the whole favourable, General Dobell reported accordingly to Sir Archibald Murray, being careful, however, to add that all would depend on whether or not the enemy's resistance could be broken before nightfall on the day of attack; if the decision should be longer delayed the Turkish force from Tellesh Sharia would probably interfere, and water difficulties might in any case make it necessary to draw off the attacking force. On the whole Gen. Dobell thought the game worth the candle. Sir Archibald Murray, after hesitation, signified his consent.
The problem with which Gen. Dobell had to deal was no easy one. Surprise and celerity were the two essentials. In order to retain the element of surprise he must strike while yet his ad- vanced base was so far off that the Turks should think them- selves securely beyond his reach. Actually, when the operation was launched, his railhead was full 20 m. from Gaza. This involved an exceedingly difficult series of approach marches to- the place of concentration, in a country where water was very scarce, supplies wholly lacking, and concealment by day very hard to secure. A considerable portion of the force had three consecutive marches to make under these conditions in order to reach the scene of action undiscovered. The movement once started, therefore, no alteration or postponement was possible without the practical certainty of its being discovered, and the chance being lost for all. Moreover, in order so far as possible to insure a rapid decision, Gen. Dobell was obliged to employ a large force. There were two and a half Turkish divisions somewhat weak, it is true at, and within a day's march of, Gaza. General Dobell employed the Desert Column (two mounted divisions and the 53rd Div.), the 52nd and 54th Divs. and the Imperial Camel Bde. But even the difficulties of moving this force in secrecy to a place of concentration 20 m. in advance Df railhead were less than the difficulties of providing it there with the necessary ammunition, water and supplies, and of maintaining that provision during the action. The whole of the transport of the Eastern Force had to be pooled and rearranged. The troops had to be deprived of all but the barest minimum. Fifteen " trains," each carrying one day's supplies for a mounted 'division or a division, were improvised in about as many days. Camel water convoys were prepared. Ammunition columns .vere specially grouped and organized. Every available horse, nule and camel, every available cart and waggon, Ford car and
- aterpillar tractor, whatever its normal use, was pressed into
his service. The troops marched with the barest essentials. And, as the result no small feat of organization two mounted 1 livisions were given a 30-111. radius of action, two and a half livisions a 2o-m. radius of action, and the remaining half divi- ion what was required to enable it to protect and assist the line 1 if communication from railhead forward.
1 In essence, then, the operation was a raid on a great scale, and, .s has been said, Gen. Dobell made it clear that he considered hat success depended on his being able to force the surrender of he Gaza garrison before dusk on the day of attack. He came rithin an ace of succeeding.
The concentration took place successfully and without alarm-
'ig the Turks by the night of March 25-26. In the early hours
'f March 26 the mounted troops crossed the Wadi Ghuzze to
urround Gaza from the N. to the S.E.; thus they would be in
position to cut off the retreat of the garrison and to prevent or
| luch delay the arrival of Turkish reinforcements whether from
he N. or from the direction of Tellesh Sharia. The sard Div.,
'hich was to attack the enemy's position on the heights E. and S.
f Gaza, of which 'Ali Muntar was the chief feature, followed the
minted troops, and was in turn followed by the 54th Div.,
D support the 53rd and to protect its exposed right flank.
' The mounted screen was in position, though not without
elay, yet in good time. The infantry was late owing to a cause
' r hich no one could either have foreseen or prevented. As
awn broke a dense fog spread over the land from the sea. The
roops could only grope their way slowly and uncertainly. They
ere delayed in reaching their position of deployment. No
Attack could be delivered until the fog had cleared. Nor did the
- >g clear until 8 o'clock, when two precious hours had been lost.
At the end of the day those two hours would in all human prob- ability have made victory complete.
By 10 A.M. the battle was joined. By the early afternoon the 53rd Div. had fought its way close to its objectives. But the Turkish position was very strong, and the ground over which the attackers fought their way forward was absolutely devoid of cover. General Chetwode, then, ordered the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div. to attack the town from the N. and N.E., while the Imperial Mounted Div. and the Camel Bde. were to extend so as to take over the screen on the N. of Gaza as well as on the E., though the Turkish reinforcements were already seen to be approaching from N., N.E. and S.E.
Before 5 o'clock the 53rd Div., strengthened by a brigade of the 54th, had taken 'Ali Muntar and had pushed beyond the crest of the line of heights overlooking Gaza. The Australians and New Zealanders were in the north-eastern outskirts of the town, fighting among the cactus hedges. N.E. and E. of the battle, the weakened mounted screen held off the enemy rein- forcements, but was being slowly forced to give ground.
Two more hours of daylight were required. Gaza lies in, and is bordered by, an immense labyrinth of great cactus hedges, impossible to fight through and clear by night. The 53rd Div. and part of the 54th were extended on the hills over Gaza on a line facing nearly N.W. Below among the houses and cactus hedges was the Gaza garrison, still not surrendered. Bearing down on the very point of the exposed right flank of the 53rd Div. was a strong Turkish force, now within a few miles. Ap- proaching the back of that same exposed right flank was another strong Turkish force, also within a few miles, coming from the direction of Tellesh Sharia. The thin mounted screen could not long delay these forces; no water had been found for the horses all day, and it must in any case be soon withdrawn. Part of the 54th Div. protected what was now the rear of the 53rd on the Mansura and Sheikh 'Abbas ridges S. of Gaza. One brigade of the 52nd Div. was available and no more. This was far from sufficient to protect the right of the 53rd Div. in its actual posi- tion, and at the same time to join it securely with the 54th. The one day's fighting, for which alone it had been possible to make effective arrangements as regards water supply, was drawing to a close. No water had been found in the Wadi Ghuzze or elsewhere by the parties detailed to search for it; and the water supply of the troops already engaged was now a matter of some anxiety. Half an hour before sunset, then, there were two alternatives. One was to launch the 53rd Div. and the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div. down into Gaza in an attempt by night to clear up, or even to drive back into the Wadi Ghuzze, the disorganized remnants of the garrison, while using the 54th Div. and the Imperial Mounted Div. as a rearguard during the night. The other was to withdraw the mounted troops while the way between Gaza and the Turkish reinforcements was still open, and to form some sort of line on the ground won, by advancing the left of the 54th Div. and retiring the right of the 53rd until the two flanks met in a secure junction. General Dobell thought the former alternative, on a dark night, in unknown and extremely intricate country, with strong enemy reinforcements already on the very outskirts of the battle, too hazardous. General Chetwode, who was at this time at Gen. Dobell's command post, emphatically agreed.
The second alternative was, therefore, adopted, and Sir Archibald Murray, who had come up in his travelling paste de commandemenl on the railway to Khan Yunis, within a few miles of the action, was informed accordingly. Several hours later Gen. Dobell received from Cairo the decipher of an intercepted wireless message sent by the enemy commander in Gaza indi- cating his intention to surrender. This message had been sent in the early evening. Its receipt by Gen. Dobell was too late. But even had it reached him earlier it is not easy to see how, with darkness actually falling and the enemy's reinforcements at hand, he was to have taken advantage of it. The two hours' fog on the morning had destroyed his opportunity.
The new dispositions ordered were successfully taken up dur- ing the night not without protest from the commander of the
