very gradually to give ground, while from daybreak on the 4th the enemy's attack developed also against the British centre and left-center, held by troops of the 52nd and 5$rd Divisions. The enemy was evidently now fully committed. He appeared, how- ever, to have miscalculated to some extent the direction of his main enveloping attack. As his captured air-reconnaissance reports subsequently showed, he was probably unprepared to find the British right flank extended so far S., and consequently failed to direct his enveloping movement sufficiently far to the westward. General Lawrence had the 42nd Div. in reserve at Pelusium station, 5 or 6 m. W. of Romani, and he ordered this division up to his right in order to be ready to attack the enemy's outer flank. Sir Archibald Murray, meanwhile, ordered the independent mobile column to move out wide round the enemy's flank against his left rear. Naval cooperation was afforded by monitors, whose fire from the sea helped to keep down the fire of the enemy's heavy howitzers.
The enemy's containing attack against the British left and centre was not pressed; his force was insufficient for any such purpose. His main enveloping attack, in a waterless region of soft sand and high dunes, had spent its force by the early after- noon. The march of the 42nd Div. from Pelusium had been delayed, but long before its leading troops could come up the mounted troops, with the reserve of the 52nd Div., had begun to press back the enemy's left, and by nightfall had removed any danger on the southern flank. At daybreak on the sth the south- ern front was completely cleared, the 42nd Div. advancing on this flank. Farther N. the 52nd Div. moved out in a south-easterly
t direction against the enemy's right wing, which assumed the r61e of rearguard, while the mounted troops on its right pressed on eastward. These converging movements drove the enemy back
- to Katia in the course of the day.
On the morning of the 6th the enemy was found to have retired from Katia, and the mounted troops took up the pursuit.
The Turkish rearguards fought stubbornly against the direct pressure of the mounted troops. The independent mobile col-
. umn with its camelmen, however, working right round the enemy's southern flank, fought a very skilful and successful little action on the yth which no doubt had a great effect in hastening the retreat; and by the evening of the Sth the enemy
- was at Bir el'Abd, some 20 m. E. of the Romani battlefield.
On Aug. 9 the mounted troops made an attempt to envelop the enemy's position and to cut off his further retreat. This attempt was unsuccessful, and a direct dismounted attack was launched which also failed to dislodge the Turks, who made
[several determined counter-attacks. During the loth and nth
j the situation at this point remained unchanged. But in the meantime the independent mobile column again worked round the enemy's left and fought a sharp action on the nth, as a result of which the enemy evacuated Bir el 'Abd during the night. The pursuit had to be abandoned on the I2th, and the remnant of the Turkish force retired to El 'Arish.
Out of a force of about 18,000 troops the enemy must have lost about half. Four thousand prisoners, a mountain battery and a number of machine-guns were left in Gen. Lawrence's hands, besides other booty; but the enemy was able to withdraw his heavy howitzers in spite of the difficulty of moving them through
- the soft desert sand. It is impossible to say under what pressure
Col. Kress von Kressenstein undertook this forlorn hope, nor what real prospects he or his superiors conceived it to offer. It failed completely, with the loss of half the force employed. Yet even so Kress may perhaps be accounted fortunate. Somewhat earlier and more vigorous handling of the 52nd Div. against the snemy's right, at the time when his left began to give way on (Vug. 4-5, might have rendered it very difficult to extricate any- considerable portion of the Turkish force. Again, as was indi- cated by the successes of the miniature independent mobile
- olumn during the pursuit, wider envelopment, especially on the
southern flank, by the mounted troops might have effected more
- han the direct pursuit actually undertaken, and might have
- ut off the retreat of more of the enemy's troops and guns. It
should be said, however, that the weather was exceedingly hot
and trying for white troops; the difficulties of watering in the desert were very great; and the going in the soft sand of that part of Sinai was so bad that the infantry rate of marching was reduced to 15 m. a day.
After this action the enemy remained about El 'Arish on the Egyptian frontier, with an advance force at Bir el Mazar, over 40 m. E. of Romani. Apart from a successful reconnaissance in force against Bir el Mazar, carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div. in the middle of Sept., no further fighting took place for a considerable period. The enemy, made nervous by the proof of extended radius of action given by the appearance of Gen. Lawrence's mounted troops before Bir el Mazar, withdrew all his forces to the neighbourhood of El 'Arish.
The instructions given to Sir Archibald Murray by the War Cabinet about this time were to the effect that the policy in Egypt was to be mainly defensive, though all preparations should be made for an advance on El 'Arish. Sir Archibald took occasion to point out that he adhered to his previously expressed opinion that, in order both to occupy El 'Arish and to be able effectively to operate from that neighbourhood against an invader on any of the routes crossing Sinai, he required at least five divisions and four mounted brigades. Actually at this time he had only four divisions available for the defence of Egypt on the E., though he disposed of a sufficiency of mounted troops. Nevertheless, in the situation as it then was, he signified his willingness to defend Egypt and to undertake the advance on El 'Arish with the troops actually at his disposal.
After the action at Romani, therefore, arrangements were actively pressed forward for the advance across the desert to El 'Arish and the Egyptian frontier. In Sept. Gen. Lawrence left to take up a new command elsewhere, and was succeeded by Lt.-Gen. Sir Charles Dobell, to whom Sir Archibald Murray now entrusted the whole of the forces in the Sinai Peninsula and on the Suez Canal. Sir Charles Dobell's command was called the " Eastern Force " of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
In the great ebb and flow of the war as a whole, the autumn of 1916 marked, almost everywhere, a turning-point. In the main theatre in the W. the great battle of the Somme roared to a conclusion far more momentous than appeared to those who were looking only for a definite breaking of the German line. In the Russian theatre, on the other hand, high-water mark had been reached in the summer, and Brussilov had been checked. In Rumania von Falkenhayn and later von Mackensen swept over the country to the lines of the Sereth. In the Balkans Gen. Sarrail had captured Monastir, but his offensive had failed to bring relief to the Rumanians. Greece was in a state border- ing on chaos. Everywhere in Europe the superficial signs seemed to indicate either turn of tide or definite ebb. In the eastern theatres affairs seemed somewhat better. The Russian front had been reconstituted in Armenia, though there was little prog- ress anywhither. In Mesopotamia, since the fall of Kut, the hot weather and the necessity for reorganization and prepara- tion had forced a suspension of active operations. Only in the Sinai desert was any forward movement in progress, one of the least of all the eddies of the war. In Arabia, the Grand Sherif of Mecca had proclaimed independence of Turkey.
The new Government in England, pressed by man-power ques- tions after the losses in the Somme battle and increasingly feel- ing the submarine menace, probably turned its eyes rather nat- urally to the eastern theatres for something to show in the way of success, when Sir Stanley Maude's preparations should have been made, the Arabs should be in motion, and Sir Archibald Murray nearing El 'Arish. In any case it was pointed out to Sir Archibald Murray early in Dec. that the gaining of a military success in his theatre was very desirable. Sir Archibald Murray continued to adhere firmly to his original opinion that a fifth division would be necessary if he was to hold and to operate from El 'Arish, and he asked for a sixth division if he should be required to make any further advance. In reply, he was told that the War Cabinet was not prepared to send him additional troops. He was to make the utmost effort during the winter, but his primary mission was the defence of Egypt.
