinces of Tacna and Arica. In 1881, when Peru first sued for peace, Chile, with an eye to the future safety of her frontiers, demanded the cession of three Peruvian provinces: Tarapaca, Tacna and Arica. The Peruvian Government made no difficulty about the first-named, which passed definitely into Chile's possession; but they refused to consider the cession of the relatively valueless provinces of Tacna and Arica, on the ground that public opinion in Peru would never suffer it. To smooth the way for them Chile offered to purchase the territory in question for the sum, or equivalent, of ten million Peruvian soles, but the offer was rejected. The war therefore continued until 1882, when Chile succeeded in occupying the Peruvian capital. Chile again made the cession of Tacna and Arica a sine qua non for the signing of the peace treaty. The Peruvian Government's chief concern was to find a way of acceding without grievously wounding the national sentiment. Examples were not lacking in recent European diplomacy of a means of effecting this; France, especially, had had recourse to an expedient wherewith to save appearances and mask important transfers of territory, namely, Nice and Savoy in 1860 (Treaty of Turin), and the island of St. Barth61emy in 1877 (Treaty of Paris). That expedient consisted in inserting in the treaties whereby the territory was ceded a soothing stip- ulation for a plebiscite, which should decide, at some future date, its definite ownership. Comparison shows that the negotiators of the Treaty of Ancon, in drafting the clause concerning Tacna and Arica, followed closely enough the formulas provided by the Treaties of Turin and Paris. The clause runs as follows:
Art. 3. The territory of the provinces of Tacna and Arica, bounded . . . etc., shall continue in the possession of Chile and subject to Chilean legislation and Chilean authorities for the term of ten years, reckoned from the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace. This term having expired a plebiscite shall decide by popular vote whether the territory of the said provinces is to remain definitely under the domain and sovereignty of Chile or continue to form part of Peru's territory. The country in whose favour the provinces of Tacna and Arica shall be annexed shall pay to the other ten million pesos in Chilean silver money or in Peruvian soles of equal fineness and weight.
A special protocol, which shall be considered an integral part of the present treaty, shall establish the form in which the plebiscite is to take place and the terms and periods in which the ten millions are to be paid by the country which shall remain owner of the provinces of Tacna and Arica.
Chile's contention subsequently was that this clause was inserted solely in order to allay Peruvian national resentment and so to make possible the conclusion of peace; that the plebiscite to which it refers was to be carried out under such conditions as to render inevitable the definite annexation of Tacna and Arica, upon which Chile had insisted from the first; that the sole pur- pose of the stipulated lapse of 10 years before the plebiscite should be held was to give the Peruvian people time to accustom themselves to Chilean rule, and that the sum of 10 million soles which would be paid by Chile was meant as compensation for the cession. Peru, on the other hand, maintained that the pleb- iscite clauses introduced into such treaties as those of Turin and Paris had not the disguised intention that Chile claimed, and that, even supposing they had, the plebiscite called for in the Treaty of Ancon was of a very different nature.
The period of 10 years had not expired before Peru took steps to secure the holding of the plebiscite, proposing conditions, which, as they included the restriction of the vote to the Peru- vians born in the two provinces, proved unacceptable to Chile. Several years of fruitless negotiation ensued, and in 1901 Peru
severed diplomatic relations. Four years later she accepted Chile's invitation to renew their intercourse, and to seek with her neighbour an agreement based upon the interests and con- j venience of the two republics; but the Peruvian plenipoten- tiary, on his arrival at Santiago, made it clear that his Govern- ment desired no other agreement than such as would forward the carrying-out of the plebiscite under the same conditions proposed previously, and diplomatic relations were again broken off.
Notwithstanding her contentions as to the purely accom- modatory nature of the clause in dispute, Chile always declared her willingness that the plebiscite should be held, provided the suffrage were not limited to Peruvians but extended to all the adult inhabitants of the provinces, including foreigners resident therein since a certain date, who could read and write; and that a representative of Chile, as the nation exercising sovereignty over the territory, should preside over the commission control- ling the proceedings. For her part, Peru insisted that the 10 years stipulated for the holding of the plebiscite was a maximum period, and that since its expiry in 1894 Chile no longer exercised such sovereignty de jure, and could not therefore justly claim to preside. Chile, on the contrary, held that the term was intended as a minimum period.
Diplomatic intercourse having been resumed, Chile, in IQIO, made definite proposals for the holding of the plebiscite in accordance with her contentions. Peru refused, and once more broke off relations.
In 1920 Peru made formal request for the revision of the Treaty of Ancon by the 1921 Assembly of the League of Nations, but later withdrew her demand, reserving the right to renew it at a future Assembly. The problem of Tacna and Arica stood in 1921 therefore in much the same position as at any time sub- sequent to the Treaty of Ancon, though towards the end of the year suggestions for arbitration were again under discus- sion. The area of the territory in dispute was only 23,306 sq. km., and only 18,000 ac. were in 1921 under cuLivation. The pop. numbered no more than 37,000, and the trade and indus- try were almost negligible. Nor were any ethnical, linguistic or religious considerations involved, the inhabitants, whether Chil- ean or Peruvian, being of the same race, speaking the same lan- guage and professing the same faith.
TACTICS[1] (see 26.347*). While personal reminiscences of the Great War had up to 1921 appeared in plenty, and in many languages, it is remarkable that so far no comprehensive and scientific study of its abiding tactical lessons had been published. Diarists and biographers there had been; also not a few training-manuals and text-books; but the world was still awaiting the Clausewitz or Henderson who would show it how military science developed from 1914 to 1918 in the minds of great leaders, how the world struggle differed from anything and everything that preceded it, and how it was finally lost and won. This is the task which will eventually confront the true biographer of Marshal Foch, the greatest soldier figure of the war, when it becomes possible to follow his innermost thoughts during the progress of the conflict. The future historian will have to show how principles and theories which had been developed during a lifetime of profound study were abandoned, modified or confirmed as the result of experience of modern war, contact with the military chiefs of Allied nations and bitter contest with the best military brains Germany and Austria could produce. When some skilled military writer shall have interpreted Marshal Foch as G. F. R. Henderson interpreted Lee and Stonewall Jackson, it may be possible not only to understand the Allied victory but perhaps even to penetrate into the future and to realize some of the simpler problems which war on the great scale has in store. That is the best the military historian can hope to do so to present the picture of the past as to throw
- ↑ This article may be considered also as supplementing, for the World War, the article STRATEGY (25.986).
- These figures indicate the volume and page number of the previous article.
